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ENTERTAINING THE IDEA:  
SHAKESPEARE, PHILOSOPHY,  
AND PERFORMANCE

To entertain is to delight and amuse (Hamlet wants no “lenten entertain-
ment”), but also to receive guests and hence to court risk, from the real 
dangers of rape, murder, or jealousy (Lucrece, Macbeth, The Winter’s Tale) 
to the more intangible exhilaration of self-disclosure and captivation in 
response to another (Romeo and Juliet, As You Like It, Twelfth Night). To 
entertain an idea is to welcome a compelling thought or beckoning fiction 
into the disinhibited zone of speculative play. “I’ll entertain the offer’d 
fallacy,” says Antipholus of Syracuse as he abandons himself to the com-
edy of errors (2.2.183).1 Like Antipholus, readers of fictions and viewers 
of plays entertain “themes” and “dreams” (2.2.178–9) on their way to rec-
ognition and new knowledge, as a mode of testing the significance and 
reach of the suppositions they encounter in a world co-created by their 
imaginative participation. To entertain an idea is to take it in, accom-
modate and pay attention to it, give it breathing room, dwell with it for a 
time. The conceit of entertaining an idea suggests a temporary visitation 
or trial period, a flirtation that might turn into more, but for now is a 
fling, a temporary affair. This welcoming gesture recognizes the mul-
tiple sensory channels through which an idea may take shape – not only 
through vision or abstract cogitation (the Platonic ground of the idea 
as a species of form or discernible shape) but also in vision’s concert or 
tension with haptic and auditory impressions. The idea so entertained is 
necessarily a stranger, and to invite a stranger into one’s parlour, closet, 
or confidence is to accept risk by exposing oneself and one’s house-
hold, including the household of the soul, to unknown incursions or 
visitations. The practice of entertaining ideas suggests a ruminative and 
meditative approach to thought, inviting us to think of philosophy as a 
form of hospitality and a kind of mental theatre. From this perspective, 
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Shakespeare’s plays supply readers, listeners, viewers, and performers of 
diverse backgrounds with equipment for living. Shakespeare solicits us 
to be more alert, more critically self-aware, more responsive to the tex-
ture of an encounter, whether in the intimacies of private bonds, the 
bustle of social life, the tangled arenas of political action, or the turbu-
lent eddies of ethical decision.
Just as the conceit of entertaining carries diverse accents, so too the 
semantic range of the aesthetic “idea” harbours complex legacies that 
are variously reactivated on Shakespeare’s stage. Erwin Panofsky’s land-
mark study Idea: A Concept in Art Theory remains a touchstone guide to the 
dominant philosophical and aesthetic theories of the idea, from Greek 
antiquity through the Renaissance, that percolated into Shakespeare’s 
artisanal culture. From the perspective Panofsky unfolds, the lingua 
franca of the idea in Renaissance art theory turns in part on the genera-
tive tension and play between Platonic and Aristotelian perceptions of 
the origin and potency of the idea (and its semantic cognates, disegno 
interno and concetto), construed as both transcendently derived copy and 
humanly crafted rival, respectively, of metaphysical realities.2 As Panof-
sky argues, “The concept of Idea as reinterpreted in the Renaissance … 
secured freedom to the artistic mind and at the same time limited this 
freedom vis-à-vis the claims of reality.”3 In this body of thought, the limit 
at stake is less a milestone in the supposed march toward a purely imma-
nent secular order than a threshold posture, engaging both the mind’s 
observation of nature and the contemplation of metaphysical intuitions 
of reality as speculative exercises that continually test – and entertain – 
the permeable boundaries between the known, the unknown, and the 
realm of conjectural possibility.
In Shakespeare’s era, the enveloping background to this dynamic of 
aesthetic energies entertained a vibrant traffic in ideas about the nature 
of the secular world that carried impressions inherited from Augustine’s 
influential understanding of secularity. Augustine’s saeculum, described 
in the City of God, denotes an inherently ambiguous “middle ground” 
poised between sacred and profane orders, a provisional composite of 
earthly and heavenly cities: “In truth, those two cities are interwoven 
and intermixed in this era, and await separation at the last judgment.”4 
For Augustine, the secular dimension to human history meant that it 
contained “no signposts to sacred meaning, no landmarks to the his-
tory of salvation,” no providentially guaranteed link between Roman 
Empire and Christianity.5 “In declaring the saeculum to be largely opaque 
to human scrutiny,” Peter Brown suggests, “Augustine protected the 
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richness of human culture from the hubris of those who wanted to relate 
every aspect of the world around them directly to the sacred” – or to the 
political administration and cannibalization of the sacred.6
For Augustine, the autonomy of the saeculum was not, of course, an 
absolute title. Neither can it be viewed in hindsight as the direct harbin-
ger of modern secular liberalism, with its imagined partition between 
private and public spheres of interest. Both the visible church (the com-
munity of believers) and the secular order, though distinct from each 
other, were co-implicated in the parenthetical and radically contingent 
time – Robert A. Markus calls this the “eschatological gap” – between 
the Christ event and the eschaton.7 Augustine’s proposed dilation 
of parenthetical temporality may well have helped protect the rich-
ness of late antique human culture for a time, precisely by holding a 
residual attachment to the “cosmopolitan and pluralistic” ethos of the 
 Hellenistic-Roman paideia, even as it also opened a space for the eventual 
ascendancy of the institutional infrastructure of “sacral Christendom” in 
the medieval era.8 However, Augustine’s sense of the opacity of events 
unfolding in the parenthetical time of the saeculum may well have turned 
out to be the more enduring dimension of his thinking about the nature 
of human affairs on the stage of the world vis-à-vis their ultimate ends. 
Certainly, by Shakespeare’s time the secular world conjured and embod-
ied in theatrical performance presents an unevenly distributed terrain 
of insiders and outsiders, with shifting degrees of inter-confessional and 
transcultural accommodation, conflict, complicity, and literacy that call 
for – and entertain – a “hermeneutics of attentiveness” to the human 
condition of plurality.9
For four centuries Shakespeare’s plays have invited directors, actors, 
audiences, and readers to entertain a startling range of ideas: succour, 
social discord, and states of nature in King Lear and The Tempest; self-
disclosure through amorous role playing in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
Twelfth Night, and As You Like It; habit and virtue as well as irony and 
anxiety in Hamlet; the force of cursing in Richard III; or acknowledgment, 
presence, wonder, and love in The Winter’s Tale, to announce a few of the 
ideas welcomed and weighed in this volume. Written during the event-
ful reshuffling of sacred verities and the launching of political and eco-
nomic forms that are with us still, Shakespearean drama is intimately 
concerned with what it means to act, speak, live, and listen in a world 
whose points of orientation must be continually re-established. The 
2016–17 Clark Library Core Program at UCLA, “Entertaining the Idea,” 
staged a series of rapprochements between performance and philosophy 
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in Shakespearean drama, conversations designed both to illumine the 
plays in their poetic and theatrical amplitude and to explore what phi-
losophy and performance might offer each other in twenty-first-century 
literary studies. In this volume, performance refers not to an archive of 
particular stagings but rather to the inherently enactive character of core 
ethical concepts such as acknowledgment, virtue, habit, love, judgment, 
and care. The resulting volume, which features some of the most inven-
tive scholars working in philosophically oriented Shakespeare studies 
today, aims to take up drama’s capacity to enhance experience, exer-
cise discernment, test existential limits, and assert common bonds. Such 
actions occur within the historical horizons in which Shakespeare lived 
and wrote, but have been renewed in the recollective history of adapta-
tion, translation, performance, and critical response, and our contribu-
tors are united by their attention to the rhythm of this renewal.
Walter Benjamin’s The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, published in 
1928, remains an exemplary work of philosophical criticism. Benjamin 
approached the drama of Shakespeare’s age under the rubric of the 
Baroque Trauerspiel or mourning play, and he gives special prominence 
to the idea in his analysis of theatre: “In the sense in which it is treated in 
the philosophy of art the Trauerspiel is an Idea.”10 By dramatizing Trauer-
spiel (modern drama) as an idea, Benjamin was distinguishing his project 
from both literary history, which, he argued, relativizes and homogenizes 
real differences among works, and aesthetic classification, which elevates 
genres into standards that exclude exceptional works and leads to a flat-
tening of artistic production. To entertain Trauerspiel as an idea is to stake 
out modern drama’s animating conditions and goals, even and especially 
when, as in the case of Shakespeare, these works fall short of classical 
genre prescriptions. Herder was the first philosopher-critic to recognize 
the import of Shakespeare’s movement beyond genre, a transit Herder 
then applied retroactively to classical drama, which he liberated from 
its own rules.11 Benjamin is working within Herder’s hermeneutic. It is 
in the spirit of Herder, for example, that Benjamin makes his famous 
declaration: “A major work will either establish the genre or abolish it; 
and the perfect work will do both.”12 In her project on “books of second 
chances,” to which her chapter in this volume belongs, Sarah Beckwith 
treats The Winter’s Tale as initiating its own distinctive line of ethical and 
aesthetic inquiry, one that cannot be confined to tragedy or romance and 
that includes works of fiction, cinema, and philosophy in its generous 
embrace. In these and other works, Shakespearean drama often finds 
itself moving away from tragedy – inhabiting tragedy’s generic architecture 
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only to sound impulses beyond the tragic – in a manner that you will see 
tracked in different ways throughout this volume. Anselm Haverkamp 
calls Hamlet “a post-tragic hero,” Sanford Budick maps the redemptive 
flow between Lear and The Winter’s Tale, and Paul Kottman argues that 
Shakespeare is not only moving beyond tragedy in works like The Tempest, 
he is also moving beyond art, an insight affirmed by theatre critic Charles 
McNulty in his Afterword, “On (Not) Performing King Lear.”
Whereas Herder works primarily through the concept of historical 
genius, Benjamin emphasizes instead the condition of creaturely life 
(kreatürliches Leben) and the condition of being created (Erschöpfungszustand).13 
Both Benjamin and Shakespeare pursue the Idea as it passes through a 
series of scriptural temporalizations, devolving into what Benjamin calls 
natural history, in which the consequences of human action metabolize 
with the physical world and materialize as ruin, desire path, and labyrinth. 
In Shakespearean drama, sublunar beings seek, avoid, or respond to the 
idea-traces impressed in their souls, secreted by their somatic processes, 
mapped by their dwelling places, projected onto the heavens, and infil-
trating their relationships with other creatures. These natural histories 
remind us of the etymological associations of the Idea, in ancient Greek 
and post-classical Latin, with the phenomenal emergence of forms – the 
play of image, likeness, and archetype – together with forms’ entailment 
in the affective genres of hope, joy, dread, and grief.14
Shakespeare’s ideas are elaborated over time as well as space, linking 
disparate moments of thought (classical, Hebrew, scholastic, humanist, 
Reformed) that take shape in landscapes sedimented by upheaval and 
distress: the carbuncled heath of King Lear, the crenelated ramparts of 
Macbeth and Hamlet, the deutero-Pauline Vienna of Measure for Measure. 
An Idea in transit, “care” precipitates from a Greco-Roman creation myth 
through the scrims of Christian theology, humoral psychology, and mod-
ern virtue ethics to form a resonant composite between medical humani-
ties and Shakespeare studies, as Sheiba Kian Kaufman demonstrates in 
her contribution to this volume. The curse is another such thought- 
fragment, as Björn Quiring argues in his piece: originating in the ancient 
juridical and ritual procedures of the Jews, the curse as ban was retooled 
in Catholic rites of excommunication and then ambiguously appropri-
ated and transformed by the Anglican Church. Shakespeare and his con-
temporaries, Quiring suggests, clarified the theatricality at the heart of 
the curse by adopting its dramatic modes of address and its de-creating 
fantasies on the public stage. In his chapter Budick focuses instead on 
the gestural, linguistic, and existential dynamics of the blessing in King 
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Lear and The Winter’s Tale, where benedictions incapable of changing fate 
still grant palpable grace to those who give and receive them. Expand-
ing this palette of theo-philosophical and liturgico-dramatic ideas, Kott-
man adds Immaculate Conception and Beckwith offers resurrection and 
incarnation, ideas re-approached for their existential wisdom rather 
than their doctrinal meanings.
Shakespeare’s overcoming of tragedy enlists the resources of comedy 
in all of its theatrical variants, from the plots of New Comedy to the 
foolery of clowns, but he drew on other tools as well, including Stoic 
spiritual exercise, as noted by James Kuzner in this volume and else-
where in his work.15 The overcoming of tragedy is never accomplished 
once and for all because it represents an existential trial, like the testing 
of Job, Jacob’s wrestling with the angel, Abraham’s binding of Isaac,16 
Jonah’s sojourn in the belly of the whale, or Christ on Calvary,17 recur-
rent scenarios in Shakespeare’s post-tragic Bible. We might conceive of 
tragedy here along the lines of Benjamin’s contemporary, the Protestant 
theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965), a friend of Adorno and Arendt. In 
The Courage To Be, Tillich associated the anxiety of death with the classical 
world; the anxiety of guilt with medieval and Reformation Christianity; 
and the anxiety of meaninglessness with the condition of secular moder-
nity.18 All three anxieties are relevant to Shakespeare, who integrated 
classical, Calvinist, and Machiavellian strains into a late medieval drama-
turgy whose resilient motifs of saints and sinners on the pilgrimage of life 
were shaken to the limit by the tremors of new thought. Shakespeare’s 
struggle with these foundational anxieties ultimately issued in what crit-
ics call the romances, but it is evident in all of his works insofar as they 
address the recurrent challenge of finding meaning, establishing trust, 
and sustaining relationships in situations of escalating scepticism. The 
repeated nature of the struggle with tragic anxiety, whether over a day, 
across a life, or among epochs, means that tragedy continues to throb 
within the corpus that creatively confronts and sublimates it. In Tillich’s 
terms, the “courage to be” always occurs “in spite of” a negativity that it 
incorporates into its styles of existence.
Anxiety so sublimated moves through irony to something else: what 
Hegel called “objective humour,” as Anselm Haverkamp argues in his 
contribution. Objective humour is not the same as comedy – but it is not 
tragedy either; its chop-fallen emblem is the skull of the jester Yorick, his 
vital laughter frozen in the new grimace of the death’s head, which in 
turn is handled with a new freedom by the contemplating Hamlet. Budick 
makes a related argument concerning the way in which Shakespeare 
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is present in his plays as an “unbodied onlooker” who doesn’t simply 
know the action to come, but who understands the “forces of being” 
unleashed in his plays, by virtue of his own prior meditative exercises. 
Budick’s Shakespeare is to his dramas as Haverkamp’s Hamlet is to Yor-
ick’s skull: each manages a sublime distance, a creative interim, that 
opens a new relationship to the world without issuing in estrangement. 
Both Haverkamp and Budick place the advent in understanding initi-
ated by Shakespeare beyond dramatic irony, since what the plays yield is 
a form of consciousness that transcends any technical achievement, and 
hence becomes philosophy.
King Lear is the most anxious, and the most tragic, of Shakespeare’s 
plays, as Samuel Johnson registered in his historic response to the 
drama. King Lear runs through this volume, in pieces by Sanford 
Budick, Sheiba Kian Kaufman, and Charles McNulty. King Lear begins 
under the shadow of the curse, hurled by the king first at his daugh-
ter Cordelia in the form of disinheritance and the withdrawal of legal 
acknowledgment, and then at his daughter Goneril in the form of a 
rant against her physical integrity and her reproductive and parental 
potential. Lear’s curses lead to his expulsion into a hostile environ-
ment of weaponized households and affective storms that eventually 
destroys not only the king but almost everyone who is near and dear to 
him. His sojourn in that landscape, however, also introduces an ethics 
of care and a poetics of benediction that imperfectly sutures the dev-
astating wounds inflicted on bodies, organs, relationships, and insti-
tutions over the course/curses of the drama. In his plays after Lear, 
Shakespeare continues to elaborate the complex relationship between 
cursing, caring, and curing, in their liturgical, medical, therapeutic, 
and poetic dimensions. Yet even in Lear, which pushes what is emotion-
ally bearable in art to its tragic limit, the highly Baroque image – in 
Benjamin’s sense – of Cordelia’s tears indexes the glittering extremes 
of affect that edge Lear from tragedy towards something else: “Those 
happy smiles / That played on her ripe lips [seemed] not to know / 
What guest were in her eyes, which parted thence / As pearls from dia-
monds dropped” (4.3). This portrait juxtaposes the petrified brilliance 
of gems with the flowing essence of weeping in a dialectical image that 
excites cogitation while arousing affect. Cordelia’s sidereal visage com-
mingles sense and sensibility, to cite Shakespeare’s most influential 
and perceptive post-tragic heir, Jane Austen. The romances that follow 
from King Lear take flight from the contrasting emotions that illumine 
Cordelia’s face.19
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Sanford Budick reads King Lear and The Winter’s Tale as pendant 
plays in dynamic exchange with each other. The mirroring operations 
of chiasmus, Budick argues, disclose a nothing at its centre that makes 
room for a transcendental yet embedded spectator: Edgar in King Lear, 
Paulina in The Winter’s Tale, and Shakespeare in both. Budick’s starting 
point is Hamlet, who moves through and beyond theatricalization from 
the very beginning of the play, disclosing purposiveness within vacilla-
tion. Sheiba Kian Kaufman’s chapter on “Care” elaborates a similar con-
tinuum between Lear and The Tempest, conducted on a more intimate 
level of human succour and attention. The Winter’s Tale is also featured 
in complementary offerings by Sarah Beckwith (on paternal love, fol-
lowing Stanley Cavell) and by Paul Kottman (on maternal love, in con-
trast with Cavell). In Shakespeare’s romances, the tragic and the comic 
refract each other like the pearls and diamonds that brim from Corde-
lia’s abyssal eyes, and terror, grief, loneliness, betrayal, and shame yield 
to a profane reconciliation that affirms mortality, guilt, and doubt as the 
conditions but not the ends of human being.
Whereas Budick emphasizes the transcendental onlooker, Jeffrey 
Knapp is interested in spectators who refuse to stay in their places, both 
within play worlds and in the theatre that houses them. Knapp’s “Enter-
tainment” begins with a number of prologues in which playwrights 
express aggression towards their audiences. Knapp then turns to Kyd’s 
Spanish Tragedy, whose internal and external theatrics display a decidedly 
mixed relationship to entertainment as a form of pleasing, hosting, and 
considering. If Shakespeare overcomes tragedy through romance, where 
does comedy fall? In Shakespeare’s fabricated worlds, comedy carves out 
the distance between the late antique and premodern scenography of 
metaphysically charged error that moves toward beatitude – Dante’s 
Comedia – and the exuberant thoroughfares of secular life captured with 
encyclopedic verve in Honoré de Balzac’s Comédie humaine. This is the 
region of irrepressible liveliness, unavoidable folly, and everyday role 
playing that is always generic in its sense of normative experiment, yet 
exceeds genre by becoming co-equal with life as a congeries of sustainable 
relationships and routines.20 Entertainment as performance and enter-
tainment as hospitality embrace this comic spectrum, as Knapp notes. 
Tzachi Zamir takes up role playing in the dramas, which he opposes to 
pretending: “To role play is not to pretend. It is to attain or maintain, to 
externalize or to share. To pretend is to be away from others; to role play 
can sometimes be the only way of being with them.” His consummate 
examples are As You Like It, in which Rosalind-as-Ganymede-as-Rosalind 
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amplifies her own being in conversation with Orlando, and Twelfth Night, 
in which Viola-as-Cesario-on-behalf-of-Orsino both verbalizes the inten-
sity of her own feelings and expresses her pain at the impossibility of full 
disclosure. Zamir also touches on the tragedies and even the Sonnets, 
but one senses that his real interest lies in role playing as a tool for living, 
and hence as a comic instrument in an existential rather than a literary 
sense. This is very much the approach of James Kuzner as well, who takes 
up love as a “way of life” in A Midsummer Night’s Dream and reads the 
play as a sceptical exercise, in the tradition of Sextus Empiricus. Initially 
caught in the brittle absolutisms of young love, the friends in the for-
est pass into a more resilient and realistic love that incorporates doubt, 
acknowledges the role of fantasy in desire, and relinquishes the certain-
ties of possession. Such a love just might endure.
“Habit” composes the infrastructure of daily life and is the subject 
of J.K. Barret’s contribution. Taking off from Aristotle, Barret explores 
the sustaining and flexible role of habit as a form of fiction that travels 
between theatrical training and daily existence. Habit in Shakespeare, 
she argues, never becomes fully automatic, but instead retains an ele-
ment of deliberative reflection that makes it into a powerful ethical tool 
as well as a key feature of theatre as an art of rehearsal. Habit, in other 
words, never completely relinquishes its relationship to judgment, the 
subject of Kevin Curran’s contribution. Judgment, unlike habit, involves 
a punctual and incisive intervention in the flow of life that distinguishes 
among actions and is itself an act. Reading judgment from Aristotle to 
Arendt, Curran argues that judgment as practised in Shakespearean 
drama is collective, physical, and inventive. For Aristotle, habit is the sup-
port of virtue, while judgment (phronesis) is a virtue; together, these two 
chapters, along with Kaufman’s work on “Care,” suggest the relevance 
of virtue ethics broadly conceived to Shakespearean drama. In the clas-
sical tradition, virtue and performance flow into each other, whether in 
Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue as habit and praxis, or in the link between 
virtue and the virtual implicit in ideas of latency and dynamism, or in the 
figure of the virtuoso as an expert performer of multiple arts and special-
ized knowledges. As a playwright, dramatic poet, and person of the the-
atre, Shakespeare tests virtue as both creative practice and serious play, 
offering up the actions of his characters to our own community-building 
and thought-refining habits of judgment.
This volume is divided into two sections. We begin with a sequence of 
shorter pieces organized around keywords that connect philosophy 
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and performance in the works of Shakespeare. This turn to keywords is 
inspired and enabled by projects like Raymond Williams’ Keywords, Émile 
Benveniste’s Vocabulaire, and the Dictionary of Untranslatables, sweeping 
works that excavate cultural and conceptual vocabularies.21 The goal for 
this collection is more open-ended and epistemologically modest: to use 
keywords to create or discover or unlock conversational spaces in which 
philosophy and performance speak to and with each other. These brief 
exercises are designed to help readers think creatively about Shakespeare, 
philosophy, and performance by providing conceptual tools supported 
by exemplary readings of works by Shakespeare, his contemporaries, 
and his heirs. In “Role Playing,” Tzachi Zamir shows how role playing 
in Shakespeare is both creative and melancholic and extends to the way 
that characters think as well as act. In “Habit,” J.K. Barret argues that the 
iterative process of theatrical rehearsal and performance, borrowed from 
rhetorical exercises and Aristotelian ethics, contributes to Shakespear-
ean character-formation as problem and project. In “Acknowledgment,” 
Sarah Beckwith compellingly compares Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale 
and the film L’enfant as stagings of knowing and its avoidance in the tra-
dition of Cavell and Wittgenstein. Jeffrey Knapp addresses the keyword 
entertainment, using Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy to explore the ambivalence 
of audience relationships in the drama of the period and beyond. Kevin 
Curran addresses judgment as a term shared by philosophical, legal, 
and theatrical scriptings of deliberation. James Kuzner takes up Pierre 
Hadot’s definition of philosophy as a way of life to read Shakespeare’s 
evaluative enactments of love in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Björn Quir-
ing invokes curse as an inherently dramatic speech act with biblical and 
thaumaturgic foundations. An alternative and supplement to the world-
shaking animus of the curse is care, the concept analysed by Sheiba Kian 
Kaufman as a mode of comportment that transforms individual concern 
into collaborative possibility in the social work of the stage.
These shorter pieces aim to be portable and teachable, sparking con-
nections among texts and disciplines. This section is followed by a cluster 
of chapters that attend to and create moments in which Shakespeare 
and philosophy meet.22 Sanford Budick provides a compelling account 
of the deep relationship between King Lear and The Winter’s Tale in Shake-
speare’s unfolding philosophical project; building on Kant and Husserl, 
Budick links the “now” of performance to philosophy’s transcendental 
perspective and he boldly discovers in Shakespeare a knowledge beyond 
theatricalization. Anselm Haverkamp argues for the centrality of Hamlet 
to the philosophy of Hegel; through a series of meticulous and revelatory 
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readings, Haverkamp shows how Hegel derived from Hamlet a form of 
objective humour that conceived of the world as history. Finally, Paul 
Kottman turns to both Hegel and Cavell. Hegel’s commentary on the 
passionless character of parental love, manifested above all by paintings 
of the Virgin Mary, re-centres The Winter’s Tale on Leontes’s refusal to 
acknowledge Hermione’s role as a mother in the lives of their children. 
Whereas Beckwith zooms in on the challenge of acknowledging pater-
nity that animates Cavell’s foundational reading of The Winter’s Tale, Kott-
man draws our attention to maternal love as a form of self-relation upon 
which fathers, including God the Father, depend.
The volume concludes with an afterword by Charles McNulty, award-
winning drama critic for the Los Angeles Times. McNulty has seen and 
reviewed many of the major productions of King Lear staged in the past 
two decades and has read deeply in earlier Shakespeare criticism from 
Jonson to Bradley. McNulty brings a performance perspective to the 
debate about page and stage that the great nineteenth-century readers 
of King Lear took up with such intelligence and evaluative insight, dem-
onstrating in his writing what dramatic criticism can be today.
Although all of the contributors to this volume seek ideas in Shake-
speare and honour Shakespeare’s own intellectual questing, our inter-
locutors resist placing ideas “behind” or “beneath” the text, striving 
instead to show how wisdom, judgment, and consciousness are pursued 
through action and exercise in the medium of drama as it overlaps with 
the conduct and adventure of life. To entertain an idea is to care for it, 
to consider its intentionality, history, rhythm, and emergent organiza-
tion with the kind of attention that an actor devotes to a part, or teachers 
devote to the learning of their students. As philosopher Milton Mayeroff 
argues in his classic essay On Caring, “In working out a philosophical con-
cept the need to reflect on it again and again from similar and dissimilar 
points of view is not a burden forced on me; I am simply caring for the 
idea.”23 From Aristotle and the Stoics through Tillich and Mayeroff, phi-
losophy’s commitment to the formation and transformation of persons 
through spiritual exercise and the ethical and cognitive work of trust, 
care, and courage/encouragement finds its neighbour in drama’s arts 
of action, audition, and acknowledgment. Shakespeare’s plays entertain 
an idea of drama that constellates the material and the transcenden-
tal, the familiar and the unexpected, the actor and the onlooker, in an 
uneasy stand-off, at once duel and duet.24 Shakespeare pushes comedy 
and tragedy towards each other and beyond themselves, emancipated 
from generic distinctions yet continuously re-prompted by inherited 
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formulae, such as the blessing and the curse. Shakespeare’s eclectic phi-
losophy of theatre convenes various forms of performance, including 
Aristotelian habit, sceptical exercise, Socratic dialogue and role play-
ing, and experiments in phenomenological bracketing that continually 
restage occasions to welcome the arrival of new forms, new ideas, of how 
to live together.
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Anyone reading a chapter on role playing in a book such as this will 
already know that Shakespeare’s plays are fraught with deviations from 
identity: disguises, forays into cross-dressing, elaborate acts of pretence 
and of calculated deceit. Yet the blurring of the differences among these 
deviations may lead to overlooking some of the most rewarding insights 
into Shakespeare’s works. Role playing will be the notion I will probe. Role 
playing will be set apart from overlapping motifs, such as pretence, lying, 
or acting. I will then turn to some episodes – in the plays as well as in the 
sonnets – in which role playing is revealed as a formative process of self-
realization, but also as entailing unhappy disquiet.
First scenario: I inform my wife that I have just returned from murder-
ing a man who slept in another room, knowing that I did nothing 
of the kind.
Second scenario: I run to my wife, panting. I have splashed ice water on 
my face, so I appear pale. I anxiously mumble to her that I have just 
murdered a man who was sleeping in the next room, knowing that 
I did nothing of the kind.
Third scenario: I am acting Macbeth and have just returned to my wife’s 
company from Duncan’s room, shaken after murdering him.
Fourth scenario: I am investigating a murder in which the alleged killer 
has returned home to confess to his wife about the murder. I ask my 
wife to help me visualize how this conversation might have trans-
pired. I enter the room where she sits, trying to imagine what I have 
committed. I sense that I am unsure of my stride. My knees buckle. 
Noting my distress, she offers me a glass of water. My hand shakes as 





In the first scenario I am lying, intentionally giving my wife wrong infor-
mation. In the second scenario I am lying to my wife, but also pretending: 
I am not merely conveying wrong information, but also embodying my 
sense of what has come to pass. I am living as if the information were 
true, responding and talking as if I were undergoing what I know to be 
untrue. In the third scenario, while I am unfaithful to the truth, I am nei-
ther lying nor pretending. I am acting. I imagine my way into being Mac-
beth as part of an aesthetic offering to an audience. What this means is 
that while acting, I try, for example, to be deep, or complex, or original, 
or vivid. These are all aesthetic qualities that are potential constituents 
of an artistic achievement for which I can be praised or faulted. In the 
fourth scenario I am not lying, pretending, or acting. Rather, I am role 
playing, trying to embody what it would be like to live through a situation 
that is not a part of my reality.
Because acting and pretending are both embodied shifts away from 
what is known to be really occurring and because acting includes epi-
sodes of pretending, it is easy to miss the differences between them. To 
begin with, pretending is not governed by aesthetic considerations; when 
pretending, the focus is not on my art. Second, pretending is instrumen-
tal: my pretending succeeds if you accept what I want you to believe (so 
if a colleague pretends to be ill to avoid a meeting, the objective is solely 
to get others to believe that such is her situation). In acting, though, 
your beliefs are only my starting point. I fail as an actor if I make you 
believe that I am Macbeth and that I have murdered Duncan but prove 
unable to engage your emotions. On its own, your deep response is also 
insufficient to validate my acting: I can be dissatisfied with my own per-
formance even if you are moved by it (for example, I may suspect that 
my performance prompted your response in a cheap manner). Third, 
pretending aims to instil false beliefs; acting plants fictional ones (which 
also explains why acting is not a form of deception).1
Turn to role playing. Because acting and role playing are both embod-
ied departures from known truths, and because, like acting, there is also 
an exploratory dimension to role playing, an inquisitiveness relating to 
finding yourself existing in some other context, it can be easy to overlook 
their differences. Acting is an aesthetically controlled imaginative trans-
formation, an attempt to be in another way. Role playing also entails the 
attempt to be otherwise, but without this being aesthetically controlled. 
In the fourth scenario above, as I roleplayed my way into the world of the 
murderer, I was not trying to avoid clichés or looking for unpredictable 
ways to convey my nervousness, which I would have done had I acted, 
 Role Playing 21
in other words, had this been an aesthetically controlled undertaking. 
What I was focusing on was my inner state: what I saw or felt or did when 
trying to become the murderer.
Role playing is an attempt to imagine your way into realizing an alien 
possibility. It can be a form of existential amplification in which you 
momentarily step outside the prescribed limits of your identity, actualiz-
ing a potential to be other than you are. Role-playing games, sexual role 
playing, masquerades, exploratory metamorphoses – these are all com-
mitted imaginative embodiments that are unrelated to art and hence are 
not forms of acting but of being other.2
Because this is a chapter about imaginative movements away from 
identity rather than about strategies of deception, it would be expedi-
ent to set aside pretending and lying. Some of Shakespeare’s characters 
lie or pretend, but this will not be my focus. As for acting, what is rid-
dling about Shakespeare’s attitude to it, is that if you glean his plays for 
insights on acting, you will be squeezing a rather dry lemon. Yes, Hamlet 
admires actors, warning Polonius that they may soil reputations. There 
are also scenes in which characters are moved by acting. Sometimes bad 
acting is geared as a trope for something. Once or twice the image of an 
actor forgetting his lines is employed. Disappointingly, that’s about it. 
Such an outcome is puzzling in light of Shakespeare’s own acting career 
and his ongoing interactions with fellow actors throughout his creative 
life. It is striking that a man who writes his way so perceptively into the 
minds of kings and war heroes, braggarts and servants, into the psyche 
of a Cleopatra, or a baptized Moor, a stigmatized Jew or a raped woman, 
says so little when writing about acting, a subject matter so near to his 
heart.
All acting students are treated, at least once, to Hamlet’s admonition 
to actors: avoid exaggerations; be faithful to nature; fit words to actions. 
These are hardly profundities. What they reveal is that Shakespeare 
regarded acting merely as a craft. Like other crafts – even those more 
reputable than acting – acting was for him no more than a financially 
motivated activity. His pen was drawn to the underlying currents, not 
to their superficial manifestations. Of acting, that underlying current 
is role playing. And – unlike his characters’ hackneyed comments on 
 acting – when it came to role playing, Shakespeare gave us gold.
Shakespeare wrote in a period for which the identification of living with 
role playing was already a platitude. Theatrum mundi, the perception 
of the world as a theatre, beheld (or not) by bemused overseers, was 
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ubiquitous. That Shakespeare puts it in the mouth of tedious Jacques 
suggests that he did not enthusiastically endorse it. “All the world is a 
stage, and men and women are merely players,” says this caustic man, 
who loves nothing more than the sound of his own voice. It is remark-
able how often one is subjected to this line along with the “Seven Ages of 
Man” speech (As You like It, 2.7.138–65), as if it conveyed the Bard’s own 
view. It matters not that no one in the play takes Jacques seriously, least of 
all the impressive characters, who dismiss him and his wisdom as idiotic 
irrelevancies as soon as they meet him.
In fact, one of the most subtly touching moments in Shakespeare is 
Orlando’s stage entry carrying Adam upon his back just after Jacques 
completes his description of living as performing. Old age, Jacques has 
just confidently declared, is nothing but a second childhood: squeak-
ing old voices, trousers that have become oversized, the decline into an 
unappealing baby. Yet just as he says this, in comes Orlando with his 
unquestioning commitment to an old servant.3 Orlando demonstrates 
how the dependency of old age need not be mere disempowerment. The 
weakness that comes with age affords an opportunity to experience grati-
tude, the rewards of the good done by others in the past. You gave. Now 
something is given to you, not as repayment, but as the reciprocation 
of a loving gesture. Does Jacques see this? No. Does he hear it? No. His 
myopia – perceiving merely ugly caricatures around him, his theatrical-
ization of life – are all dregs floating in the same muddied pond that he 
mistakes for disenchanted wisdom.
I believe that Shakespeare cannot share Jacques’s version of theatrum 
mundi because Jacques is unaware of the distinction between role play-
ing and pretending, a distinction time and again dramatized in Shake-
speare’s work. Jacques talks of acting and equates acting with pretending. 
This means that when existence is a serialization of roles performed, 
life amounts to variations on an embodied aping of something other. 
Jacques misses the overlap between acting and role playing. By contrast, 
what Shakespeare finds is that embodied make-believe, role playing, can 
be a gateway into touching reality, not just a vehicle for its avoidance. 
This insight is repeatedly realized in episodes in which his characters 
are role playing. (That such role playing is itself set in motion as part 
of acting - a real actor’s enactment of a fictional character immersed in 
role playing – amounts to a reframing, which does not alter what such 
episodes show about role playing as such.)
The very play featuring the “Seven Ages of Man” speech presents 
the capacity of role playing to establish love. Rosalind, role playing as 
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Ganymede, tutors Orlando into wooing a woman in the most effective 
way. Ganymede voices dimensions of Rosalind’s being – vulgar humour, 
sexuality, wit – that ought to be suppressed in her cultural context. Rosa-
lind is aware, too, that apart from violating expected norms, these sides 
of her will prove unpalatable to Orlando. She is cognizant of this because 
she has taken a look at his sonnets, Orlando’s graffiti on Arden’s trees, 
recognizing that an angel is what he pines for. The Rosalind of Orlando’s 
dreams is a meek being serenely accepting his honourable courtship. Per-
haps, after months of timid wooing, she would guardedly grant him a lock 
of hair. Alas, Rosalind is no Juliet. She is more of an adolescent version of 
a Cleopatra, envisaging bedding him after tying his arms with her scarves. 
“My Rosalind is fair,” he whispers in devotion. “I would have you out of 
your apparel,” she dryly tells him as Ganymede. She, for him, resembles a 
sublime idol. He, for her, resembles a Chippendale performer.
This experience of being released into a fuller subjectivity is no private 
affair, but an interpersonal feat. Rosalind is not merely expressing sexual 
desire or an unbridled sense of humour that happen to disagree with 
norms of femininity. She does so while conversing with Orlando. The 
self is not only a ready-made entity coming into contact with other selves, 
like interacting billiard balls. Rather, the self is, to an extent, a cluster 
of occurrences. You are not just a you, but a happening. You happen in 
and between other self-happenings. And some of these self-happenings 
require an imaginative embodiment whereby you work yourself into 
being other.
Another example for such self-happening within a role is how loy-
alty, friendship, and filial gratitude intersect with role playing in King 
Lear. Kent’s very being consists of his fidelity to Lear. Yet when, through 
becoming Caius, Kent’s unwavering allegiance becomes an extended 
taxing gift to Lear, a gift that will not be reciprocated or even acknowl-
edged, something in Kent’s essence gets distilled even further. His loyalty 
becomes prodigal, ripening into the unconditional love Lear was yearn-
ing for. Edgar, too, chooses to remain undisclosed to his blind father. He 
leads him on while succeeding in remaining a son. Perhaps Edgar real-
izes that nothing being said could rectify what has been undone by his 
father. “How could Isaac go on living with Abraham after what elapsed 
between them?,” Edgar may have wondered, deciding to role play his 
way into preserving something of the son. To role play is not to pretend. 
It is to attain or maintain, to externalize or to share. To pretend is to be 
away from others; to role play can sometimes be the only way of being 
with them.
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Need we speculate about Shakespeare’s own homoerotic tendencies, 
about the particular attraction of theatre for him and the appeal of a 
mask-enabled acting of same-sex love in public settings? Could this safe-
zone also be the wellspring of his ability to recognize and vividly linger 
upon how theatricalizing a life can amount to not merely an evasion, but 
self-realization? We may ponder this; we are not compelled to, though. 
When writing words daily intended to assume the flesh and blood of 
actors, the manner whereby some lines bring out more than play cannot 
be missed.
Macbeth’s lament over his wife is a potent example. Commenting 
upon one of the lines – “Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player / 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no 
more” – Ian McKellen notes how the text drives the actor delivering the 
lines to no longer speak in character. If life is a poor player that will 
all too soon vanish, and if that is what I am doing now, as actor, Shake-
speare’s words force me to face not my in-character experience, but my 
real one. What the line points to is the ephemeral nature of the genuine 
focus, now bestowed upon the genuine me – how it, how all of it, signifies 
nothing. When writing for actors, it is possible to configure a fictional 
context of role playing in which a truth that transcends the role playing 
is being encountered and then channelled back into the role played, 
animating the performance.4
Regardless of where and how Shakespeare discovered life’s interlacing 
with role playing, it is important not to overlook how such episodes are 
not only celebrated as indubitable positives. Apprehension, or some 
sense of lack, always shadows such moments.
Shakespeare could have been cheerful through and through: people 
sometimes become who they are by virtue of what they imagine through 
acts of role playing. Instead, the processes he depicts involve characters 
growing into their identities, but also foregoing something. Characters may 
lose their way because of a role. This happens to Rosalind, who fails con-
trolling Ganymede. It may also be occurring to Hamlet, who puts on 
an antic disposition but suspects that he is genuinely losing his sanity. 
Characters may also be endangered by the roles they play. This transpires 
when others mistake them for someone other. Such is exemplified by 
Viola, who is challenged to a potentially mortal duel. Characters may 
unwittingly harm others because of their role playing: women undergo 
the torments of love after falling for Viola and for Rosalind, mistak-
ing them for men. Role playing causes characters to discover hurtful 
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information that they would rather avoid. Such is Portia’s lot when Bas-
sanio tells her that his love for his wife is merely skin deep. Characters 
can intentionally demean each other through role playing, as when Hull 
and Falstaff pretend to be father and son, and the would-be king exploits 
the opportunity to shift from friendly ridicule to cruel abuse by insisting 
that Falstaff is a nothing. Even when characters experience love in and 
through role playing, they are evading some other contact: such is evi-
dent in the relationship between Rosalind and Orlando when, because 
Rosalind’s role playing is shared with the audience and Celia but not 
with Orlando, the romance as a whole assumes the quality of an affair.
Role playing is an attainment. It is also, however, a danger and a loss.
When thinking of Shakespearean role playing, it is confining to consider 
merely masks, disguises, and donned personas – the Duke of Vienna as 
Friar Lodowick, Portia as Balthazar, Falstaff as the fat woman of Brainford. 
We ought to think in broader terms, of episodes in which role playing is 
mentalized. At such moments, role playing is vocalized, but not embodied.
Consider the first words spoken between Romeo and Juliet, that mutual 
plunge into a game of make-believe in which she becomes a holy statue 
and Romeo her devoted pilgrim. The exchange is too brief to amount 
to role playing, even less to a role playing that another is meant to be 
taken in by. Coordinates of an imaginary situation get borrowed, but the 
players are not immersing themselves in roles. Rather, they are impro-
vising, indicating what they might say or do. This game of make-believe 
is fleeting; it is delicate – the purpose is to give structure to love; and it 
differs from imagining another as something else, as, say, when Romeo 
imagines Juliet’s face to be a battlefield upon which death is advancing, 
or when Juliet imagines cutting Romeo up into little stars. This is not to 
see X as Y, but to momentarily perform as if X were Y, to speak to X as if he 
were Y, to fancy how X would relate to you were she Y. Three centuries 
later, Stanislavski will write that this as if is the heart of acting.
Because what we are presently considering are examples not merely 
of disguised characters, but of brief yet intense forays into a mindscape 
in which a role is playfully adopted, the threshold between drama and 
poetry becomes blurry. Consider sonnets that involve such imaginary 
odysseys into what the speaker would do or feel if he were someone 
other, for example, Sonnet 57:
Being your slave, what should I do but tend
Upon the hours and times of your desire?
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I have no precious time at all to spend,
Nor services to do, till you require.
Nor dare I chide the world without end hour
Whilst I, my sovereign, watch the clock for you,
Nor think the bitterness of absence sour
When you have bid your servant once adieu.
Nor dare I question with my jealous thought
Where you may be, or your affairs suppose,
But, like a sad slave, stay and think of naught
Save, where you are, how happy you make those.
So true a fool is love that in your will,
Though you do anything, he thinks no ill.
The sonnet does more than to invoke the conventional courtly trope of 
the beloved as a detached mistress (and not just because the mistress may 
well be a master). What the speaker insists on doing is to eroticize the 
beloved’s absence by imagining his way into the role of an awaiting slave. 
To be neglected would have been offensive, had I not been your slave.
I have elsewhere argued that unlike the purely sexual quality of sadis-
tic theatricality, masochistic role playing may revolve around love and 
intimacy.5 For some of us, love is not found when restricted to set iden-
tities but is located in the to-and-fro of gravitating into a role. Sonnet 
57 brings out the mental operation being mobilized. We note that the 
speaker’s identity does not disappear through such role playing. He is 
not a slave but like a slave. The concluding couplet bitterly comments 
upon his awareness of rationalizing something. He moulds the experi-
ence of being abandoned into a bearable form, while aware that it is a 
self-serving trick. The transition to the next sonnet, in which the speaker 
is not like a slave but is one, coupled to the disappearance of the self-
mockery, becomes moving precisely because the speaker is no longer 
sure of role playing.
My first point is that something is being achieved – a ripple of comfort, 
a flutter of arousal – by entering a slave’s role, even if the role playing 
takes place in thought alone. To find role playing in the sonnets is to 
appreciate how imagining oneself into otherness begins in the mind and 
how it sometimes lingers there. A word, slave, may function like a prop, 
may be as potent as a costume being donned. So if Shakespeare asso-
ciates role playing with a birth of something that is otherwise unavail-
able, we should look for such surfacing of being other not only in his 
disguised characters. My second observation is that in many of these 
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mental forms of role playing, too, it is possible to hear the murmurs of a 
not wholly positive experience, that, once again, the role playing orbits 
around some locus of pain. The transformed speaker resorts to imagi-
nary role playing not because it is uplifting or pleasurable, but because 
it is the lesser of two evils.
The cue for acting is not just some visible mask. It is a willingness 
to be teleported to the realm of “what if.” This holds true even for the 
disguised characters, who are already role playing. For them, too, there 
is role playing and there is role playing. Here is Viola being prompted by 
Olivia to tell her what she (as Cesario) would do were she rejected by 
Olivia. Viola’s response is sufficiently mesmerizing to get Olivia to fall in 
love with her:
Make me a willow cabin at your gate
And call upon my soul within the house.
Write loyal cantons of contemned love
And sing them loud even in the dead of night.
Halloo your name to the reverberate hills
And make the babbling gossip of the air
Cry out “Olivia!” Oh, you should not rest
Between the elements of air and earth,
But you should pity me.
After you shake away the dizziness suffered by sorting out the many levels 
of role playing (a male actor is playing a woman, Viola, pretending to be a 
man, Cesario, invited to imagine how he would act if he were her rejected 
lover), you will feel for Viola’s capacity to take advantage of the opportu-
nity to encode a genuinely suppressed desire into the role of an unrecip-
rocated lover. Viola’s actual predicament is her painful love for Orsino, 
a love she must hide. How apt, then, that the conceit shot through the 
lines above is all about giving voice, about shouting the beloved’s name 
day and night, about publicly announcing one’s love. Once again, role 
playing is a means to both touching and projecting what is real, but also 
expresses the pain that making this very choice entails.
While I do not think that the reflections advanced here depend too 
much upon Shakespeare’s own love preferences, it is difficult to resist 
intuiting, here too, how the power of Viola’s lines is driven by extensive 
familiarity with clandestine love, a love that must remain coded. “No 
longer mourn for me when I am dead,” says the speaker in Sonnet 71, 
“Lest the wise world should look into your moan / And mock you with 
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me after I am gone.” The loss of some lovers cannot be mourned as such. 
If the world suspected, the world would mock you for it. One wonders 
about the degree to which Shakespeare’s love writings are, ultimately, 
informed by extensive transitions into the world of “what if.”
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is no more than encouraging the audience to believe that my character is 
dead. I am not attempting to be dead in some original or rich way.
 2 For examples of role playing as a prolonged imaginative metamorphosis 
that is not acting, see Thomas Thwaites, GoatMan: How I Took a Holiday from 
Being Human (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2016).
 3 Ruth Nevo, Comic Transformations in Shakespaere (London: Methuen,  
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 4 Kirk Browning, dir., Ian McKellen: Acting Shakespeare (New York: 
Entertainment One, 1982).
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Habit is a hard word. Its roots reach back, via the Latin noun habitus, to 
the verb habeo, habere, which can mean “to hold” as well as “to have as a 
habit, peculiarity, or characteristic.”1 As the Oxford English Dictionary doc-
uments, habit’s definition includes clothing as well as the way a person 
“holds oneself,” demeanour, disposition, character, “personal custom, 
accustomedness.”2 Habit collects in one word a range of meanings that its 
sometimes-synonyms split into two: custom and costume. John Bullokar 
offers a lengthy entry in his An English Expositor: Teaching the Interpretation 
of the Hardest Words in Our Language (1616):
The outward attire of the bodie, whereby one person may be distinguished 
from another; as the habit of a Gentleman, is different from the habit of a 
merchant, and the habit of a Handi-crafts man differing from them both. 
Sometime it signifieth a qualitie in the bodie or minde, not natural, but 
gotten by long custome, or infused by God: as an Orator still exercised in 
making orations, hath gotten a habit of eloquent speaking; and the holy 
Apostles had a habit to vnderstand and speake languages without studie.3
His definition elaborates certain cruxes: not just clothing, but the capac-
ity for that “outward attire” both to individuate and communicate recog-
nizable social position; not just a “qualitie in the bodie or minde” – an 
indication of character or personality – but the source of that quality 
(whether acquired over time or divinely injected).
Bullokar’s inclusion of a “qualitie in the … minde, not natural, but 
gotten by long custome” situates his definition in a tradition that reaches 
back to Aristotle’s influential account of ethical cultivation. In the sec-





comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name [ethike] is one that is 
formed by a slight variation from the word ethos [habit]” (1103a.16–21).4 
Aristotle’s attention to the etymological links between habitual action 
and the development of character underscores how habit shapes and 
trains the person who repeats an action into the kind of person who 
exemplifies the characteristic for which that action is typical.5 In this 
chapter I approach Shakespeare’s plays in terms of habit to show how 
the playwright uses the exigencies of stage performance to investigate 
such philosophical models. The implications for character develop-
ment – onstage and off – resemble the challenge that arises, as William 
Gillette puts it in his well-known manual The Illusion of the First Time in 
Acting (1915), in trying to make a (thoroughly rehearsed) performance 
seem fresh and spontaneous to “each successive audience” rather than 
“one of a thousand weary repetitions.”6 I argue that Shakespeare not 
only critiques the assumed stability of “outward attire,” but also inno-
vates longstanding approaches to habit by entertaining the possibility 
that its hold might be temporary. In so doing, he advocates for an ethics 
predicated not on training or performance that boasts staying power, 
but rather on the creative potential of a habitual practice that demands 
active and deliberative choice.
Clothes and the Man
Of the fifty-odd appearances of the word habit in Shakespeare’s plays, 
fewer than ten refer to something besides clothing. In most instances, 
Shakespeare’s habit means “dress”: in King Lear, to cite just one example, 
Edgar adopts “a madman’s rags, to assume a semblance / That very dogs 
disdained” and helps his father, undetected, “in this habit” (5.3.184–5).7 
If, in the early modern period, it was the “putting on of clothes, that 
quite literally constituted a person … the means by which a person was 
given a form, a shape, a social function, a ‘depth,’” theatre challenged 
the stable social identities that attire (and its regulations) aimed to fash-
ion.8 Clothing may operate like so many uniforms to establish and rein-
force social position, but the very fact that Shakespeare’s habits can be 
mere “semblance” – the basic building blocks of disguise – unsettles the 
force of the link.
Shakespeare’s employment of the word habit in Measure for Measure 
structures Duke Vincentio’s plan to get new perspective on Vienna 
by visiting it in disguise. As he prepares, he implicitly invokes a well-
known saying, which cautions that the hood does not make the monk: 
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“Supply me with the habit, and instruct me / How I may formally in 
person bear / Like a true friar” (1.3.46–8). He underscores the proverb’s 
meaning by admitting that clothing is necessary but not sufficient to pull 
off the charade he has in mind. His formulation, in other words, sev-
ers habit, meaning “clothing,” from habit’s potential to mean “manner” 
or “demeanour”. Vincentio’s request implies that the “outward attire” 
aspect of habit does not extend to a person’s formal “bear[ing],” even as 
it communicates that such demeanour can be taught (“instruct me”).9
The Latin form of the proverb that lurks behind Vincentio’s words 
appears verbatim in Twelfth Night, where Shakespeare comes at the ques-
tion of dress from a slightly different angle:
olivia: Take the fool away…. Sir, I bade them take away you.
feste: Misprision in the highest degree! Lady, cucullus non facit monachum – 
that’s as much to say as I wear not motley in my brain. (1.5.36–7, 52–5)10
It’s not quite right to say that Feste’s liberal gloss translates the proverb’s 
point rather than its Latin words. Though he maintains the distinction 
between clothes and the person who wears them, his approximation 
alters the inflection. On his account, attire is not aspirational. Rather, 
motley – a jester’s multi-coloured outfit – guarantees nothing about its 
wearer’s mental faculties, nor, presumably, interior state. Feste insists 
on a distinction between a person’s costume and essence. In rejecting 
the idea that he can be reduced to and limited by his outfit, he takes 
aim at the hierarchizing power implicit in the sumptuary laws opera-
tive in Shakespeare’s England, what Bullokar’s definition claims habit is 
good for – distinguishing between kinds of people. Twelfth Night’s alleged 
fool showcases how drama might guide an examination – and even an 
unstitching – of the seams that join habit’s meanings together. The 
pointed rewriting accomplished by his paraphrase questions outward 
attire’s function as shorthand for sorting people into types.
How to Breed a Habit
Feste employs a proverb to challenge the assumption that we are bound 
or defined by the clothes we wear; Vincentio refers to it to signal that 
threads alone cannot animate a costumed type. Their perspectives high-
light tensions that separate habit’s range of meanings; they also invite 
us to push beyond a critique of sartorial limitations to consider Shake-
speare’s revision of the other aspect of the definition – those qualities 
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of mind “not natural, but gotten by long custome.” In Two Gentlemen of 
Verona, Valentine succinctly articulates that meaning of the word with-
out any mention of clothing: “How use doth breed a habit in a man!” 
(5.4.1). His description roughly accords with the explanations of habit 
formation offered by twenty-first-century psychological and neuroscien-
tific research. Forming a habit, one such study claims, takes between 
18 and 254 days (the average is 66).11 To hear contemporary neurosci-
ence tell it, “use” establishes “habit circuits” in the brain. The litmus test 
is “ automaticity” – habit is what you do often, without thinking. This 
approach to habit highlights the “experience-dependent plasticity” of 
the brain – repetition establishes habit because the brain is adaptable, 
shaped by our encounters.12 From a neuroscientific perspective, hab-
its emerge as a kind of resource management: “Fully acquired habits 
are performed almost automatically, virtually nonconsciously, allowing 
attention to be focused elsewhere.”13 By this account, habitual actions 
and behaviours stand distinct from deliberate ones.14
After Othello’s Iago has nudged Cassio into the drunkenness that will 
lead him into personal and professional peril, Cyprus’s governor asks, 
“But is he often thus?” (2.3.111).15 Montano’s question assumes the suc-
cess of “experience-dependent plasticity”; habits might take time to form, 
bred by “use” and “long custom,” but eventually they indicate defining 
features. Parsing this trajectory takes on an almost forensic cast in the 
play.16 After Othello strikes Desdemona, Lodovico floats two explana-
tions: “Is it his use / Or did the letters work upon his blood, / And new-
create this fault?” (4.2.267–9). In asking his charged question – is Othello 
always abusive or were there extenuating circumstances? – Lodovico, 
like Montano, assumes that identifying an action as singular or signa-
ture makes a difference. In this regard, both men employ the logic of 
the Aristotelian tradition – that habit entails character – on terms that 
activate a discourse that fears the dangerous potential of “use.” Custom’s 
insidious capacity to breed shows up frequently in the period’s exten-
sive anti-addiction literature, which tethers bad habits to vice.17 Richard 
Younge writes at length about alcohol’s deadly power to incite “desper-
ate custom” in The Drunkard’s Character (1638). He cautions against the 
dangers of
habituat[ing] errors into manners…. Custome brings sinne to be familiar, 
that the horror of it is turned into delight; and as men doe at first lesse like 
sinne, so with continuance they doe lesse feele it: frequency in sinne, takes 
away the sense of sinne.18
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Younge’s warning adds another pervasive view of habit to the repetition 
that takes hold as automatic: habit dulls perception. In this case, “drunk-
ards” grow so accustomed to sin that they can no longer recognize drink-
ing as a vice.
Is habit so corrupting that, far from forming ethical character, it can 
pervert the very ability to identify sin as such? Hamlet takes up this ques-
tion explicitly in a heated address to his mother:
Assume a virtue if you have it not.
That monster custom, who all sense doth eat
Of habits evil, is angel yet in this:
That to the use of actions fair and good
He likewise gives a frock or livery
That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight,
And that shall lend a kind of easiness
To the next abstinence, the next more easy;
For use almost can change the stamp of nature,
And either shame the devil or throw him out
With wondrous potency. (3.4.157–67)19
Hamlet’s prominent sartorial metaphor highlights a core tension – 
Denmark’s prince recognizes the potential for “habits evil” to lose their 
visibility as sins (“custom ... all sense doth eat”), but, unlike Younge, 
Hamlet approaches the acquisition of virtue and vice with notable even- 
handedness; they are equally “easy” to “assume.”20 The “use of actions” 
that “lend[s]” increasing ease to successive iterations recasts habit’s auto-
maticity as ever-diminishing resistance. However, even if the ease of rep-
etition that Hamlet advocates blurs the line between rote performance 
and sleepwalking, he notably never goes so far as to claim that habitual 
action will become automatic.
In a published piece of fatherly advice, John Basire enlists a common-
place beloved by the writers who warn against drinking: “Custom turns 
into an Habit. Est enim Consuetudo altera Natura: For Custom is a second 
Nature.”21 Although the Latin alter, altera, alterum can be employed in a 
number of ways – “second” (whether as a numeral or as an indication of 
quality); similarity (a “second self”); contrast (“another”; “ different”) – the 
early modern tendency to English this popular saying as “second nature” 
still resonates.22 We retain that interpretation of the phrase in current idi-
omatic speech – to call a behaviour or an action “second nature” is to high-
light how effortless and ingrained it is. We don’t invoke second nature to 
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set our inclinations apart from nature, but rather to affirm them as natu-
ral. Our own usage bears witness to a strain in which similarity registers 
as sameness. Put another way, the “second nature” rendering smoothes 
over any worry that second means “lesser”; more importantly, it sidesteps 
habit’s potential to be alien, for altera to signal difference. Approach-
ing the commonplace with this fuller range of options in mind reveals 
a subtle split – not all writers equate custom and second nature.23 For 
example, Cicero’s version reads: “consuetudine quasi alteram naturam 
effici” (5.25).24 His inclusion of a qualifier (quasi) resonates with remarks 
in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: “As soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtu-
ally natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin 
to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events 
often” (1.11.1370a).25 In the Nicomachean Ethics, no one is effortlessly 
good (2.5.1105b.10–11). In the Rhetoric, habit comes indescribably close 
to nature without ever merging into it. Yet unlike the emphasis that neu-
roscience places to splice habitual and deliberative actions, the tradition 
that retains the difference between a second nature and almost a second 
nature, between always and often, defines habit as the crucially deliberative 
side of the coin. In Hamlet’s outburst, the word almost provides the only 
protection on the slippery slope down which “monster custom” slides.26 
Without it, habit’s amorality provides no safeguards to prevent casting 
off with equivalent “ease” what anyone might “put on.” For Hamlet, 
habit comes close to “chang[ing] the stamp of nature” without actually 
effecting a lasting alteration. By invoking ease, by invoking good and bad 
habits, by remembering that often is not always, he admits that habit’s 
hold might be temporary. In signalling this qualification – almost a sec-
ond nature as an other nature – he implicitly urges a  re-evaluation of 
 experience-dependent plasticity, and gives voice to theatre’s potential to 
disrupt habit’s circuitry. Habit’s flexibility, in turn, becomes an ethical 
resource by retaining a continual need for conscious choice.
Theatre’s Dual Natures
Hamlet’s diatribe highlights the intersection of habit’s putative ability to 
shape ethical character and the discourse that surrounds acting: as the-
atrical device, clothing functions like the actor’s mask; it aids imperson-
ation.27 According to a logic compatible with Aristotle’s ethical interest 
in habit, early modern pedagogy, following the rules of ancient rhetori-
cal training, operates on the assumption that donning a mask has lasting 
consequences for the face that bears it.
 Habit 35
Critics of the stage shared this belief. According to the anti-theatricalist 
John Rainolds, the “inconvenience and hurt which [playing] breedeth, 
[is] principally to the actors, in whom the earnest care of liuely represent-
ing the lewde demeanour of bad persons doeth worke a great impression 
of waxing like vnto them; next, to the spectators, whose maners are cor-
rupted by seeing and hearing such matters so expressed.”28 If Rainolds 
believes that the “inconvenience and hurt” to which actors are subjected 
develops incrementally, just as Gertrude’s assumed virtue would “lend 
a kind of easiness” to each successive “abstinence,” he keeps that opin-
ion to himself. For both actor and spectator, the “great impression” and 
“corrupt[ion]” of “maners” works as instantaneously as Medusa’s gaze. 
Yet Rainold’s own metaphor works against his point. He might intend 
to communicate that “lively” representation grows into or becomes an 
impression “great” because indelible, but his word choice – “waxing” – 
retains a potential for alteration and malleability through the very mate-
rial it invokes. As Shakespeare puts it in Venus and Adonis, “What wax so 
frozen but dissolves with tempering, / And yields at last to every light 
impression?” (586–7). Unlike its critics, practitioners of theatre, in 
Shakespeare’s time and after, keep pressure on the temporary, delibera-
tive side of the process of “waxing like.”
To be sure, learning lines might require actors to engage their “mere 
imitative echo faculty” in order to “jabber [a theatrical part] as a street 
piano forces you to hum a tune that you positively dislike,” as George 
Bernard Shaw once advised.29 The link between repetition and invol-
untary delivery in theatrical rehearsal and performance informs Con-
stantin Stanislavski’s concern that the actor who doesn’t “experience his 
role” by using “his own living desires” will “execute” his part “mechani-
cally.”30 He returns repeatedly to habit, second nature, and the threat of 
mechanical performance to discuss the careful middle ground an actor 
must tread in preparing a part. In the best-case scenario, the actor “com-
pletely dominated by passion” will be able to forget “physical objectives, 
he executes them mechanically, oblivious to them…. The body lives its 
own habitual, motor existence and the soul lives its deeper psychologi-
cal life.”31 Since it is the automaticity of “motor existence” that frees the 
actor to engage the “soul” and “passion” necessary for performance, 
managing that “mere imitative echo faculty” allows performance to draw 
on habit without stopping there. In Stanislavski’s version, the actor’s own 
life experiences inform the character that the actor plays, which flips 
the prescription for shaping character upon which the rhetorical tra-
dition relied and against which early modern anti-theatricalists warned 
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while still retaining its lexicon. Stanislavski claims that “everything must 
be done through habit, which turns what is new into something that is 
my own, organic, into second nature.”32 If we read the expanded terms 
this approach to habit contributes to character development back into 
Shakespeare, Hamlet’s “almost” engages a flexibility inherent to habit 
and also serves as a reminder that onstage habit was never limited to the 
assumption of “outward attire,” metaphorical or otherwise. When, how-
ever, Shakespeare opposes calculated recurring behaviour to supposedly 
signature repetition, he also relocates the force of habit’s potential to 
“new-create” another nature.
Repetition’s Uses
When Emilia finds Desdemona’s “napkin,” she notes that her “wayward 
husband hath a hundred times / Wooed me to steal it” (3.3.296–7). 
Her adjective registers a tension between Iago’s erratic tendencies – 
“ wayward” as “capricious” – and the steadiness of his interest in Des-
demona’s handkerchief.33 Emilia emphasizes his consistency when she 
presents it to him: “which so often you did bid me steal” (3.3.309). In the 
exchange that follows, Emilia claims she seized an opportunity: “[Des-
demona] let it drop by negligence. / And to th’advantage I, being here, 
took ’t up” (3.3.311–12). As she hesitates to hand it over, Emilia implic-
itly contrasts her happenstance encounter to Iago’s “hundred” requests, 
voiced “often,” a point she makes a third time as she tries to assess what 
he wants with it: he was “so earnest / To have me filch it.” Despite being 
attuned to his repetitions as she produces her own, she fails to hear the 
language of habit in his oblique reply: “I have use for it” (3.3.319).34
It is not until the play’s final act that Emilia comes to a realization 
about Iago’s frequent request, one that shifts the terms of habit. Over 
Desdemona’s dead body, Othello rants that his wife “was as false as 
water,” that “Cassio did top her.” “Ask thy husband else,” he tells Emilia. 
“Thy husband knew it all” (5.2.137–40). This exclamation takes Emilia 
by surprise. “My husband?” she asks. After she has asked this same ques-
tion three times, Othello remarks, “What needs this iterance, woman? 
I say thy husband.” When she utters a fourth version of the query, 
Othello voices his exasperation: “He, woman; / I say thy husband: dost 
understand the word? / My friend, thy husband, honest, honest Iago” 
(5.2.145–59). Othello defines husband through a series of referential 
links – Emilia’s husband is Iago. How might she recognize him? Because 
he is Othello’s friend; because he is “honest, honest.” Emilia’s repetition 
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marks a dissonance she herself does not yet understand. It is not until 
Othello explains that he knew about his wife’s infidelity because of the 
handkerchief that Emilia identifies a pattern that can explain the incre-
dulity underwriting her earlier “iterance”:
I found [the handkerchief] by fortune and did give my husband,
For often, with a solemn earnestness
– More than indeed belonged to such a trifle –
He begged of me to steal’t.  (5.2.223–7)
This is Emilia’s fourth version of the same information. This time, 
however, rather than a sign of caprice or wooing, she retrospectively 
reads Iago’s earnestness as “solemn” and out of step with “such a 
trifle.”
If Iago’s “hundred” requests were meant to power a terrible scheme, 
then they conflict with his wide-circulating reputation as an honest 
man.35 Although Emilia’s initial account shared the hyperbolic math evi-
dent in Othello’s claim about Desdemona’s infidelity – “she with Cassio 
hath the act of shame / A thousand times committed” (5.2.217–18) – she 
did not understand Iago’s request via Lodovico and Montano’s forensic 
principle, which assesses “use” and behaviour repeated “often.”36 Their 
account relies on a world view that naturalizes unthinking iterations – 
the habits bred by use – as stable, defining features. It imagines habit 
inseparable from repetition (verbal or behavioural). By contrast, Emil-
ia’s own repetitions attempt to make sense of discomfiting suspicions. 
The subtle shifts in phrasing across her four versions of Iago’s entreaties 
chart her emerging recognition of the habitual nature of his request. 
Remarkably, that realization occurs because she finally understands 
Iago’s “wooing” in the light of premeditation. Put another way, when 
Iago said he had “use” for the handkerchief, he was clarifying that his 
“often” and “hundred” requests signalled the deliberative logic of habit. 
Emilia discovers that automaticity provides a limited guide to character, 
because Iago treats habit as a kind of making. His version of cultivating a 
habitual practice brings fiction into the world.
Yet Another Nature
Viewed in a certain light, Stephen Gosson’s complaint that when we play 
theatrical parts we “declare our selues by wordes or by gestures to be 
otherwise then we are,” and are thus guilty of lying, takes the worlds 
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that fiction builds incredibly seriously.37 Although he would classify it as 
benefit, not threat, Stanislavski might mostly agree. He posits that “daily, 
systematic work in imagining the given circumstances of a role can cre-
ate habit in the imaginary life which becomes nature, a second imaginary 
actuality.”38 Stanislavski introduces seismic shifts into a familiar vocabu-
lary; not only does he stress the real impact habit can have on “imagi-
nary life,” but he also replaces second nature with “second imaginary 
actuality” – what we would call fiction, and what Philip Sidney would call 
poetry. In his Defense of Poetry, Sidney, like Aristotle, foregrounds ethical 
cultivation: it is exclusively poets who “deliver a golden” world – one that 
compares favourably with nature’s “brazen” world – that can, in turn, 
better its readers. As he puts it, the “poet doth grow in effect another 
nature.”39 In Sidney’s case, “another nature” describes the creation of 
a fictional world that imagines things (and the readers who encounter 
them) to be “otherwise,” but inoculates it from the charge of lying.40 
Shakespeare shows how we might turn to the resources and limitations 
of habit, but not as a tactic for grounding “imaginary life.” Instead, his 
art creates “another nature” that investigates the deliberative possibili-
ties we might both assume and discard. Shakespeare recasts habit as its 
own kind of poetry, which can give shape to a world that is otherwise 
without necessarily striving to be golden. Rather than relying on an eth-
ics entailed in the dependability of habit’s circuits, he retains the tem-
porary, malleable starting point assumed by both ancient virtue ethics 
and contemporary neuroscience. In associating habit with an ongoing 
process of deliberation and judgment that concerns virtue in an extra-
moral sense, he recuperates habit’s creative potential to imagine other 
worlds or to imagine the world otherwise. In so doing, he incorporates 
habit’s amorality into an ethics predicated on the deliberative demands 
of active choice, which showcases habit’s capacity to become an embodi-
ment of a modality of fiction. Attending to habit in Shakespeare’s plays 
enables us to examine how fiction furnishes alternatives without simulta-
neously presupposing a reliable vision – akin to the easy shorthand that 
habit as clothing supposedly provides – of how things might be other 
than they are.
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In this chapter I explore the path-breaking, wide-ranging, and profound 
concept of acknowledgment in the work of Wittgenstein and Cavell, and 
I exemplify the practice of acknowledgment in Shakespeare’s Winter’s 
Tale, and in an astonishing film by the Dardenne Brothers called L’enfant. 
Finally, I investigate the implications of acknowledgment for the task of 
criticism.
Acknowledgment in Wittgenstein and Cavell
Wittgenstein’s Remark 244 (PI, ¶244) gives voice to a philosophical 
problem and invites us to imagine a possibility: “How does a human 
being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the 
word ‘pain.’ Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primi-
tive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has 
hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him excla-
mations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.”1
Stanley Cavell first develops his idea of acknowledgment in relation 
to Wittgenstein’s numerous remarks and examples about pain in the 
Philosophical Investigations. The idea of acknowledgment first emerges in 
“Knowing and Acknowledging,” an essay paired with his more famous 
“King Lear and the Avoidance of Love,” both published in Must We Mean 
What We Say? in 1969.2 From the beginning, acknowledgment and avoid-
ance are bound up together: avoidance turns us away from knowledge 
we have, distorting our relation to ourselves and the world. That rela-
tionship is most developed in part 4 of the great Claim of Reason, which 
takes up “Skepticism and the Problem of Others.”3 It takes Cavell some 





idea that we live, in his words, “between acknowledgment and avoid-
ance,” which is also the title of the final chapter, chapter 13. Here by 
exploring Wittgenstein’s extraordinary thought experiments – the par-
able of the water boiling in the pot (PI, ¶297), the brilliant beetle in 
the box (PI, ¶293), the imagination of a race of men and women who 
don’t express pain when they have it, smiling babies (PI, ¶249) and 
dogs simulating pain (PI, ¶250), the would-be private diarist trying to 
impress upon himself the sign S onto his supposedly recurrent sensation 
(PI, ¶258), or the invitation to see if we could possibly imagine a lan-
guage that we alone could use (PI, ¶243, 256) – Cavell claims that the 
moral of the Investigations, and the heart of its philosophical cure, was 
to diagnose our false pictures of the inner and the outer. Such pictures, 
in denying our actual separation from each other, all but obliterated 
the precise ways in which we know each other, that is, by virtue of our 
expressions. In Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein, language, gesture, and 
the entire intricate world of our responsiveness are the way, the only way, 
we reveal ourselves to each other. This basic feature of our encounters is 
distorted in false pictures of inner and outer where our bodies and ges-
tures, words and expressions are pictured as a veil, a mask, a superficies, 
that covers over, disguises, or hides our true inner-ness, rather than the 
only way it is humanly revealed.
The idea of acknowledgment comes as an alternative to the philosophical 
habit of mind that worries over the gap between word and world, between 
the expression of pain and pain itself. There is no need to get between pain 
and its expressions because our callings out of pain and our responses to 
each other’s pain in comforting, succouring, healing, are expressions of 
pain, not something that gets in the way of it. “Between,” Cavell suggests, 
is a picture, an attempt to wedge language between our inner lives and 
our outward expressions.4 “The dependence of reference on expression 
in naming our states of consciousness, is, I believe, the specific moral of 
Wittgenstein’s inventions containing the so-called private language argu-
ment.”5 What it reveals is the depth to which language is shared.
Cavell had begun his analysis of the Investigations with the idea that 
criteria in Wittgenstein are invoked not so much for, say, entrance quali-
fications, or dog competitions, where there were specific guidelines, and 
rules set by experts and umpires, but rather for things such as sitting on 
a chair, having a toothache, reading, thinking, pointing to something. 
These are things we are all in a position to know, that need no expertise. 
How do we learn pain then? Well, we learn how to talk, says Wittgen-
stein – suggesting that our learning is not best described as a process of 
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attaching a name to a thing, but rather an initiation in all the complex 
modes of life, habits, practices, and ways of doing things that give us a 
world at all. “You learned the concept pain when you learned language” 
(PI, ¶384; Wittgenstein’s italics). Furthermore these criteria for things 
being what they are – which is what Wittgensteinian criteria elucidate (PI, 
¶371, ¶373), why Wittgensteinian grammar shows us what kind of object 
anything is, can tell us only of the identity of something, not whether 
it actually exists. They are criteria for things being so, but not for their 
being so, as Cavell so felicitously puts it.6 (This is why scepticism is a per-
manently available possibility, why criteria are fully open to scepticism.) 
Criteria are disappointing in this respect: they can’t tell us whether that 
man over there is only feigning pain or actually having it, only that it is 
pain at issue. And they are doubly disappointing because they depend 
on our voicing of them to do the work they actually do, on our counting 
this as something here and now in this instance, for this occasion.
Cavell thinks that the idea that there could be a language known only 
to me, which he calls the “fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness,” would 
mean that I did not have to take the responsibility for making my desires, 
needs, dreams, feelings known to others, because in the fantasy I could 
not do so, and I could escape myself and my own self-knowledge.7 If the 
word and the world could somehow be stamped on each other without 
my intervention I would also not have to take a role in the voicing of cri-
teria, and so I would not be exposed to you and all the others who make 
up my world. The fantasy maintains my autonomy; it denies the depth of 
my dependence on others. In exploring the terrain of acknowledgement 
Cavell shifts the entire terrain of our knowledge of others from the realm 
of epistemic failure to the harder terrain of response and responsibility.8 
But in so doing he confronts our deep and pervasive disappointment 
with what criteria can do. To do what they do, we have to give voice to 
criteria – we have to decide whether what you are showing me now is 
pain, and it seems as if I may have nothing to go on but my sense of 
your wince or moan. Would it not be better that I knew you were in pain 
by some more sure means that your giving voice to it, and that I could 
know your pain by something other than my response. My response, my 
acknowledgment is the way I know your pain, the way I respond to your 
expressions that are your criteria for pain, and this seems so vulnerable 
and precarious, so small and unreliable a thing to bank on.
Cavell suggests that when we imagine some better way of knowing each 
other than humanly, through our bodily expressions and responses, 
we exit our mutual attunement and threaten the ways in which we are 
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intelligible to each other at all. That is why these sections and others 
of the Investigations lead on to remarks such as “What gives us so much 
as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?” (PI, ¶283), or “How am 
I filled with pity for this man?” (PI, ¶287).
Cavell’s elucidation of the concept of acknowledgment makes our 
responses towards each other the crux of the matter, as Edward Minar 
has recently affirmed.9
When Regan sees Gloucester gripping the sides of the chair on which 
he is bound, in helplessness, in impotent defiance, in terrified anticipa-
tion of whatever is to come, when he howls at the pain and horror of 
his blinding, both the inestimable pain of it and the terror of the fact 
of it, Regan surely knows it is pain Gloucester is in. She knows his pain 
as a dimension of her power; her pleasure means that her acknowledg-
ment of it is wrenched out of the natural ways in which we learn about 
pain from being comforted, succoured, and cared for (if indeed we are). 
Regan knows Gloucester’s pain through her power and pleasure, just as 
the servant acknowledges Gloucester’s pain by trying to put a stop to it, 
or by fetching poultices for his bleeding rings. We are being asked to see 
the role such knowledge plays in their lives, and the claims such knowl-
edge makes on them and us here and now. We know Gloucester’s pain 
through his expression of it and our responses: Regan and the rebellious 
and faithful servant will reveal what counts for them. That will be part 
of Gloucester’s knowledge of it too. Our criteria thus show what pain is, 
and they show us too, they reveal who we are by virtue of our responses.
John Gibson has helpfully suggested that there is something dramatic 
about acknowledgment in the sense that “an act of acknowledgment is 
a way of giving life to what it is that we know, of bringing it into the pub-
lic world.… Understanding, if fully possessed, establishes a type of dra-
matic relation between knower and the world. It places us in the world 
as agents who are responsive to the range of values and experiences that 
are the mark of human reality.”10
Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein shifts the entire terrain of knowledge 
from the false terrain of the internal objects transparently and natu-
rally known to me by introspection. It is by means of acknowledgment 
(which of course includes knowledge, being a dimension of it) that we as 
humans know each other and come to know our selves. Are there impli-
cations for criticism?11
I can’t encounter works of art without asking what counts for me, 
and struggling to give voice to why it matters and how, so that you 
might be able to see it too.12 Cavell’s idea that criteria are criteria of 
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judgment – that they are both predications of judgment – that this is 
judged to be X, and proclamations (hence expressions) of judgment – 
that it counts as X for us now and in this instance – extends to the entire 
terrain of language and judgment what Kant had articulated for the spe-
cific terrain of aesthetic judgment alone.13 When I tell you what I see in 
this film, I want you to see it too. I am not at all content to let you rest 
in your wrong opinion of this film but will strive to become clearer and 
more articulate about what it is I do see. My judgment of this film is 
my acknowledgment of it, it is how I come to know it. My acknowledg-
ment encompasses self-knowledge, for I will have revealed to you and to 
myself what counts for me.
Part 2: L’enfant and The Winter’s Tale
I have been teaching a new Shakespeare class recently under the loose 
and capacious rubric, “Shakespeare Now and Then.” Most of the materi-
als we study are versions of The Winter’s Tale, beginning with one source, 
Robert Greene’s Pandosto. Eric Rohmer’s beautiful film Conte d’hiver 
(1992) is an evident homage to Shakespeare’s play. Rohmer shows us Fél-
icie watching entranced as the “statue” comes to life in a performance of 
The Winter’s Tale, and we come to understand that the play confirms and 
helps articulate her self-understanding. George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda 
(1876) features the statue scene in The Winter’s Tale. There Gwendolyn 
shows herself to great effect in her alluring costume, and it is an instance 
of her painful ignorance of herself and the world. But the other films and 
novels we examine, such as Jane Austen’s lovely and late novel, Persuasion 
(1818), perhaps as much a tale of autumn as of winter, or the Dardenne 
Brothers’ haunting film, L’enfant (2005), and Pedro Almodóvar’s scintil-
lating melodramas, Talk to Her (2002) and Volver (2006), never explic-
itly reference Shakespeare’s play. But they are Winter’s Tales: that is my 
claim. They share the promise and the terror of those words that sound 
and resound the idea of return (coming back, volver), recovery, renewal, 
but too remembrance, repentance, resurrection, remorse, recognition, 
redemption. They are all books of second chances. When read together 
they mutually illuminate each other, interweaving strand on strand of 
the themes of childhood, forgiveness, remarriage, the role of art, and 
the relation between the past and the present. To our class The Winter’s 
Tale seemed so deep and generative in these works that the vocabulary 
of source, influence, analogue, adaptation, homage, or re-creation gave 
way to words such as incarnation, resurrection, echo, haunting.
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After 1996 when the Dardenne Brothers made their breakthrough 
film La Promesse, they went on to make a series of stunning films that 
renovate filmic realism. Hand-held cameras and, at least at the begin-
ning of their film careers, unknown amateur actors were used. The films 
stay very close to the grain of life of their largely impoverished and mar-
ginalized characters, inarticulate in words but extraordinarily expres-
sive. The protagonists are depicted with no condescension, and because 
there is no moralism in the way we are asked to encounter them, the 
films open up an astonishing ethic of acknowledgment. In the context 
of my class, what emerged in rich association with The Winter’s Tale, was 
the disowning of childhood, and the fundamental theme of the second 
life of forgiveness.
In the Dardenne Brothers’ searing 2005 film, L’enfant, The Child, a 
young grifter called Bruno, played by Jérémie Renier, sells his child, 
Jimmy, newly delivered to his partner, Sonia. Asked to look after Jimmy 
for the afternoon while Sonia signs on to the Social Services in the dismal 
and decayed post-industrial outskirts of Liège, Bruno, as if on impulse, 
arranges to exchange Jimmy for five thousand euros. He has learnt about 
a so-called adoption service, a thinly veiled front for human trafficking, 
from the woman who buys his stolen goods. When Sonia asks Bruno 
where Jimmy is, in a scene that takes place near the polluted river in 
which he has an utterly makeshift shelter, he says in a matter-of-fact way, 
“I sold him” and “I thought we could have another.” At this news Sonia, 
like Hermione, faints. We next see her in hospital refusing to speak to 
Bruno and cutting off all relations with him.
The transaction with the traffickers is depicted in the most painstak-
ing detail. We follow closely behind Bruno, the hand-held camera never 
far from him as he takes Jimmy to a derelict apartment on the outskirts 
of the town and leaves him there, as he receives the money, counted 
note by note. What counts for Bruno is very much at issue in this film, 
and counting here has the full force of accounting both in its financial 
and fully ethical sense.14 Every transaction is in cash, as Bruno lives in an 
entirely cash economy, made up of pawnshops, fences, impulse buys, and 
surviving for the day: work is for losers. In the transaction we see only the 
trafficker’s hands counting the notes, and not his face.
At almost every moment we are aware of Jimmy’s extraordinary vul-
nerability and about what it means to be born into such a world. The 
film opens with Sonia’s search for Bruno to show him his child when 
she is released from hospital after giving birth. (He has sublet her flat 
while she is in hospital without her knowledge.) As she crosses the busy 
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highway holding the newborn Jimmy to reach Bruno in his shack by the 
river, we are made aware of the smallness and fragility of the child in the 
harsh world he is born into. The Dardenne Brothers used twenty babies 
to shoot the scenes with Jimmy, although it is a relief to know that dolls 
were used for the scenes in which Jimmy rides on the back of a motor-
bike with Sonia and Bruno.
Now it is important to say that the intense human drama of the film is 
not in the merciful return of Jimmy – which happens very quickly. Bruno 
recovers Jimmy but is then beaten up and taken for the sixteen euros he 
has on him and told now to steal for the traffickers to repay the money 
lost on the transaction. Since Jimmy is quickly recovered, most of the 
film depicts the aftermath of the sale, and chiefly, as I see it, the possibili-
ties of Bruno’s acknowledgment of Jimmy as his child, that is, of himself 
as a father. This is to say, as Cavell says of Hermione to Leontes, that 
Jimmy is not empirically lost, but transcendently lost to Bruno.15
The film has four main protagonists, all of whom are contenders for 
the title: Jimmy, is l’enfant, whose loss and recovery drive the plot; but 
Bruno and Sonia are children, playing like puppies nuzzling, fighting 
and joshing around with each other in affection, playful rivalry, and as 
children seemingly unaware of the responsibilities, implications, and 
commitments of parenthood. The last contender for the film’s title is the 
boy Steve who works for Bruno as his main accomplice and child thief. 
It is with Steve that Bruno is first awakened into a different way of being.
Steve and Bruno embark on a bravura theft – Steve grabs a woman’s 
handbag while on the back of a motorbike with Bruno. It seems fool-
proof, but the victim of the theft is surprisingly persistent and she com-
mands a nearby car to set off in hot pursuit. The car chase ends with Steve 
and Bruno parking the moped near the river and submerging them-
selves under a jetty in its stinking, cold, polluted waters. (The actors had 
to be hospitalized after shooting this scene.) Steve, terrified with cold 
and the fear of discovery, loses his grip on the jetty. He panics and flails 
around in the water, looking as if he might drown. Bruno immediately 
saves him from the waters, and afterwards we seem him trying to warm 
Steve’s poor frozen feet back into life and feeling. But the cops come, 
and while Bruno makes a run for it, Steve is carted off for his first arrest.
Steve has grabbed onto him, and Bruno has – almost inadvertently – 
“rescued” him. He turns himself in to the police to save this boy. “It was 
me,” he says, performing an act bound to lead him to prison.
It is important to see that Bruno’s responses to the boy are fully natu-
ral and instinctive. I once heard a story like this. In London in the 1980s, 
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a friend of mine had been raped by a man who, it appeared, was a serial 
rapist, sometimes acting alone, and sometimes with another man. In the 
attempt to prosecute these men – who wore masks and were hard to 
identify, the police brought together the women who had been raped 
over a number of preceding years. There were nearly thirty women in 
the room, and it was apparent that these men had been operating all 
over the city. One girl told my friend that she was attacked on Hamp-
stead Heath, but that as the two men dragged her down into a copse 
where they could rape her out of sight, she tripped over a root in the 
copse. She instinctively put out her hand to the younger man standing 
next to her to prevent herself from falling and he, instinctively too, held 
her hand to steady her. This man was unable to rape her. For a moment 
he had – by the purest instinct – acted to save her from the simple harm 
of falling down. He was now, for that moment, in a flash able to experi-
ence himself as a helper, not a harmer. The two men started arguing and 
they let her go.
At each point, and minutely, variously, precariously, we take up posi-
tions in relation to each other, we figure out where we stand in that 
relation, what we are prepared to take responsibility for. Of course, that 
young man assumed a different responsibility in relation to his instinc-
tive response to the girl. Another man might have done something 
different – he might have hardened himself more decisively against the 
girl, wanting not to appear weak in front of his fellow rapist.
Bruno’s responses to the boy in the water are like this: he rescues the 
boy who is terrified of drowning. He helps him get to the shore and then 
he rubs his feet to warm him up. He has not suddenly become kind but 
he has responded, and the later events of the film show that something 
has shifted in him, because he knows himself to be capable of such a 
response. When he turns himself in to the police, he is trying to save the 
younger boy from getting into the hands of the justice system. The film 
shows us no struggle of conscience. It is simply something he does. In 
taking on this action, which grows out of his response to the boy, he is 
building on something instinctive and taking responsibility. All of a sud-
den Bruno has instinctively taken care of Steve. He voluntarily goes to 
the police station, admits that he was the thief. His actions lead at once 
to his own imprisonment and the release of Steve.
Bruno has resisted holding Jimmy. Neither does he want to see his 
child, and he does not look at him. He has not named the child. When 
he asks what he is called, Sonia has said, “Jimmy, as you wanted.” She tells 
him that they will have to go to the town registry and register the birth. 
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The French term is reconnaître: the child in being given a second name 
must be legally recognized. Bruno must recognize himself as the father. 
Bruno knows he is the child’s father, both biologically, and since he does 
register the child, he is legally his father too in the eyes of the state. The 
French term is officalese, but it carries the film’s full force of a moral 
recognition. Yet after legally recognizing Jimmy, Bruno denies to the 
police that the child is his, after he has sold him and returned him as he 
attempts to escape the rigour of the law. While in hospital after her faint 
on the river, Sonia has told the police what Bruno has done. Now Bruno 
denies his paternity, accusing Sonia of cheating on him with other men. 
Even though Bruno has got Jimmy back, he has no idea what fatherhood 
means. We might say that he disowns the knowledge of his paternity.
Acknowledgment implies that what is acknowledged is true. And this 
means that its opposite is not knowledge but rather denial, avoidance. 
Bruno is avoiding paternity, refusing it. He knows he is Jimmy’s father, 
but he has not taken that on. The language of denial and avoidance indi-
cates that what is being avoided is a truth we can’t bear to see.
At the end of the film Bruno and Sonia acknowledge each other in 
the prison where she visits him for the first time. It is a miracle of film-
making and acting. He asks her how Jimmy is. It is the first time he has 
expressed genuine care or concern for the child, and it is the first time 
he has named the child, thus recognizing him as worthy to have a name 
and to bear the name given him by Sonia. The camera has followed her 
in a long panning shot, taking in the other visitors in the prison. Then 
it focuses on Bruno’s face, then Sonia’s. As Bruno puts the coffee cup to 
his lips, he suddenly starts to cry. As the camera moves between them, we 
see that Sonia too answers his tears with her own, and for several minutes 
we watch these two look directly at each other, hold each other’s hands 
over the coffee as their tears spill over their hands. Gently they butt their 
heads together as if they are now solid creatures for each other again. 
It is the first time they face each other since the hospital visit. They are 
tears of lament, of sorrow, perhaps also tears of joy. It is an astonishing 
moment in the film.
Can we say here that the child is acknowledged as Bruno’s when he 
recognizes his own position in relation to Jimmy, fully, irrevocably, and 
here, remorsefully? What is involved in recognizing yourself as a father? 
In seeing your child as yours?
Acknowledgment, then, is shot through our relations with each other. 
It involves understanding where we stand in relation to others. That 
Bruno is Jimmy’s father is not a matter of biology – though he may try to 
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use biology to deny paternity. Nor is it a matter of the law. To recognize 
Jimmy in the law is to grant him a name, to register him as a citizen of 
the polity of the city Liège. To acknowledge him as his child, and to thus 
take on the position of father in relation to him, not to any child, and 
not abstractly, is a matter of personal, painful biography. It is clear in 
this astonishing scene that Bruno has surprised himself with his question 
about Jimmy. Caring for Steve has made him understand himself as a 
creature who cares and is bound up in and with the cares of others.
In his stunning book, composed with the photographer, Jean Mohr, 
about the English country doctor, John Sassall, John Berger writes about 
how he sees Sassall weep. Observing that the suffering that doctors wit-
ness carries a large strain, he suggests that in his dealings with his patients 
he must come close enough to recognize his patients fully. Berger says,
A man or a woman who is sobbing reminds one of a child, but in the most 
disturbing way. This is partly because of the particular social convention 
which discourages adults (and particularly men) from breaking into tears 
but permits children to do so. Yet this is by no means the whole explana-
tion. There is a physical resemblance between a sobbing figure and a child. 
The “bearing” of the adult falls away and his movements are limited to cer-
tain very primitive ones. The centre of the body again seems the mouth: as 
though the mouth were simultaneously the place of pain and the only way 
by which consolation might be taken in. There is a loss of the control of the 
hands which again can only clench or paw. The whole body tends towards 
a foetal position.… Why is the similarity so disturbing? Once more I believe 
the explanation goes further than our sense of compassion. In some way 
the similarity, once established, is brutally denied. The sobbing man is not 
like a child. The child cries to protest. The man cries to himself. It may even 
be that by crying again like a child he somehow believes that he will regain 
the ability to recover like a child. Yet that is impossible.16
Bruno’s hands clench and paw, as do Sonia’s. And his mouth opens in 
pain and cannot hold its shape in its woundedness. But this man is not 
crying to himself. His tears are involuntary: he cannot help them, and 
they surprise him, they bring him back into Sonia’s world, for he can cry 
for her and cry for Jimmy, cry for what he has done and left undone, cry 
for the transcendental loss of Jimmy and for Jimmy’s recovery, for the 
loss of Sonia and for her return to him, a return that happens through 
their tears. His tears are his acknowledgment of her, they are not after the 
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fact of his acknowledgment. In his responsiveness is his responsibility as 
they come into view for each other through their tears. So Bruno’s tears 
are the tears of a child who is growing up. They are his growing pains.
Cavell’s understanding of acknowledgment entails that to recognize 
himself as the father of Jimmy – to acknowledge it, for he knows he 
knows it – is to be able to see himself as the man who sold him, it is to 
recognize his relation to Jimmy, his fatherhood.
If the film traces out the very lineaments of this acknowledgment for 
Bruno, what are we asked to acknowledge?
In closing, I wish to suggest that the concept of acknowledgment can 
help us envisage the claims made by literary, dramatic, or filmic works 
on us. This is a film we can learn from and not just about. Derek Gottleib 
suggests that this might be a first condition of literature or film’s educa-
tive capacity for us – that we are in a position to learn from it.17 Further-
more such acknowledgment will not emerge from various facts about 
the film but by virtue of our own response to it as an untranscendable 
horizon. Literary, filmic, and theatrical art bears on us.
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Judgment offers a powerful framework for understanding some of the 
most basic and profound components of theatrical experience, from 
bodily sensation and the spatio-temporal dynamics of the stage to the 
strange creative alchemy involved in getting audiences to make collec-
tive leaps of imagination. I will explain what I mean by all this in due 
course, but first we need to understand what exactly judgment is. This is 
trickier than it may sound. For example, is judgment an act or a process? 
Is it a concept or an experience? To which cultural or theoretical field 
does it belong, and to what set of social practices?
As this short list of questions indicates, judgment is a uniquely protean 
thing. Part of its history is legal, with the courtroom serving as its primary 
institutional home. Judgment is also a central feature of the Abrahamic 
religions, lending them moral force and, in the case of Christianity, man-
aging the spiritual and temporal thresholds between prelapsarian and 
postlapsarian and salvation and damnation. In a variety of Renaissance 
sources, ranging from sermons to moral interludes, we find divine judg-
ment being contrasted with the inflexible and error-prone judgment of 
the secular common law courts.1
The history of aesthetics is also bound up with conceptions of judg-
ment. In the vernacular literary criticism that developed in England over 
the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, programmatic 
descriptions of good writing and right reading by figures such as Philip 
Sidney, George Puttenham, Samuel Daniel, and Henry Peacham were 
heavily invested in judgment, citing it as both the faculty responsible for 
proper discernment and the attribute that stands to benefit from supe-





(the science of judging) was not strictly literary, however. Deriving from 
Aristotle and Cicero, it also applied to political “invention,” or what we 
might now call policymaking. Both versions of invention, the literary and 
the political, involved the principle of decorum, a version of judgment in 
which careful consideration is given to the particulars of circumstance 
rather than general moral precepts.2
Finally, judgment is also a key term in the Renaissance discourse of 
sociality, in which context it is viewed as a practice that knits the individ-
ual’s sense of self into a larger community of taste. For example, Stephen 
Guazzo in The Civile Conversation (1581) writes, “The judgment which 
we have to know ourselves is not ours, but we borrow it of others … the 
knowledge of ourselves, dependeth of the judgment and conversation 
of many.”3 Comments like this in Renaissance conduct books intersect 
with the long philosophical tradition of thinking about how judgment 
links individuals to larger collectives. This line of thought begins with 
Aristotle and the Stoics and is taken up with particular rigour in the 
eighteenth century when writers like the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Jean-
Jacque Rousseau, and especially Immanuel Kant formulated new ideas 
about the role of judgment in social and political life.4 Later, in the twen-
tieth century, Hannah Arendt developed the moral and political implica-
tions of Kant’s arguments in a series of influential essays. At the time of 
her death in 1975, Arendt was planning a final volume of her seminal 
work The Life of the Mind on “Judgment.”5
What we can say for sure, then, is that judgment has an assemblage-like 
structure. It sprawls across the thought-worlds of law, religion, aesthetics, 
rhetoric, and philosophy and signifies across several semantic fields. In 
this chapter I will be attentive to all of these intellectual contexts, but my 
larger aim will be to show something new: judgment, I will argue, is part 
of the basic DNA of theatricality. Understanding how it works – what it 
enables and what it structures in theatrical contexts – offers one way to 
map out how performance constitutes a unique form of embodied philo-
sophical thought.
The chapter will unfold in three parts: “The Feeling of Judgment,” 
which will focus on Hamlet; “The Physics of Judgment,” which will focus 
on Measure for Measure; and “The Ethics of Judgment,” which will focus 
on The Tempest. By the end of the chapter, I hope to have shown not only 
how judgment helps us understand what happens at plays – emotion-
ally, physically, and ethically – but also how Shakespearean theatre helps 
us recover a way of thinking about judgment that has largely been left 
out of the post-Enlightenment liberal tradition; a way of thinking about 
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judgment that is collective, physical, and creative rather than individual, 
rational, and normative.
1. The Feeling of Judgment
What does it feel like to judge? This probably sounds like an odd ques-
tion, since we do not typically think of judgment as a sensory experience. 
Judging is something we do with our mind, not our body. We also do not 
tend to think of judgment as an emotional experience. Indeed, most 
would say that sound judgment is exercised when reason overrides the 
distorting effects of passion. These are the first assumptions I would like 
to overturn in this chapter, and I will be enlisting Hamlet to help me do 
so. Once we have established an account of judgment that is physical and 
interactive, we will be ready to consider the physics and ethics of theatri-
cal judgment in the next two sections.
Our scene is Queen Gertrude’s bedroom, act 3.4, the “closet scene.” 
Hamlet has impulsively killed a snooping Polonius, and he now confronts 
his mother about marrying his uncle so soon after his father’s death. The 
scene is structured around a comparison of two pictures, one of Hamlet 
Senior, the other of Claudius. It is a scene that essentially stages looking, 
and, more specifically, stages the connection between vision and discern-
ment. Hamlet asks his mother to “Look here upon this picture, and on 
this, / The counterfeit presentment of two brothers” (3.4.51–2).6 He 
starts by presenting his father:
See what a grace was seated on this brow,
Hyperion’s curls, the front of Jove himself,
An eye like Mars to threaten and command,
A station like the herald Mercury
New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill,
A combination and a form indeed
Where every god did seem to set his seal
To give the world assurance of a man;
This was your husband. (3.4.53–61)
Hamlet then presents Claudius:
  Look you now what follows:
Here is your husband like a mildewed ear
Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes?
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Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed
And batten on this moor? Ha, have you eyes? (3.4.61–5)
What is notably missing from this passage is an appeal to reason. Inter-
pretation and moral choice are, instead, securely anchored to the body 
and its methods of gathering information. Gertrude is impelled to “see” 
and to “look,” for this, according to Hamlet, is how one discerns between 
“Jove” and “a mildewed ear.” Twice he demands of his mother, “Have you 
eyes?” The connection between sensation and judgment becomes more 
explicit as the passage progresses:
    what judgment
Would step from this to this? Sense, sure you have –
Else could you not have motion. But sure, that sense
Is apoplexed, for madness would not err
Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thralled
But it reserved some quantity of choice
To serve in such a difference. What devil was’t
That thus hath cozened you at hoodman-blind?
Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight,
Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all,
Or but a sickly part of one true sense
Could not so mope. (3.4.68–79)
It is not a lack of reason or any other higher, disembodied faculty that 
has led to Gertrude’s misjudgment. It is the fact that “sense / Is apo-
plexed” (emphasis added). Nor are we to understand that term sense 
as equivalent to the modern common sense, a kind of foundational, self-
evident logic. On the contrary, the metaphor of blindfolding – “What 
devil was’t / That hath cozened you at hoodman-blind?” – reinforces the 
physiological valence of the word. Judgment is a species of spectatorship 
in Hamlet’s speech. Had the queen been able to see, she would have 
been able to judge. This sort of judgment – good judgment – involves a 
clear alignment of perception and emotion. Bad judgment, on the other 
hand – Gertrude’s judgment – is associated with the misalignment of 
these two things: “Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight.” The closet 
scene places moral decision at the crossroads of sensation and emotion. 
It impels Gertrude, along with all the spectators in the theatre who are 
gazing on with her, to look hard, not with the inner eye of the soul or the 
mind, but with the outer eye of the body.
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Where does this conception of physiologically based discernment 
come from? The starting point is the Nichomachean Ethics, where Aristotle 
observes that ethical behaviour “is not easy to determine by reasoning, 
any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things 
depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.”7 This 
observation laid the foundation for a tradition of thought concerned 
with pre-rational sensate judgment that influenced writers in the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, as well eighteenth-century theorists of aesthetics. 
Within this tradition, judgment was understood to be a faculty that func-
tioned by relating sensible particulars – that is to say, specific things that 
we see, hear, and feel – to intelligible universals – that is, broadly appli-
cable notions of good and bad, right and wrong. Renaissance faculty 
psychology inherited two distinct versions of this Aristotelian scheme. In 
the first version, judgment is described as an expression of reason rather 
than feeling. In the writings of Thomas Wright, Philippe de Mornay, and, 
later, John Locke, passion and bodily sensation impede good judgment.8 
In the second version, which is much closer to Aristotle’s own writings, 
judgment is viewed as a collaboration among the senses, which, over 
time, generate universal principles or what we now might call “standards 
of judgment.” As Aristotle put it in De Anima, the animal soul – the site of 
sensory knowledge and the aspect of our being that we share with other 
non-human creatures – is not just the faculty that generates movement, 
it is also the source of our “capacity to judge, which is the function of 
thought and perception.” “Each sense,” he writes, “judges the specific 
differences of its own sensible object.… Sight produces upon white and 
black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest.”9
In the sixteenth century we find some English scholars rehearing this 
account of the relationship between judgment and sensation. Abraham 
Fraunce, for example, writes in The Lawyers Logike (1588), “For as Aristo-
tle teacheth in the second of his demonstrations, every sensible creature 
hath a naturall power and facultie of judging, which is called sence; & 
this sence (2. Topic) is of him sayde to bee a certayne kinde of judge-
ment: and without doubt, the sence is a most upright judge of suche 
thinges as are properly under his jurisdiction, as the sight of colours, the 
hearing of soundes, the smelling of smelles (4. Metap).”10
For Fraunce, following Aristotle, judgment is common to “every sen-
sible creature,” because sensation constitutes a “certayne kinde of judg-
ment.” At the heart of this argument is the idea that how you feel bears 
directly on how you discern and, eventually, on how you act. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, it is an argument that accommodates the notion of 
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passion leading ultimately to moral action. This is noteworthy because 
it runs counter to more than one powerful tradition of thought in the 
Renaissance, including Calvinism, which in general urges the repression 
of passion, and Stoicism, which generally sees virtue rather than sen-
sation or emotion as the source of moral action. However, as Timothy 
Hampton has shown, even Montaigne, a writer strongly influenced by 
Cicero and Seneca, acknowledged in essays like “De l’inconstance de 
nos actions” and “Apologie de Raymond Sebond” that there were limita-
tions to the Stoic ideal of virtue over passion, that direct bodily experi-
ence (being disgusted by something you witness or being aroused by a 
speech, for example) could impel a kind of applied virtue.11 This, cer-
tainly, is what Hamlet has in mind in act 3.4 when he urges his mother 
to see right, to feel right, to judge right, and finally, therefore, to act right: 
“Confess yourself to heaven, / Repent what’s past, avoid what is to come” 
(3.4.147–8) and “Not this, by no means, that I bid you – / Let the bloat 
King tempt you again to bed” (3.4.179–80).
Hamlet has often been placed on the path to individuality and inte-
riority, but the closet scene inhabits a different terrain, a place where 
judgment, responsibility, and action cohabit with sensation, emotion, 
and collectivity. This path leads, in one direction, to the Aristotelian 
materialism I have commented on. In the other direction, it leads to 
 eighteenth-century sentimentalism – most notably, the work of David 
Hume, Adam Smith, Henry McKenzie, and Samuel Richardson. Sen-
timentalism, as both R.F. Brissenden and Hina Nazar have shown, dis-
tinguished itself from other paradigms of Enlightenment liberalism by 
entwining judgment and feeling. In Nazar’s words, “Judgment emerges 
under sentimentalism as a worldly and contingent process, one that is 
inextricably tied to feelings and sociability.”12 My aim in pointing out 
these links is not to make the Enlightenment beholden to the Renais-
sance, or Hume beholden to Shakespeare, or both beholden to Aristo-
tle. My objective, instead, has been to use the closet scene in Hamlet as 
a starting point for thinking about the history and theory of judgment, 
not so much as a straight line of development, but rather as an evolving 
constellation of ideas in which sense and emotion move in and out of 
view. Hamlet helps us see this kaleidoscopic process in action by staging a 
scene of judgment that point us both backwards and forwards, curating 
a set of conceptual links between Aristotelian materialism, early mod-
ern faculty psychology, and a particular strain of Enlightenment liberal-
ism. What it leaves us with finally is a set of historical and philosophical 
coordinates than can help us reframe judgment as a form of collective 
 Judgment 61
participation in the-world-out-there, a way of feeling with others, and of 
translating common experience into action.
2. The Physics of Judgment
So far I have suggested that judgment is an embodied process, that it is 
collective, and that it is participatory. This section will reinforce these 
claims by showing how theatre sets judgment in motion. Toward this 
end, I will be focusing on act 5.1 of Measure for Measure, a scene in which 
two faces – Mariana’s and Duke Vincento’s – are crucial to the play’s final 
scene of condemnation and forgiveness. I am especially interested in 
how the spatial, object-oriented grammar of the face invites us to think of 
judgment less as an individual decision or rational cognitive procedure 
than as a physical, dimensional event that involves orientating oneself in 
space and time. I will be referring to this as the “physics of judgment.”13
The theatre provides an especially compelling locale for thinking 
about the physics of judgment. Indeed, judgment shares with theatre 
its most basic raw materials: people and things arranged in space and 
time. The face is crucial to this discussion, because in Measure for Mea-
sure it stands at the crossroads of theatre and judgment, indexing their 
shared fields of location and duration and their common orientation 
toward the future. With this in mind, I will begin this section by map-
ping out how the physics of judgment works in act 5.1. The scene brings 
together two deception plots. The first of these involves Duke Vincento 
who throughout the play dresses as a friar to observe the behaviour of 
his subjects undetected. The other involves Mariana, a woman who was 
betrothed to, then abandoned by, Angelo, the hypocritically puritani-
cal deputy filling in for the duke. Mariana, Isabella, and the duke trick 
Angelo into consummating his marriage to Mariana by sending her to a 
garden-house where Angelo thinks he is having a tryst with Isabella. The 
collision of these two plots in the final scene of the play leads to a series 
of revelations in which the face plays an essential role.
The first of these revelations occurs when, in the wake of Isabella’s 
accusations of sexual blackmail, Mariana is led onstage, supposedly to 
absolve Angelo of Isabella’s charges. Here is the initial part of the scene:
duke: Give us some seats.
Two seats are brought in.
  Come, cousin Angelo,
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In this I’ll be impartial: be you judge
Of your own cause.
 The Duke and Angelo sit
 Enter Friar Peter with Mariana veiled
  Is this the witness, friar?
First let her show her face, and after speak.
mariana: Pardon, my lord, I will not show my face
Until my husband bid me. (5.1.165–70)14
This is clearly a scene of arbitration. A charge has been made and a 
witness is being brought in to testify. The duke even has some seats set 
up to make the exchange feel more like a trial with judge and jury pre-
siding. We should also note that Mariana’s face is at the centre of this 
 judgment-event. The duke’s command, “First let her show her face, and 
after speak,” seems to assume that the forensic and moral evaluation 
integral to judgment is possible only under certain baseline conditions 
of collective ethical orientation: the mutual acknowledgment and recog-
nition intrinsic to the face-to-face encounter. But Mariana refuses: “I will 
not show my face / Until my husband bid me.” A little further on, Angelo 
echoes the duke’s request, at which point Mariana finally acquiesces:
angelo: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
mariana: My husband bids me, now I will unmask.
 She unveils
This is that face, thou cruel Angelo,
Which once thou swor’st was worth the looking on. (5.1.204–7)
Two aspects of this exchange are important for understanding the phys-
ics of judgment. To begin with, the component parts of this  judgment-event 
consist predominantly of actions and reactions centred on Mariana’s veiled 
face. This stage business is marked verbally throughout: “give,” “come,” 
“show,” “not show,” “let’s see,” “unveils.” That is to say, Mariana’s face 
indexes the way the judgment-event unfolds in space. In addition – and 
this is the second aspect – Mariana’s face indexes the way the judgment-
event unfolds through time. All terms pertaining to temporal positioning – 
what linguists call “time deixis” – are used in reference to Mariana’s face: 
“first,” “after,” “until,” “now.”15 Here is the relevant passage once again, 
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this time with time deixis marked in bold and references to Mariana’s face 
underlined:
 Is this the witness, friar?
 First let her show her face, and after speak.
mariana: Pardon, my lord, I will not show my face
Until my husband bid me.     (5.1.165–70)
…
angelo: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
mariana: My husband bids me, now I will unmask.
 She unveils (5.1.204–5.1)
Marking the exchange in this way highlights the peculiar theatrical role 
played by the face in this scene. Though obviously part of the actor’s and 
character’s body, the face also functions almost like a prop. It is instru-
mentalized in a way that exceeds the demands of character in order to 
advance elements of plot and theme. To this extent, the face muddles 
some of the standard categories of theatrical semiotics established by 
scholars such as Patrick Pavis, Erika Fischer-Lichte, and Keir Elam. Con-
sider some basic examples of these categories: linguistic signs, paralin-
guistic signs, kinesic signs, and proxemic signs. Linguistic signs function 
both rhetorically and acoustically. They comprise both the meanings 
of individual words spoken on stage and the tone and pace of delivery. 
Paralinguistic signs, meanwhile, include such things as props, music, 
scenery, and lighting. Kinesic signs are self-contained bodily movements, 
such as gestures. Proxemic signs, on the other hand, are movements of 
bodies through the space of the stage.16
Mariana’s face does not fit in a straightforward way into any of these 
categories. Instead it performs two different kinds of signification 
 simultaneously – kinesic and proxemic – while also challenging received 
wisdom about how these signifying units are supposed to work. Mari-
ana’s face is a kinesic sign in the way that all faces always are on stage, 
but the fact that it remains veiled for most of the exchange seriously 
undercuts its ability to do what kinesic signs are supposed to do: express 
or gesture. Mariana’s face is a proxemic sign to the extent that it occa-
sions the scene’s primary actions and reactions. Indeed, it is at the centre 
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of the scene’s orbit of movement. And yet it does very little in the way of 
significant movement through space itself. A full semiotic reckoning of 
Mariana’s face would also require the addition of a new sign-category, the 
“chronemic,” which would allow us to isolate the face’s time-indexical 
function in the scene. As a chronemic sign, Mariana’s face is consistently 
pointing to the temporal context in which it appears. It creates a scene 
of judgment, which does not manifest itself in a flat present of decision, 
but rather unfolds sequentially through a linear process of action and 
response: “First let her show her face, and after speak”; “I will not show 
my face / Until my husband bid me”; “Now I will unmask.”
The face in Measure for Measure bursts the seams of our received systems 
of theatrical interpretation. It demands a more flexible and expansive set 
of critical concepts. As the material anchor in the final scene’s culminat-
ing moments of punishment and forgiveness, it offers a vantage point 
from which we can observe the physics of judgment at work, the way in 
which adjudication unfolds through the space and time of a mimetic 
environment comprising bodies, voices, and objects. From this perspec-
tive, judgment takes the form of a collaborative event. It has less to do 
with individual evaluation than with the collective application of knowl-
edge toward a specific end. And as with all forms of applied knowledge – 
geometry, mechanics, even rhetoric – the aim of judgment is to make 
something: in this case, a liveable future, a shared sense of truth, and new 
conditions of social possibility in Vienna. We see the beginning of this 
process unfolding gradually during the scene of Mariana’s unveiling: col-
lective appraisal of the situation evolves as false knowledge and misper-
ception give way to true knowledge. The revelation of Mariana’s face is 
the hinge on which the former swings toward the latter. Here is the scene 
with references to knowledge – first false, then true – set in bold:
mariana: Why, just, my lord, and that is Angelo,
Who thinks he knows that he ne’er knew my body,
But knows, he thinks, that he knows Isabel’s.
angelo: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
mariana: My husband bids me, now I will unmask.
 She unveils
This is that face, thou cruel Angelo,
Which once thou sworest was worth the looking on;
…
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duke: Know you this woman?
 …
angelo: My lord, I must confess I know this woman, (5.1.201–7, 213, 217)
This moment – the first phase of act 5.1’s extended judgment-event – 
marks the beginning of a shared coming-into-knowledge. Mariana’s 
unveiling and the acknowledgement it triggers – “I know this woman” – 
establishes a new truth about the relations among the characters on 
stage that will lead eventually to fundamental changes in the social fabric 
of Shakespeare’s Vienna. We may tend to think of judgment as a singu-
lar decision or decree, something that ends or resolves things. But the 
dynamics of the face in Measure for Measure shows us something different: 
a version of judgment that is not only collective, but also creative, and 
which therefore has as much to do with the future as with the past.
3. The Ethics of Judgment
Judgment, we have seen, is fundamentally theatrical because it is physi-
cal, collective, transactional, and creative. But why does this matter? 
What are the broader ethical implications of theatrical judgment? How 
might it affect an audience’s sense of themselves as moral stakeholders 
and empowered world-makers? This section addresses this final cluster 
of questions.17 The discussion will move between two locales. One is a 
public amphitheatre in London where around 1611 an old man, a father 
and a magician, asks his audience for forgiveness and approval. The 
other is a stuffy courtroom in Jerusalem where in 1961 a philosopher-
cum-journalist, a German-Jewish émigré to the United States, was tasked 
with covering the trial of a Nazi leader.
We start on the London stage, where Shakespeare’s play The Tempest is 
drawing to a close. Prospero has released the island castaways and set his 
servant Ariel free, and says the following to the audience:
Now my charms are all o’erthrown,
And what strength I have’s mine own,
Which is most faint. Now ’tis true,
I must be here confined by you,
Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
Since I have my dukedom got,
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And pardoned the deceiver, dwell
In this bare island by your spell,
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands.
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be,
Let your indulgence set me free. (5.1.319–38)18
Prospero presents his case to the playgoers who are expected to con-
sider two related questions: (1) Was the play good? (2) Has Prospero 
behaved in an ethical manner? Importantly, though, the playgoers are 
not simply being prompted to pass judgment. More precisely, they are 
also being asked to imagine through judgment a future for Prospero, 
an imaginative addendum to the fiction presented on stage. If the audi-
ence disapproves and does not clap, Prospero will remain imprisoned 
on the island. If they approve and do clap, he will return to Milan. This 
latter context is important because, as I hope to show, attending to the 
interplay between judgment and invention helps us understand how the 
epilogue contributes, in a culturally specific way, to a much larger set of 
questions about the relationship between freedom and responsibility in 
the theatre.
Though it may seem arbitrary to us, the idea that judgment and inven-
tion are inherently connected would have been familiar to many in 
Shakespeare’s time, including a considerable number of playgoers and 
playwrights. It finds its source in a long tradition of rhetorical learning 
that stretches from Aristotle though Cicero and Quintilian and onwards 
to the Renaissance humanists.19 Thomas Blundeville’s commentary in 
The Arte of Logicke (1599) is fairly standard. He explains that while “inven-
tion finds matter,” judgment “frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the 
same into due forme of argument.”20 In other words, invention is the 
skill of deciding which line of reasoning is most likely to strike a particu-
lar audience as especially compelling. Judgment’s role is to break that 
line of reasoning down into component parts and then arrange them in 
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a sequence calculated to achieve maximum persuasiveness. Judgment, 
that is, turns ideas into arguments by lending them organizational form.
With this in mind, we can begin to see how judgment might be con-
ceived as one crucial point along a continuum of creative endeavour. 
For those with some training in rhetorical theory, judgment was a form 
of making rather than a form of decision, as we would now tend to view 
it. The request for judgment in Prospero’s epilogue is also an appeal to 
the audience’s capacity for literary invention, specifically their ability to 
craft an imaginary afterlife for Prospero: “Release me from my bands / 
With the help of your good hands,” he implores; “As you from crimes 
would pardon’d be, / Let your indulgence set me free.” According to 
the terms set by Prospero, then, clapping is an act both evaluative and 
generative, a verdict on the past and a vision for the future. This gives 
theatregoers a different kind of ethical stake in the play they are watch-
ing than would otherwise be the case. As fellow makers, rather than just 
consumers, the audience’s collective sense of the good, of what is right 
and what is wrong, is implicated in the play’s imagined conclusion, and 
all the more so for the moral freight Prospero so insistently attaches to 
the epilogue. Judgment here develops out of a sense of responsibility to 
communal norms –which are both moral and aesthetic. Not to judge, 
accordingly, would be a failure of responsibility.
Taking the link between judgment and responsibility as a cue, I want 
now to shift our critical gaze from seventeenth-century London to 
 twentieth-century Jerusalem where, in 1961, Hannah Arendt, writing for 
the New Yorker, sits alongside other journalists in a different kind of the-
atre: the courtroom. This courtroom hosts the trial of the Nazi leader 
Adolf Eichmann. Arendt is underwhelmed by Eichmann. She thinks he 
is forgettable, unintelligent, even unfrightening. She is also critical of 
the trial itself. It seems to her a show trial, one that uses Eichmann as 
a proxy to condemn and punish anti-Semitism in general. Against this 
method of retribution, Arendt argued that the Holocaust called for spe-
cific and nuanced forms of condemnation, mostly of Nazis, but also of 
Jewish leaders who cooperated with the Nazis. That this did not hap-
pen represented for her a “fundamental problem” common to “all these 
postwar trials,” which had to do with “the nature and function of human 
judgment.” She writes,
What we have demanded in these trials, where the defendants had com-
mitted “legal” crimes, is that human beings be capable of telling right from 
wrong even when all they have to guide them is their own judgment, which 
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moreover happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard 
as the unanimous opinion of all those around them.… Since the whole 
of respectable society had in one way or another succumbed to Hitler, the 
moral maxims which determine social behavior and the religious com-
mandments – “Thou shalt not kill!” – which guide conscience had virtually 
vanished. Those few who were still able to tell right from wrong went really 
only by their own judgments, and they did so freely; there were no rules to 
be abided by, under which the particular cases with which they were con-
fronted could be subsumed. They had to decide each instance as it arose, 
because no rules existed for the unprecedented.21
Judgment for Arendt, in other words, is not an expression of external 
social or legal norms, but rather an expression of personal responsibility. 
So long as you are human, there is an expectation that you will be able to 
tell “right from wrong.” What post-war trials like Eichmann’s threw into 
sharp relief for Arendt was the degree to which so many were willing to 
shirk this responsibility, either by refusing to judge or by issuing a sort of 
judgment that was so broad and sociological, so resistant to the concrete 
threshold between right and wrong that it amounted to non-judgment. 
Arendt understood, of course, the reluctance of both Germans and Jews 
to examine closely what took place in Europe between 1933 and 1945, 
to pinpoint definitively the many groups and individuals – Nazi officers 
and bureaucrats, “Christian churches,” members of “the Jewish leader-
ship” – who had a hand in what she calls “the totality of moral collapse.” 
However, she concludes that “this understandable disinclination is insuf-
ficient to explain the reluctance evident everywhere to make judgments 
in terms of individual moral responsibility.”22
In the years following her coverage of the Eichmann trial, Arendt 
finally did arrive at an explanation. In an essay called “Personal Respon-
sibility under Dictatorship” she recalls, “I was told that judging itself is 
wrong: no one can judge who had not been there.”23 At the heart of this 
fiercely neutral stance, Arendt decided, was deep scepticism about the 
possibility of human freedom:
There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging that has nothing 
whatever to do with the biblical “Judge not, that ye be not judged,” …  
[f]or behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one 
is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could 
be expected to answer for what he has done.… [W]e’re all alike, equally 
bad, and those who try, or pretend that they try, to remain halfway 
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decent are either saints or hypocrites, and in either case should leave 
us alone.24
What Arendt does brilliantly in her writings on judgment is triangulate 
between three large, difficult concepts – judgment, responsibility, and 
freedom – in a way that deepens our understanding of all three. Judg-
ment is an expression of responsibility, and responsibility, in turn, is a 
condition of being a free agent capable of moral decision and active 
world-making. Viewed in this way, judgment is a means of manifesting 
our status as free agents in moral terms – in terms, that is, of a collec-
tive obligation to the good that only a free agent could enter into. The 
refusal to judge is troubling to Arendt because it indicates an unwill-
ingness to be accountable for the world we all must share. It rehearses 
a vision of politics as something that works upon rather than through 
human actors and in this way advances precisely the sort of detached 
acquiescence that forms the necessary conditions for totalitarian disas-
ters like the Third Reich.
Hannah Arendt’s work on the Eichmann trial establishes a framework 
for thinking about judgment that helps us uncover some of the ethical 
deep-structure of Prospero’s epilogue. Specifically, she equips us with a 
vocabulary and a set of concepts that allow us to think about the audi-
ence’s evaluative response in The Tempest as an expression of responsi-
bility rather than authority, and therefore as something grounded in, 
and oriented toward, sociality and recognition. This has the effect of 
re-describing the historical particulars of Prospero’s epilogue in terms of 
the more universal ethical dynamics of participatory politics. It shows us, 
in other words, that at the heart of Prospero’s judgment-invention link-
age is an implicit assumption that the playgoers assembled in the theatre 
are free agents and therefore not just able to judge, but also expected to 
judge. For it is through judgment that they shape the moral contours of 
the future – Prospero’s future.
Conclusion
My aim in this chapter has been to guide readers through the feeling, 
the physics, and the ethics of judgment in Shakespearean contexts – 
three largely neglected components of the theory and practice of dis-
cernment. The point of this exercise has been not only to broaden our 
conception of what judgment is and how it works, but also, and more 
specifically, to lay claim to “judgment” as a useful critical keyword for 
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the philosophical study of theatre. Viewed in the broadest terms, judg-
ment is both a methodology for social and material interaction and a 
systematic form of future-oriented thought. The former is rooted in the 
sensory experiences, physical choreographies, and temporal rhythms 
of living. The latter is rooted in the impulse to create new worlds of 
objective, aesthetic, and/or moral consensus. Accordingly, in the the-
atre, judgment helps us understand how a play’s affective environment 
and orchestration of time and space generate its capacity for creative 
and moral empowerment. Indeed, within the arc of its unfolding, judg-
ment bridges the gap between what we feel and do together now – con-
demn Claudius, forgive Angelo, applaud Prospero – and how we live 
and believe together later. Theatrical judgment forms communities by 
translating common physical experience (looking, hearing, moving) 
into common axes of value (a shared sense of right and wrong, good 
and bad). To this extent, judgment reminds us that theatre is always 
both particular and universal; a specific constellation of material bodies 
and artefacts deployed toward a certain narrative end and a general sys-
tem of meaning-making whose component parts foster collective leaps 
of imagination and speculation.
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I’ll fit you.
– Thomas Kyd, The Spanish Tragedy
The chief aim of Renaissance actors and dramatists, or so they typi-
cally said, was to please their audiences – “to entertain this presence 
with delight,” as John Marston declared at the start of his 1600 comedy 
Jack Drum’s Entertainment. But Marston’s Entertainment takes a strangely 
twisted path to assuring its spectators that it will indeed delight them. 
The show begins with a warning from a stagehand, the tireman, that 
the audience may have to disperse, “for he that composed the Book we 
should present” – the playwright Marston – “hath snatched it from us, 
upon the very instance of entrance, and with violence keeps the boys 
from coming on the Stage.” “You much mistake his action, Tireman,” 
says a child actor who next appears, having somehow broken through 
Marston’s barricade. The author’s “violence proceeds not from a mind / 
That grudgeth pleasure to this generous presence”; on the contrary, “he 
was loath, / Wanting a Prologue, & ourselves not perfect, / To rush upon 
your eyes without respect.”1 According to the child actor, the only reason 
that Marston stands in the way of entertaining his audience is that he’s 
so committed to entertaining them.
No sooner has the boy finished speaking than Jack Drum begins in 
earnest, which makes its opening turbulence all the more puzzling. Why, 
at the outset of a play that Marston wishes he could “sweeten” for his 
spectators with “the music of the spheres,” would he cause them even 
momentary distress? In part, he must want to emphasize for his audience 





their “delights.” But the violence that the child actor no less than the 
stagehand attributes to Marston also highlights an element of aggression 
in the author’s ostensible devotion to his audience. “If you’ll pardon 
his defects and ours,” says the boy, “he’ll give us passage, & you pleas-
ing scenes.”2 What at first appears to be a humble request for the audi-
ence’s leniency turns into the author’s threat that he will withhold his 
entertainment until he and the actors receive their pardon in advance. 
Several years later, in the first edition of another comedy, his Parasi-
taster, or The Fawn, Marston even more plainly mixed his signals to his 
audience. After a letter to the reader in which he modestly refers to his 
plays as his “stage-pleasings,” Marston lards the prologue to Parasitaster 
with the most extravagant praise of his spectators: “For we do know that 
this most fair-filled room / Is loaden with most Attic judgments, ablest 
 spirits, / Than who there are none more exact, full, strong.” “O you are 
all the very breath of Phoebus,” the prologue continues effusing: “In 
your pleas’d gracings all the true life blood / Of our poor author lives; 
you are his very graces.” But then the final lines of the prologue turn all 
this servility to affront: if “any” of the playgoers should “wonder why” 
the author has been “drawn / To such base soothings” of them, then 
“know his play’s – The Fawn.”3 Now it’s impossible to mistake the object 
of Marston’s hostility: he resents his audience for expecting him to bow 
and scrape to them. But by contriving to insult them through flattery, 
Marston also manages to retain the strange double edge of his earlier 
self-presentation as the author who stops his own entertainment from 
starting: in the prologue to The Fawn, that is, Marston still associates his 
belligerence with his desire to please.
Other dramatists of the period tempered Marston’s apparent mood 
swings from obsequiousness to defiance by more moderately asserting 
their rights to the audience’s respect. “Your silence and attention, worthy 
friends,” begins the prologue to The Merry Devil of Edmonton (ca. 1600), 
which then invites the audience to share the work of entertainment by 
asking them to “entertain the subject of our play.” In the prologue to 
his comedy If It Be Not Good, the Devil Is in It (1611), Thomas Dekker 
declares that he seeks applause “for Merit,” not “for Pity.” But few if any 
dramatists maintained that they could command the attention of their 
audiences without also delighting them. The prologue to The Merry Devil 
requests silence from its spectators so that “your free spirits may with 
more pleasing sense / Relish the life of this our active scene”; in the pro-
logue to his own Devil play, Dekker anticipates that he’ll be “crowned” 
by the audience only “if he please” them.4 The best playwrights, Ben 
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Jonson declares at the start of his 1601 Poetaster, address their audiences 
with neither the “arrogance” of a master nor the “dejection” of a slave. 
Rather, they choose “a mean ’twixt both,” which is to instruct as well as 
entertain – and ideally, the instruction should itself prove entertaining: 
in the prologue to his 1611 comedy The Alchemist, Jonson hopes that his 
audience will “be pleased” by the “fair correctives” he offers them.5 “To 
the wise,” as Jonson’s disciple Francis Beaumont argues in the prologue 
to The Knight of the Burning Pestle (1607), it is “as great pleasure to hear 
counsel mixed with wit, as to the foolish to have sport mingled with rude-
ness.” Although another Jonsonian playwright, Peter Hausted, conceded 
that the “satire” in his comedy The Rival Friends (1632) had so offended 
his audience that they “cried down” the play, he nevertheless insisted 
that his entertainment had been “made to please”:
 and had the vicious age
Been good enough, it had not left the stage
Without its due applause. But since the times
Now bring forth men enamoured on their crimes,
And those the greater number, ’twere disease
To think that anything that bites should please.6
In Hausted’s view, “good” playgoers should accept a dramatist’s violence 
against them as a form of entertainment – they should love it when he 
“bites” them.
“I’ll fit you,” promises a more sinister version of Hausted in one of the 
foundational triumphs of the commercial Renaissance theatre. Thus far, 
I’ve been drawing my evidence about Renaissance theories of entertain-
ment from the comic drama exclusively; it seems reasonable, in plays that 
end happily, for dramatists to assure their audiences that the action will 
unfold “as you like it.” But the violence and loss in tragedies makes them 
likelier settings for dramatists to reflect on their own ill will towards their 
audiences, however self-defeating that hostility may be. So it is that, in 
Thomas Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy (ca. 1587), the playwriting knight marshal 
of Spain, Hieronimo, stages a tragedy that wreaks havoc on all parties to 
the performance: the author, the actors, and the audience, too. What 
could be more emphatic a repudiation of the dramatist’s obligation to 
please? And yet when Hieronimo mocks his spectators for assuming that 
the murdered actors of his play will “revive to please tomorrow’s audi-
ence,” he does not mean that the playgoers he is addressing have been 
left feeling disgruntled by the performance they have just witnessed. On 
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the contrary, he knows that they have thoroughly enjoyed it: “Old Mar-
shal,” the king of Spain had just exclaimed, “this was bravely done!”7 
Contemporary evidence indicates that Kyd’s own play was just as suc-
cessful as Hieronimo’s at entertaining its audience, even though it so 
brazenly expressed a fantasy of harming them. For the rest of this chap-
ter I’ll explore the play’s surprising account of how it could achieve such 
perverse appeal. And I’ll end by suggesting that the popularity of The 
Spanish Tragedy may have inspired a similar approach to entertainment 
in many later Renaissance plays, which aimed to please their audiences 
by encouraging them to see their relationship to author and actors as 
profoundly conflictual and therefore as itself dramatic.
I
Perhaps the first question to ask about The Spanish Tragedy as entertain-
ment is why anyone ever finds tragedies entertaining. “The beholding 
of troubles and miserable slaughters that are in Tragedies,” argued the 
theatre hater Stephen Gosson in 1582, “drive us to immoderate sorrow, 
heaviness, womanish weeping and mourning, whereby we become lovers 
of dumps, and lamentation.” The action of The Spanish Tragedy begins 
in the aftermath of a war between Spain and Portugal that has taken 
the lives of some “three hundred” soldiers on the Spanish side alone. 
One of these murdered Spaniards, Don Andrea, is now a ghost whom 
the powers of the underworld have sent back to earth so that he can 
witness more killing. As his escort Revenge informs him, “Thou shalt 
see the author of thy death, / Don Balthazar, the Prince of Portingale, / 
Deprived of life by Bel-imperia.”8 What good, as Gosson asked, can come 
from all this butchery?
“Victory,” declares a “cheerful” Spanish general in the very next scene. 
“Blest be heaven,” replies the Spanish king, who asks the general to 
augment the king’s “pleasure” at such “good news” by going into more 
detail about the bloodshed. From the general’s account of the war, the 
king is delighted to learn that Hieronimo’s son Horatio distinguished 
himself in combat: “Frolic with thy King,” the king joyfully exclaims to 
his knight marshal. So elated is Spain’s monarch by his “war’s success” 
that he shares his high spirits with his enemies, too. Rather than lord 
it over the captured Portuguese prince Balthazar, he magnanimously 
decides to feast Balthazar instead as “our friendly guest.” “We pleasure 
more in kindness than in war,” the king subsequently informs the Por-
tuguese ambassador; indeed, he asks the ambassador to think of their 
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two countries now as friends, not foes. “Spain is Portugal, / And Portu-
gal is Spain,” he insists, and to prove his point, he offers to marry his 
niece Bel-imperia to his prisoner Balthazar. That’s not all: if “the match 
go forward,” the king declares, then “the tribute which you pay shall 
be released,” and if Balthazar and Bel-imperia should eventually “have 
a son,” then “he shall enjoy the kingdom after us.” Just as killing has 
led to frolicking, so, the king believes, it can promote an international 
accord. “Our peace,” he assures the ambassador, “will grow the stronger 
for these wars.”9
Such an unexpectedly comic outcome to the hostilities between 
Portugal and Spain does not please everyone at the Spanish court. It 
incenses Balthazar’s prospective bride, Bel-imperia, who cannot recon-
cile herself to Balthazar because he killed her lover Andrea in battle. Yet 
even before Bel-imperia reveals her continuing enmity toward the Portu-
guese prince, the ghost of Andrea already highlighted the controversial 
nature of merging friends with foes when, in the first scene of the play, 
he reported to Revenge how the judges of the underworld take special 
care to separate the ghosts of dead warriors from the ghosts of dead 
lovers. “It were not well / With loving souls to place a martialist,” one 
of these judges had cautioned; “either sort” must be “contained within 
his bounds.” Andrea posed a dilemma for the judges, because in life 
he had been both a lover and a warrior, and that same confusing blend 
of concord with discord resurfaces in the next scene of the play when 
the king commands his subjects to “entertain” Andrea’s killer Balthazar 
“with greatest pleasure that our court affords.” Not even Balthazar can 
quite fathom why his Spanish enemies are treating him so remarkably 
well: “I frolic with the Duke of Castile’s son,” he marvels to the Portu-
guese ambassador, “wrapped every hour in pleasures of the court.”10
By refusing to entertain Balthazar as a lover, Bel-imperia thinks that 
she is preserving the proper distinction between enmity and amity that 
the king has subverted, and yet she herself clouds the same issue when 
she decides to “love Horatio” in order “to spite the Prince.” Her very 
choice of Horatio as lover demonstrates how Bel-imperia herself hopes 
to convert the horrors of war into the pleasures of peace: it is Horatio’s 
record as a fighter, she tells us, that recommends him to her as her “sec-
ond love.” In her subsequent flirtations with Horatio, Bel-imperia tempts 
him to believe “that pleasure follows pain, and bliss annoy” – the same 
counterintuitive logic that the Spanish king had proposed to the Portu-
guese ambassador. “Let dangers go,” she urges Horatio; “thy war shall be 
with me, / But such a war as breaks no bond of peace.” Exceeding the 
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king’s own blandishments, Bel-imperia does more than replace war with 
love; she equates the two:
Speak thou fair words, I’ll cross them with fair words;
Send thou sweet looks, I’ll meet them with sweet looks;
Write loving lines, I’ll answer loving lines;
Give me a kiss, I’ll countercheck thy kiss.
Be this our warring peace, or peaceful war.
Love conquers war, these playful incongruities suggest, through a “lov-
ing” likeness that assimilates the hostile actions of crossing and counter-
checking to the friendly actions of meeting and answering. In their next 
scene together, Horatio accepts Bel-imperia’s invitation to re-enact his 
earlier violence as lovemaking. “Then thus begin our wars,” he declares 
as the two embrace: “Put forth thy hand, / That it may combat with my 
ruder hand.” “Set forth thy foot to try the push of mine,” an aroused Bel-
imperia replies. For the lovers, such erotic reciprocity replaces conflict 
with imitation. Yet in his earlier account of battle, the Spanish general 
had already defined war as itself a series of imitations, in which provoca-
tion leads to provocation, then to incursions across the shared border 
that otherwise contains each nation within its bounds, then to a close 
combat that renders one fighter indistinguishable from his opposite, 
reducing them to the reflexive aggression of “pede pes et cuspide cuspis,” 
foot-to-foot and pike-to-pike.11 The unmistakable echo of the general’s 
speech in Bel-imperia and Horatio’s foreplay further complicates the 
underworld’s opening distinction between loving likeness and hateful 
opposition, but not with the effect that Bel-imperia intends: if war gener-
ates likeness no less than love does, then how can love claim likeness as 
its distinctive property?
Bel-imperia and Horatio mistakenly believe that their “mutual amity” 
has been insulated from the violence it resembles in the same way that 
Hell keeps lovers separated from martialists – through containment; 
they think that they are “safe” within the bounds of Hieronimo’s “pleas-
ant” arbour. But Bel-imperia has shared the secret of her tryst with her 
servant Pedringano, and although she assures Horatio that Pedrin-
gano “is as trusty as my second self,” her confidence turns out to be 
fatally misplaced: Pedringano betrays the lovers to Balthazar and to 
Bel-imperia’s villainous brother Lorenzo. This act of treachery does not 
mean that Bel-imperia was wrong to think of Pedringano as her second 
self: it means that she was wrong to think of a second self as inevitably 
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subservient to the first, when it can just as easily be understood as a self 
that exceeds the bounds of the original. Knowing what Bel-imperia knows, 
Pedringano is able to conduct Lorenzo and Balthazar inside Hieroni-
mo’s pleasance, where they witness the no longer private lovemaking 
between Bel- imperia and Horatio and grow more incensed and belliger-
ent the more they watch. “Whereon dost thou chiefly meditate?” they 
overhear Bel-imperia asking Horatio. “On dangers past and pleasures to 
ensue,” he replies. “On pleasures past and dangers to ensue,” Balthazar 
whispers to his co-conspirators. Then Bel-imperia: “What dangers and 
what pleasures dost thou mean?” “Dangers of war, and pleasures of our 
love,” answers Horatio, to which Lorenzo bitterly responds, “Dangers of 
death, but pleasures none at all.” Unnervingly, Balthazar and Lorenzo 
express their hostility to the lovers not merely by opposing or negating 
what the lovers say but also by imitating and echoing them. In effect, 
the haters become a kind of second self to the lovers, and the next time 
that Lorenzo and Balthazar spy on them, their very responsiveness to 
Bel-imperia and Horatio excites a violent reaction that reflects the lov-
ers’ own equations of love and war. Watching Bel-imperia say to Horatio, 
“I dart this kiss at thee,” and Horatio reply, “Then I retort the dart thou 
threw’st at me,” Lorenzo can no longer contain himself. Rushing out 
from cover, he stabs Horatio again and again – taking his cue, as he 
himself claims, from the erotic provocations of the lovers: “Ay, thus, and 
thus! These are the fruits of love.”12
II
Two kinds of borders collapse when Lorenzo kills Horatio. One of them 
had already been breached when the king of Spain and then the two 
lovers had overridden the conventional distinction between violence 
and pleasure. But now Lorenzo transgresses a further boundary by refus-
ing to accept any distance as a spectator from the action he observes, 
and The Spanish Tragedy never allows either line of demarcation to be 
restored in full. Just as the confines of Hieronimo’s pleasant arbour fail 
to shelter Bel-imperia and Horatio from their enemies, so Lorenzo and 
Balthazar discover that they cannot keep their killing of Horatio hidden 
there. Hieronimo overhears “outcries” that rouse him from his bed and 
lead him to the “murd’rous spectacle” of his son’s body hanging in the 
garden. Revenge is the play’s general name for the logic that will shortly 
transform Hieronimo from a spectator of violence to an enactor of it, but 
that change begins in this scene with a blurring of Hieronimo’s vision, 
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which causes him to perceive Horatio’s corpse as both identical and anti-
thetical to his son: “Alas, it is Horatio, my sweet son! / Oh, no, but he 
that whilom was my son.” Soon enough, Hieronimo will speak of his pow-
ers of sight in the same self-oppositional terms: “O eyes, no eyes, but 
fountains fraught with tears!” This famous line epitomizes the dialectical 
relation between loving likeness and violent opposition that now comes 
to dominate the play. At the heart of Hieronimo’s own outcry is a simple 
metaphor: “my eyes are fountains.” But Hieronimo posits that similitude 
through negation, as if his eyes could not resemble fountains unless they 
first stopped being eyes. A recurrent term for likeness in The Spanish Trag-
edy is the “counterfeit”: literally something made in opposition as well as 
imitation, like Bel-imperia’s “countercheck” of Horatio’s kiss.13 In a later 
scene of the play, Hieronimo loses his mind at precisely the moment 
where he recognizes the counterfeit or “lively portrait” of himself in an 
old man whose son has also been murdered. Claiming to see his “self-
same sorrow” in the face of this second self, Hieronimo can no longer 
think of himself as contained within his own bounds – as selfsame.14
The lovers imagine themselves to be resolving the problem of bro-
ken borders by embracing the likeness between them as a twinning that 
excites a loving “twining” or merger. In his more lucid moments, Hieron-
imo takes a somewhat different though still similarly contractual view of 
likeness. He believes that, in order to contain a malefactor’s “outrage,” 
the law must answer “blood with blood”; he is praised for his “pursuit of 
equity.” Yet the increasingly powerful account of likeness in the play is 
that it amplifies rather than contains, through a redoubling or (to bor-
row a term from the general’s battle speech) a rebounding that exceeds 
the boundaries of the selfsame; thus Hieronimo’s grieving wife Isabella 
likens her own eyes to fountains that “gush out” tears.15 Revenge in The 
Spanish Tragedy follows the same principle of reciprocity as justice does, 
only more so. After Lorenzo and Balthazar learn that Pedringano has 
murdered a servant of Balthazar’s (a killing that Lorenzo had secretly 
arranged), Lorenzo urges Balthazar to reject the hierarchy of imitation 
that would limit his answering violence to a merely reflexive echo of 
the original. According to Lorenzo, Balthazar should instead think of 
revenge as outdoing the crimes it imitates – as exacerbating or in his 
terms “exasperating” them: “Take the pains / To exasperate and has-
ten his revenge.” Similarly, when the viceroy of Portugal learns that his 
courtier Villuppo has falsely accused another courtier of murdering 
Balthazar, the viceroy promises to punish Villuppo not with “so mean a 
torment as we here / Devised for him, who thou said’st slew our son, / 
But with the bitterest torments and extremes / That may be yet invented 
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for thine end.” Even the magnanimous Spanish king will later threaten 
Hieronimo with “th’extremest kind of death / that ever yet was invented 
for a wretch.” Increasingly, the play depicts revenge as a rebounding that 
provokes its actors to entertain the notion of a boundless response: an 
“endless tragedy” is what Revenge himself promises to perform in the 
final line of the play.16
This is not to say that The Spanish Tragedy ultimately places likeness 
on the side of enmity rather than amity, of war rather than love, of exas-
peration rather than pleasing. On the contrary, likeness defeats such 
oppositions, and the play represents pleasing as itself a form of trans-
gression. The first of the forty times that a version of the word pleasing 
crops up in The Spanish Tragedy, it is associated with a border crossing: 
Don Andrea recalls how, after arriving at the gates of Hell and “there 
pleasing Cerberus with honeyed speech,” he “passed the perils of the 
foremost porch.” When Balthazar later asks Hieronimo “to entertain” his 
father the viceroy and the Spanish king with “suchlike pleasing motion” 
as his earlier “entertainment” of the Portuguese ambassador, Hieronimo 
agrees to “fit” his royal audience with the art of poetry, which he char-
acterizes as “passing pleasing to the world”: surpassingly pleasing, that is, 
pleasing past ordinary bounds. To give an audience a play that fits them 
is to please them by reflecting their own desires back to them – as they 
like it – but Hieronimo seizes on his play as an opportunity to harm his 
audience as well as delight them, through a redoubling of them that 
breaks the bounds of their own self-sameness. His first step in alienating 
his audience from themselves is to induce the former onlookers Lorenzo 
and Balthazar “to play a part” in his show.17
From the start of The Spanish Tragedy, Kyd had been fitting his own 
audience for such self-alienation by placing a version of them onstage, in 
the spectating figures of Don Andrea and Revenge. This “audience vis-
ible to the audience,” as Lukas Erne puts it, is redoubled in turn when 
Kyd’s own spectators go on to watch Don Andrea and Revenge watch 
Balthazar and Lorenzo as they watch Bel-imperia and Horatio – and then 
these additional blurrings of the boundary between audience and actors 
get exacerbated further when Lorenzo leaps from his seat to stab the 
man he’s been watching, just as Hieronimo, in a later echo yet also a 
reversal of Lorenzo’s earlier “trespass,” will reach from the stage to stab 
an audience member. “Haply you think … / That this is fabulously coun-
terfeit,” Hieronimo derisively exclaims to his audience after they have 
applauded him: what they don’t yet understand, he believes, is that his 
entertainment has been genuinely counterfeit, insofar as it has countered 
the audience in the very act of pleasing them.18
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To judge from the spectating Andrea, this rebounding effect to enter-
tainment does more than appal the viewers: it transforms them, too. At 
the start of The Spanish Tragedy, Andrea says not one word about desiring 
revenge. The first indication of any bloody thoughts on his part comes 
after he has witnessed the Spanish king turn from warring with Balthazar 
to entertaining him: “These pleasant sights,” Andrea then protests, “are 
sorrow to my soul.”19 The more Andrea watches, the more exasperated 
he grows. Two acts later, his spectatorship has so markedly intensified his 
bitterness that he denounces Hieronimo’s apparently friendly overtures 
to Lorenzo as blocking his own “passage to revenge.” By the end of The 
Spanish Tragedy, when Andrea expresses his delight at having witnessed 
the deaths of friends and enemies alike, his thirst for violence seems to 
have passed all bounds:
Horatio murdered in his father’s bower,
Vile Serberine by Pedringano slain,
False Pedringano hanged by quaint device,
Fair Isabella by herself misdone,
Prince Balthazar by Bel-imperia stabbed,
The Duke of Castile and his wicked son
Both done to death by old Hieronimo,
My Bel-imperia fall’n as Dido fell,
And good Hieronimo slain by himself –
Ay, these were spectacles to please my soul.20
Seneca, from whom Kyd copied the framing device of Andrea and 
Revenge, was also the source for Kyd’s dramatization of a spectator who 
finds himself desiring ever more “murd’rous spectacles.” In Seneca’s 
tragedy Thyestes, for instance, the avenging King Atreus looks on with 
delight as his brother Thyestes unwittingly eats the flesh of his own chil-
dren, until the king realizes that hoc quoque exiguum est mihi, that even 
this is too little for him: he now wishes that his brother had been fully 
conscious of the horror he was committing. The best way for a ruler to 
demonstrate his power, Atreus had earlier asserted, is to turn his sub-
jects against themselves. Quod nolunt velint: what they don’t want is what 
they must want – a principle Atreus puts into action by making Thyestes 
cannibalize his own children.21 Hieronimo’s entertainment manages to 
provoke his audience into wanting what they don’t want, not only by 
encouraging them to applaud a violence that is targeted at them but also 
by exciting a bloodlust in them they might not otherwise have known 
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they possessed. “Fetch forth the tortures!” exclaims the Spanish king at 
the end of Hieronimo’s play, the same king who had earlier tried to con-
vince everyone that his chief pleasure was in kindness.22 The difference 
between Thyestes and The Spanish Tragedy is that Kyd makes outrageously 
explicit what had merely been implicit in Seneca: he transforms the 
revenger from a king to a dramatist, who perverts his audience not so 
much by tyrannizing over them as by entertaining them.23
It seems unlikely that The Spanish Tragedy could have gone on to become 
one of the most popular and influential plays of its time in spite of the 
hostility towards its audience that it so plainly manifests. The play itself 
suggests instead that its commercial success, and the success of other 
Renaissance plays like it, depended not only on actors and dramatists 
who were ambitious to do more than please their audiences but also on 
audiences who were ambitious to experience more than being pleased – 
who were, indeed, ready to surrender their spectatorial detachment 
from actors and playwrights in exchange for a more immersive relation 
with them, no matter how compromising that collapse of boundaries 
might prove to be.24 So powerfully did The Spanish Tragedy make its mark 
on its first audiences that echoes of the play rebound throughout the 
subsequent drama of the period. These, however, are not exclusively sub-
servient reflections of the original. “When this eternal substance of my 
soul / Did live imprisoned in my wanton flesh,” Andrea solemnly intones 
at the start of The Spanish Tragedy, “I was a courtier in the Spanish court.” 
Later imitators have their characters say, “When this eternal substance 
of the soul / Did live imprison’d in my wanton flesh, / I was a Tailor in 
the Court of Spain”; “When I was mortal, this my costive corpse / Did lap 
up figs and raisins in the Strand”; “When this transforméd substance of 
my carcass / Did live imprison’d in a wanton hogshead,” and so on.25 By 
perverting its horrors into comedy, Renaissance parodies of The Spanish 
Tragedy pleased their audiences by helping them take their revenge on 
Kyd, their entertainer.
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Cursing is given a strange prestige in some of Shakespeare’s plays. The 
intermediate status of the curse, floating between temporalities, between 
institutions, and between power and subordination, renders it analogous 
to the theatrical form and interesting to the theatre of the early modern 
period.1 Shakespeare first explores its intricacies in Richard III. With an 
extraordinary clarity, this play reflects on the character and significance 
of the curse, first and foremost its odd, paradoxical status and its inti-
mate relation both to the theatre and to the question of divine law. For 
the curse is a speech act marked by a strange ambiguity: it can be defined 
as both an appeal to and a condemnation through a punitive divine 
judgment.2 The word curse traditionally designates a mythical, exclusion-
ary divine judgment that posits a new law and gives the world a new struc-
ture. Both Yahweh’s curse upon the serpent, man, and the ground in the 
Book of Genesis (3.14–19), and Jesus’s apocalyptic condemnation of the 
reprobate (Matthew 25:14) conform to this description. In this context, 
curses not only determine the future, but also legitimate the past and the 
present; they serve as explanatory devices. One might say that the mythi-
cal curse establishes a mythical guilt a priori. This primordial guilt finds 
its most pertinent expression in a legal demand that is impossible to 
meet insofar as its transgression is antecedent to any subject’s behaviour. 
In this respect, the curse functions as the verbalization of a exclusion-
ary “ban”3 that God as the sovereign has always already imposed upon 
humankind, either directly or through his representatives. Christian 
jurisdiction proceeds to institutionalize this collective guilt as the basis 
of its legal structure.4
But the curse is not only a mythical speech act, articulating a pri-





judgments within the legal order itself, as exemplified by the biblical 
obligation to repeat every seven years the curses in Deuteronomy that 
perpetuate the covenant with Yahweh (Deut. 27–8 and 31:10). These 
curses represent a transcendental world order within the juridical sys-
tem; and in this respect they do not appear as law-making but as law-
preserving.5 Legitimate, effective cursing therefore tends to insert itself 
into a chain of pre-existent curses that it extends and cites. Subjects may 
damn their opponents, but only by quoting and thus re-actualizing the 
word of God. They may also damn themselves in this fashion: one of 
the most prominent variations of the curse is the oath as conditional 
self-execration.6
The resultant problem of this speech act is that the curse simulta-
neously posits and negates the difference between world and divine 
judgment: in the empirical act of cursing, the creative power of a foun-
dational mythic Word is referenced as a force that from the outset deter-
mines the situation in which the curser and the cursed find themselves. 
This suggests that the curse as an empirical speech act reduces itself to 
an empty, repetitive gesture: it posits what it already presupposes, forever 
redundant. The condemnable deeds or the condemnable persons have 
already brought a pre-existent curse down on themselves to which the 
execrator merely lends his or her voice in repetition. Yet on the other 
hand, on many occasions it is obvious that the imprecator aspires to 
carry out this condemnation personally through the curse, supplement-
ing a universal justice that seems to have failed. Thereby the maledictor 
insinuates that, at the moment of its utterance, judgment and world do 
not coincide after all. Since the curse, while denying the divergence of 
judgment and world, at the same time upholds this difference as its own 
cause and origin, it subverts itself.
On account of this paradoxical structure, curses cannot have any 
effect that is univocally demonstrable and determinable by language. 
Absolute power and complete impotence converge in this speech act. 
For this reason, it is structurally impossible to disprove or to prove the 
effectiveness of curses empirically. Insofar as it affirms the course of the 
world and at the same time denies it, the curse touches upon the prob-
lem of representation in general: it aims to create a reality by referring 
to it as pre-existent. Seen from this perspective, the curse per se can be 
seen as an eminently theatrical speech act, positioned at the boundary 
between fantasy and fact and mediating between them.
Over the centuries, this self-suspending, theatrical dimension of the 
curse has always been an issue in the polemical struggle of competing 
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parties for power over this performative act. Nevertheless, the curse has 
remained a mark of spiritual authority for a long time. For example, the 
superior political position of the medieval popes vis-à-vis the secular rul-
ers is based in part on their power to curse, i.e., to excommunicate – as 
can be demonstrated by the circumstance that the dispute over lay inves-
titure in the eleventh century was solved temporarily when Pope Gregory 
VII excommunicated the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV.7 The eccle-
siastical discourse about this topic (e.g., in the writings of Gregory the 
Great) regularly contrasts curses that are to be rejected for their lowly 
personal motivations with the Christian curse that is necessary as an 
instrument of eternal justice.8 The church therefore considered extra-
ecclesiastical cursing as pagan and prohibited it to the laity by decree.9
At the beginning of the early modern age, the rite of excommunica-
tion constituted the most visible institutionalized act of condemnation 
by divine judgment. The ceremony marks the expulsion of a parishio-
ner from the congregation of the faithful by the clergy. It is part of the 
liturgy; its announcement (which is subject to major local differences 
of formula and frequency) is incorporated into the church service.10 
Excommunication formulas are not freely invented by the clergy but 
consist almost entirely of reworked, rearranged, and refunctionalized 
biblical and patristic quotes. In addition to these extensive formulas, the 
ritual of the major excommunication involves the representational use 
of sacred objects. This is what the traditional phrase “bell, book and can-
dle” refers to, evoking three forms of symbolically expulsing and mur-
dering the accursed. Firstly, during the excommunication ceremony, the 
clergy frequently extinguish candles that represent the anathematized 
person’s light of life.11 Secondly, the ceremony includes the ringing of 
bells “in churches throughout the city,” some legends suggesting that 
they imitate funereal knells.12 Thirdly, the ritual of excommunication 
involves the forceful closing of a holy book, generally a Bible or a Book 
of Psalms.13 This is associated with a blotting out from the “book of life” 
(liber vitae), i.e., from the roll of the blessed that God keeps.14
The evident theatricality of this ritual emphasizes the close relation 
between curse and drama. Indeed, theatre itself has evolved to a consid-
erable degree through an engagement with the problem of the curse, 
its derivatives like the oath and other forms of binding speech. It has 
repeatedly been pointed out that theatrical performances have devel-
oped out of religious rituals all over the world. In the case of England, 
these were mainly church rituals – first those of the Easter ceremonies, 
then those of the Corpus Christi festivities, which developed into Mystery 
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plays.15 These stagings included representations of exclusionary cer-
emonies, such as the cursing of Judas during the Last Supper.16 English 
theatre has evolved to a high degree through an engagement with the 
ceremonies of church and state; it has imitated them, but also deviated 
from them. It is an institution that must arrange and embed itself in very 
specific ways within persistent social rituals if it wants to survive and to 
perpetuate itself.
Elizabethan England around 1600 was a society whose use of ritu-
als had thoroughly changed in the course of the Reformation. A lot of 
church ceremonies had been removed from the liturgy, among them 
the ritual of excommunication. The English Reformation had sus-
pended the papal power to exclude Christians from the congregation, 
not least because Henry VIII (in 1533) and Elizabeth I (in 1570) were 
excommunicated by the pope and for a long time ruled England under 
a ban. Thus, under Henry VIII, the pope’s power to excommunicate was 
declared null and void,17 but the ritual curse did not disappear after this 
abolition. Rather, it was appropriated and transformed by the state and 
continued to play an important role in new customs and institutions. 
Especially during the sixteenth century – in part even before the Refor-
mation – secular power took over the rhetoric of execration. In 1521, for 
example, the mayor of Lincoln published “a formal curse on those who 
had improperly removed the records and books of the Common Coun-
cil.”18 And the oath ceremonies of self-execration became even more 
important than they had been in medieval times; indeed, they became 
an essential component of the English Reformation itself. In 1534 the 
Act of Supremacy demanded that all officials and the clergy to swear an 
oath of loyalty to the king as the head of the English church.19 Thomas 
More is the most prominent victim of the resultant conflict and the sub-
sequent consolidation of Anglicanism.
The Anglican Church, however, was not successful in its attempts to 
establish a curse monopoly. Several competitors claimed the malediction 
for themselves: besides the Church of England, these rivals included the 
pope (represented by those Catholics who remained in England), but 
also the leaders of more or less radical Protestant groups. Puritans and 
other sects used excommunication ceremonies in their congregations as 
an instrument of power, while making no effort to codify the causes and 
forms of cursing. Some Puritan preachers, for example, tended to exe-
crate unruly members of their community;20 Quaker leaders imprecated 
their enemies and collected legends about the subsequent divine judg-
ments.21 In English theologico-political literature of the sixteenth and 
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early seventeenth centuries, there was a proliferation of texts containing 
curses or pertaining to curses, while at the same time questioning their 
efficacy and intensifying attempts to control them.22
Curses in early modern England functioned as remainders that, 
after the abolition of the rites into which they were firmly integrated, 
became apparently placeless and redundant, but continued to play 
an important role in their marginalized position. At this time splin-
ters of excommunication ceremonies found their way into the secu-
lar theatre. The theatrical curse was ideally suited to unfolding and 
questioning the aporetic, crypto-theatrical structures of a jurisdiction 
supported by political theology. Thus, theatre engaged in an analytical 
“work on myth”23 that linked it to the project of philosophy.24 How-
ever, this semi-philosophical work was not so much motivated by an 
upwelling of enlightened zeal as by the theatre’s own self-interest. One 
can generally observe that the Elizabethan drama established itself by 
appropriating conventions and ceremonies and by reshaping them in 
accordance with its own goals and those of its controlling organiza-
tions.25 The role commercial theatre played in the struggle for power 
over the curse was related to the fact that the English government tried 
to use drama as a propaganda instrument, for theatre was heavily regu-
lated by a state apparatus that tried to consolidate its own authority. 
The Queen’s Men, for example, were from the very beginning con-
ceived as a troupe of propagandists who were supposed to spread 
royalist enthusiasm.26 This general task occasionally also included the 
appropriation of the excommunication and of other rites, a process 
in which these adoptions often assumed the form of parody. The the-
atre often ridiculed excommunication as a stupid, malicious act full 
of empty pathos, and as an illegitimate meddling of the “pope’s play-
house” in British affairs.27 For example, conflating excommunication 
and exorcism, Christopher Marlowe ridicules both of them in Doctor 
Faustus (3.1.73–87)28; and when James I came to Cambridge in 1615, 
the university likewise staged “a play containing an episode mocking 
the whole procedure of exorcism.”29 Within the diegetic action of these 
plays, ritual acts are performed in a way that the hollow fetishism 
underlying them is exposed; they are marked as inherently unsuccess-
ful and as dependent on deceptive staging. In these appropriations of 
the curse, an untimely ceremony is, on the one hand, exposed as an 
empty, outdated, “undead” ritual; but on the other hand, its tenacious 
forms and formulas are perpetuated and given a new home, which 
keeps them both problematizable and profitable.
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Shakespeare’s intervention in this situation adds a new twist to the 
general development: the curse appears in Shakespearean drama as a 
thoroughly theatrical speech act, even within the diegetic framework. 
The insufficient binding power of this theatrical performative is rep-
resented by his plays in such a way that the distinction between reality 
and theatrical “misplay” appears to have been shifted into the interior of 
the representation. But their emptiness notwithstanding, many of these 
Shakespearean curses appear to be opportune and necessary; they turn 
out to fulfil an important function despite, or even precisely because of, 
their ineffectuality. This transposed form of performative effectivity is 
related to the importance Shakespeare accords to the stage as a space in 
which social roles can be both analysed and renegotiated.30
All this is pertinent to the Yorkist tetralogy, first and foremost to Rich-
ard III. The ambivalence of excommunication and its problematic effi-
cacy is frequently demonstrated in this play. In this context, it needs to 
be pointed out that the history play Richard III has all the trappings of 
a propaganda play, designed to legitimate the reign of the Tudors. The 
Tudors relied on this kind of propaganda, because the dynastic legiti-
macy of the first Tudor, Henry VII, was dubious. In order to conceal 
this questionable state of affairs, the court disseminated the myth that 
Henry VII had been installed as the King of England because he was 
favoured by God and therefore destined for that role.31 For this reason, 
Henry’s predecessor, Richard III, had to be represented as evil incarnate, 
so that his deposition and murder, no matter by whom, could be repre-
sented as justified and that the goodness of Henry VII could shine all the 
more brightly against this dark background. A substantial number of the 
characteristics and misdeeds that were ascribed to Richard at that time 
have turned out to be inventions.32
When Shakespeare uses these propaganda topics, he brackets them to 
a certain degree by blending the legitimacy crisis of the Wars of the Roses 
with the legitimacy crises his contemporaries experienced, for the mas-
sive crisis of legitimacy that is represented in Richard III in many aspects 
resembles that of the sixteenth century more than that of the actual fif-
teenth century: feudal, liturgical, and other obligations perpetuate them-
selves in Shakespeare’s play, despite their obvious obsolescence or mutual 
incompatibility. In the course of the three parts of Henry VI, references 
to religious and secular authorities have already been subverted, because 
these references have been too flagrantly employed in the service of self-
interest. Within the action of play, ritual acts are thus performed in such a 
way that their underlying hollowness is exposed. Oath ceremonies are one 
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prominent example: they have become altogether powerless, although 
everybody still insists on them. This strange state of affairs unfolds above 
all in the first scene of the second act when the dying king, Richard’s 
brother Edward, tries to regulate the intrigues at his unruly court by insti-
tuting an oath ceremony that is obligatory for all parties:
edward: Rivers and Hastings, take each other’s hand;
Dissemble not your hatred: swear your love.…
Take heed you dally not before your King,
Lest He that is the supreme King of kings
Confound your hidden falsehood, and award
Either of you to be the other’s end.…
Wife, love Lord Hastings, let him kiss your hand:
And what you do, do it unfeignedly.…
Dorset, embrace him; Hastings, love lord Marquess. 
 (2.1.7–8/12–15/21–2/25)33
The problem with this sacred invocation of oath-based universal recon-
ciliation is that the political career of the Yorkists has been defined by 
perjuries. The decisive battle for the victory of their party was won after 
York had broken his holy oath of loyalty against Henry VI at the insistent 
urging of both Edward and Richard. Edward himself had in this context 
proclaimed:
edward: But for a kingdom any oath may be broken.
I would break a thousand oaths to reign one year.
(3 Henry VI, 1.2.16–17)
That is the fetishism of the society in which Richard lives: it believes in the 
eternal validity of divine rituals and at the same time manipulates them in 
the pursuit of personal interests. For this reason, all statements invoking 
the godhead and the higher decrees of morality appear to be empty and 
theatrical in this play. For example, in the discussion between Richard’s 
brother Clarence and his murderers, the two sides become entrapped in 
the contradictions of their position; when the murderers try to legitimate 
the killing and when Clarence tries to convince them that it is unlawful, 
their exchange becomes ever more circular, since nobody can point to 
an authority that has not been subverted (1.4.171–201). Under these aus-
pices, political theology itself turns out to be a theatrical affair.
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At this point Richard, who doesn’t seem to share the fetishism of his 
environment, enters the scene. He turns the empty ritual into a mere 
farce he can manipulate, as if he were its director. Richard’s behaviour 
and his utterances hint at the fact that rituals for him are just empty 
representations that he may turn to his own advantage by making 
ironical use of floating curses, oaths, and portentous prophecies (see, 
e.g., 1.1.36–40, 1.2.68–9, and 2.1.54–60). With his skill at manipulating 
remnants of sacredness and at the same time ironically subverting them 
by taking on various roles, he brings about what Elizabethan drama does 
in the public arena, and in this respect he appears on stage as an alle-
gory of theatre. A.P. Rossiter and others have discussed how in Richard 
the public persona of the Elizabethan actor and stage director seems to 
have been reproduced within drama itself.34 Just as the drama of Shake-
speare’s time tends to appropriate outdated, obsolete rituals, above all 
those of the church, for its own purposes, Richard, as a born actor, does 
the same thing within the diegetic reality of the play. Richard’s success 
derives from his exploitation of the fetishistic belief of his antagonists in 
the world’s religiously mediated intelligibility, a belief he himself does 
not want to share. From his advanced perspective, he can control the 
other characters, because he controls the signs and symbols by which 
they make sense of the world.
In that sense, Richard III is a modernizer; and that is why the tradi-
tionalist ex-Queen Margaret is his great opponent in the field of ritual. 
Margaret, the widow of Henry VI, is, without doubt, the most promi-
nent execrator in Richard III. As a monument to outmoded power rela-
tions, she pronounces, in her two scenes on stage, almost nothing but 
curses and laments; even her “gentle counsel” assumes the form of a 
ban that she articulates in order to polarize the court (1.3.289–94). 
Quoting snippets of excommunication formulas and their biblical 
precedents, Margaret directs her curses above all against the Yorkists. 
She does not perform a complete excommunication ceremony, but 
there are many fragmentary quotes from execration formulas among 
her numerous curses. They reach their most prominent and richly 
allusive fury in 1.3, during her major execration of the entire atten-
dant court:
margaret: Though not by war, by surfeit die your King,
As ours by murder, to make him a king.
Edward thy son, that now is Prince of Wales,
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For Edward my son, that was Prince of Wales,
Die in his youth, by like untimely violence.
Thyself, a queen, for me that was a queen,
Outlive thy glory like my wretched self:
Long may’st thou live to wail thy children’s death,
And see another, as I see thee now,
Deck’d in thy rights, as thou art stall’d in mine;
Long die thy happy days before thy death,
And, after many lenghten’d hours of grief,
Die neither mother, wife, nor England’s Queen.
Rivers and Dorset, you were standers-by,
And so wast thou, Lord Hastings, when my son
Was stabb’d with bloody daggers. God, I pray Him,
That none of you may live his natural age,
But by some unlook’d accident cut off. (1.3.197–214)
This speech is structured by the imitation of traditional patterns: allu-
sions on the level of form as well as content evoke the great curse of the 
Covenant in Deuteronomy 28 that is a favoured source of excommuni-
cation formulas even in the Anglican Church. The threat, for example, 
that the execrated ones will survive their children and die in loneliness, 
is reminiscent of Deut. 28:32ff.; the proclamation that they will be forced 
to relinquish their position to a usurper, of Deut. 28:43ff. An influence 
of the Psalms is also discernible.35 These curses and laments that Mar-
garet as well as the other former queens (i.e., the Duchess of York and 
Elizabeth) pronounce subvert the dialogic situation and dissolve it into 
conventional ceremonies of mourning and cursing. Their speakers are 
exponents not only of outdated power relations, but also of outmoded 
forms of representation. What is notable about Margaret’s maledictions, 
however, is the fact that both the curser and the cursed are being defined 
by terms of deprivation: loss of position, loss of social connections, and 
loss of perlocutionary power. In her representations, the curse appears 
as a congregation created by violent degradations in which the position 
of the excommunicate largely coincides with that of the excommunica-
tor: curses are received and passed on in concatenated series in which 
the execrators are at the same time the execrated. Margaret is not the 
first link in this chain of curses, as Richard is the first to point out: he 
refers to the curse that his father pronounced against Margaret before 
she executed him:
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richard: The curse my noble father laid on thee
When thou didst crown his warlike brows with paper,
And with thy scorns drew’st rivers from his eyes,
And then to dry them, gav’st the Duke a clout
Steep’d in the faultless blood of pretty Rutland –
His curses then, from bitterness of soul
Denounc’d against thee, are all fall’n upon thee,
And God, not we, hath plagu’d thy bloody deed. (1.3.174–81)
Richard thus points out that Margaret’s deeds in the three parts of Henry 
VI, when she was still in power, were not godlier than those of Richard, 
even though she now constantly invokes God’s name. Once again, the 
sanctifying performatives of all parties are subverted by an inherent irony. 
Margaret’s curses appear superior only by virtue of the fact that she sub-
ordinates herself explicitly and entirely to the fatal dynamics and the apo-
retic structure of this speech act. The horizon of this unfolding lex talionis 
is total destruction since the pure logic of vengeance can find no other 
end. Margaret herself recognizes this constitutive excess of her maledic-
tory inventory:
margaret: Think that thy babes were sweeter than they were,
And he that slew them fouler than he is:
Bettering thy loss makes the bad-causer worse.
Revolving this will teach thee how to curse. (4.4.120–3)
But even this inherent excess is shadowed by an inherent redundancy: 
it is the problem of all cursing queens and ex-queens that Richard, 
whom they curse, is already cursed by his deeds, which makes their 
work seem tautological. In Anne’s words, they “curse [the] cursed 
self” (1.2.80). All this makes it seem not too farfetched to understand 
Margaret and her outmoded and undead rituals as an allegory of 
English Catholicism in its decline. But that would overly simplify the 
dramatic constellation: like all of Shakespeare’s characters, Margaret 
represents a theatrical potential that can at best be overdetermined 
by political parables. Representations of diverse social tendencies 
coalesce in this placeless personification of a past that is marked as a 
simulacrum.
Nevertheless, Richard at times displays almost timid reactions to 
Margaret, such as his oddly childish interruption of her cursing tirade 
96 Björn Quiring
(1.3.234). He seems to be in awe of her liturgical curses against him 
and apparently wants to prevent their propagation (see also 3 Henry VI, 
5.5.43, and Richard III, 4.4.149–51), for Richard wants a new distribution 
of curses in the social field, that is freely manipulable and functionalized 
in the interest of dramatic power.
But the curse cannot be subdued so easily; it soon becomes apparent 
that it escapes Richard, and the latter cannot altogether keep it under con-
trol, not least because Richard the universal impersonator and cynic is still 
a believer in one thing: he believes in the sacredness of the crown. He con-
siders it the unmoved centre of history (the earthly Paradise, “Elysium,” 
3, Henry VI, 1.2.30) and the king’s name “a tower of strength” (5.3.12). 
The crown functions as Richard’s one fetishistic object, around which his 
deceptive reality structures itself, but which is itself not deceptive. More 
than his amorality, it is this perverse faith in a fixed point in the universe 
that proves his undoing. When he finally achieves the crown, he attempts 
to further legitimize his position by either murdering or marrying all 
other legitimate pretenders to the crown; but he goes about this project 
with so much political clumsiness that he increasingly comes to resemble 
his predecessor. Like Edward IV, he involuntarily establishes double binds 
(e.g., in 4.2.442–55), and begins to harken after “drunken prophecies” 
(4.2.94–105). In the process he neglects the realm of politics as if it had 
grown irrelevant in the new “dark monarchy” (1.4.51). When he hears of 
the attack by the new pretender to the throne, Richmond, who lacks real 
dynastic legitimacy, he seems genuinely confused (4.4.469–73).
His final downfall begins at the night before the Battle of Bosworth 
Field, with the entrance of the cursing dead (5.3.118–77). The ghost 
scene almost seems redundant in a play that swarms with characters who 
count themselves among the living dead (see, e.g., 4.3.26–7) and whose 
series of executions resembles the procession of a danse macabre. But 
this episode is as necessary as The Mousetrap is for Hamlet: as a mirror 
image of the drama, it opens the play onto a meta-theatrical level, for 
the dead perform an abridged version of the play: their entrances are 
chronologically arranged according to the point in time at which they 
were killed, and their accusations repeat the plot development of Richard 
III. Ghostly apparitions often introduce this meta-theatrical dimension 
in Shakespeare’s dramas; they are not only histrionic themselves, but 
also direct the spectator’s attention to the theatrical character of reality 
by pointing towards a different scene, “ein anderer Schauplatz.”36 However, 
the entrance of the dead in 5.3 is more ceremonious than was customary 
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in the Elizabethan theatre.37 The ghosts dialogue neither with each 
other nor with the living; instead, they recite formulas. The stereotypical 
and only superficially varied exhortation “Despair and die!” in all ten 
cases is combined with a “Think on …” formula that is a reminder of the 
speaker’s murder. Often, but not consistently, two other locutions occur: 
“Let me sit heavy on your soul” and “Let fall thy sword.” The formulaic 
character of these utterances again suggests liturgical performatives; the 
scene of the ghosts mixes elements of the sacrificial mass with ecclesi-
astical excommunication ceremonies. Together with the dead, a dead 
ceremony returns. But in contrast to the mass, the revenant dead do not 
testify to anything beyond themselves in the theatre. They demand nei-
ther their own deliverance nor Richard’s eternal damnation nor other 
interventions of divine powers. All they insist on is commemoration and 
the defeat of Richard, resulting from his awareness of former guilt. The 
ghosts are, as it were, “enlightened” ghosts who already take into consid-
eration their own possibly phantasmatic status as personified pangs of 
conscience:
rivers, grey, vaughan: Our wrongs in Richard’s bosom
Will conquer him. (5.3.145–6)
However, this wish involves a slight paradox: the dead insistently demand 
commemoration even though the dream in which they appear must itself 
be understood as a form of this commemoration. The princes make this 
dilemma explicit by cursing Richard with a bad dream in which they 
themselves appear:
princes: Dream on thy cousins, smother’d in the Tower. (5.3.152)
Since Richard is experiencing this very dream at the very same moment, 
the curse wishes for something that is already happening, emphasizing 
its redundant nature. The political claims of the cursing ghosts, however, 
remain unreconciled behind the facade of a ritual univocity; their curse 
is less a communal than a serial act. (According to the stage directions of 
the Folio, never more than three ghosts have to be on stage at the same 
time.) Contrary to Tillyard’s dictum,38 this scene, then, does not signal 
the inception of a new epoch of theologico-political unity, but represents 
incompatible and obsolete claims on symbolic positions of power. The 
revenants do indeed echo each other but without actually speaking in 
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harmony: polyphonic notes tending toward dissonance are softly audible 
in their chorus. They continue to speak as Yorkists and Lancastrians, 
and it is precisely the residual claims to legitimacy on the two competing 
sides that lend performative strength to their curses. The dead do not 
articulate a law but an abundance of mutually exclusive obligations. Con-
sequently, the curse pronounced on Richard remains overdetermined, 
and Richard’s subsequent defeat remains a matter of interpretation: it 
can be ideologically appropriated, but it has no indisputable meaning 
beyond itself.
It is all the more necessary that the curse perpetuate itself after 
Richard’s downfall and death. His successor, the future Henry VII, does 
not suspend but actually affirms the logic of theatrical execration that 
has kept the mechanism of the drama in motion until that point. His 
blessing of England and her monarch is supplemented by a prospective 
curse on their traitors that ends the drama:
richmond: Abate the edge of traitors, gracious Lord,
That would reduce these bloody days again,
And make poor England weep in streams of blood.
Let them not live to taste this land’s increase,
That would with treason wound this fair land’s peace. (5.5.35–9)
Their use of metaphors as well as their content and their symmetrical 
positioning establish connections between Richard’s opening mono-
logue and the concluding speech of Richmond.39 The similarity of their 
names and the symmetry of the scenes in which they share the stage 
brings them closer together and thereby puts an ironic twist on their 
statements. As is true of other Shakespearean dramas, the ending of 
this play is a pseudo-ending inasmuch as the curses pronounced by and 
over Richard III apparently continue to be in effect in the kingdom of 
the Tudors. In the final analysis, Richmond is a shadow of Richard; he 
imitates him. Richard has prepared the ground on which his successor 
can justify his usurpation. At the end, the curse that has unfolded in 
the social field is not dissolved, but passes from one constellation to the 
next; the problem of its persistence in spite of its secularization remains 
unresolved.
However, by appropriating and analysing the curse, Shakespeare has 
successfully represented the theatre as the better, more enlightened 
church. After all, it is the theatre that makes it possible to compare and 
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judge Richard and Richmond in this way. So the theatre with all its iro-
nies has shown itself as the medium in which the social structures and 
conflicts of the recent past can be given their adequate representation. 
Theatre is allied with deception, but on stage this deception is marked 
as a deception and can be problematized, discussed, and perhaps even 
renegotiated and transformed. But while theatre turns out to be a better 
representation of the relevant forces constituting early modern English 
society, its effectiveness is still associated with the persistence of ancient 
rituals. The form of the ban that it delineates and turns into an object of 
political thought and critique also lends it some latent force of legitimacy. 
Richard III opens a space for philosophical reflection on the mythical 
curse, but the curse nonetheless persists within the theatre and cannot 
be overcome because the social effectivity of Shakespeare’s drama still 
relies on it. The curse as a destructive source of social cohesion remains 
a factor inherent within theatrical representation; theatre has given it a 
new home, but its reflexivity has not been able to unravel the knot of rit-
ual exclusion and thus save the spectators from its destructive potential.
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Over the last several years, I have been thinking about literature in gen-
eral, and Shakespeare in particular, as offering a way of life.1 My inspi-
ration here, at least in part, came not from work in literary studies but 
from work in philosophy, especially that of Pierre Hadot. Hadot believes 
that ancient philosophy’s offer was not so much an aporia-free system of 
doctrine as a robust way of living, of confronting problems that were as 
everyday as they were ontological.2 Philosophers across classical schools 
aimed as much to form as to inform, and so Hadot places askesis at phi-
losophy’s core. Philosophy once was and ought to be not just about iden-
tifying what is true and good but also about attending to problems of life 
and living. In Shakespeare as a Way of Life, likewise, I wrote as much about 
how Shakespeare’s plays offer a way of life as about how those plays offer, 
or are subject to, ideological critique.3
Many of Shakespeare’s plays, I argued, might sensibly be read as urg-
ing askesis in some of Hadot’s senses: for instance, in prompting an “exis-
tential choice” intended to transform the self and in showing far more 
concern with the kind of life one lives than with elaborating a coherent 
system of belief. Reading Shakespeare as a sceptical thinker, I tried to 
highlight his concern with how doubt might allow us to relate to our 
minds and bodies, to be free, and to love. In the present chapter, I would 
like to think further about how Shakespeare offers a way of life – and 
in particular, an art of love – in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. For Hadot, 
philosophy is realized through its performance, through becoming a 
way of life; in Shakespeare’s comedy, similarly, love is realized not simply 
through performance, but through the performance of doubt.
From its first scene, characters in A Midsummer Night’s Dream conceive 
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Hippolyta by doing her injuries, Demetrius wants to slay Lysander and 
feels as if Hermia has slain him, and Helena for her part seems happy to 
be beaten. Indeed, one of the play’s solutions to the violence that struc-
tures love involves its own kind of violence: Oberon and Puck forcing 
homicidal characters into sleep and then drugging them. Conjoining 
love and violence so often, Shakespeare’s play can make “love is war” 
seem like the only apt metaphor for romance.4
All the same, the play also offers alternative, non-violent versions of 
love.5 We might look, as some readers do, to two moments when char-
acters conceive of love in terms of union: when violence between lover 
and beloved seems not possible because there isn’t much of a “between” 
separating lovers at all. Specifically, we might look to Helena’s portrayal 
of what her relationship with Hermia once was, when they felt “as if our 
hands, our sides, voices and minds, / Had been incorporate” – when 
these friends, “like to a double cherry,” had “two seeming bodies, but 
one heart” (3.2.200–12).6 If we take what Lysander says seriously, we 
might also look to one of his declarations of love for Hermia, when he 
says that their love might comprise “one heart, one bed, two bosoms, 
and one troth” (2.2.41). Helena and Lysander may well use the rhetoric 
of unity in order to manipulate Hermia, but they both at least portray 
love as gentle, mutual, and reciprocal,7 so much so that their portray-
als are sometimes said to accord with Aristophanes’s famous account of 
love in Plato’s Symposium, in which the search for love is the search for a 
lost unity.8 Here the story of love becomes not a story of conquest but a 
story of self-completion, of the self’s move from lack to wholeness, from 
restlessness to peace.
But Shakespeare conjoins peace and love in other ways as well. When 
love in the play is not a story of conquest, it is not always a story of comple-
tion. In at least one moment, love and peace come together when love 
involves what we often think that it ought to overcome – serious, thor-
oughgoing doubt – and when the story of love, the end toward which it 
moves, cannot be discerned.
The moment I have in mind occurs in act 4, when Theseus and Egeus 
awaken the central quartet of lovers after the chaos in the wood. The 
lovers all seem changed. They may have changed in many ways, but the 
change most obvious to me is in how tentative they are, how unsure of 
themselves and their love. When Lysander attempts to account for him-
self, and for how these four reached a “gentle concord” after so much 
discord, he seems not to know what to say. “I shall reply amazedly,” he 
says, “Half sleep, half waking; but as yet, I swear, / I cannot truly say 
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how I came here” (4.1.145–7). Lysander eventually remembers how 
they entered the wood, but not how they entered their present state of 
peace. He certainly doesn’t conceive of that state as one he has deserved, 
earned, or achieved, and that seems important. More important, per-
haps, is the fact that Lysander’s inability to account for himself, to “truly 
say” what has happened to him, arises here for the first time, when he is 
less combative than he has ever been.
Demetrius, for his part, can recall how he got to the wood: with Hel-
ena’s help. But he cannot recall how he ended up loving her again:
 I wot not by what power –
But by some power it is – my love to Hermia,
Melted as the snow, seems to me now
As the remembrance of an idle gaud
Which in my childhood I did dote upon,
And all the faith, the virtue of my heart,
The object and the pleasure of mine eye,
Is only Helena. (4.1.163–70)
Demetrius, too, abandons the wilful, headstrong behaviour that defined 
his earlier encounters with nearly everyone. He realizes that he is sub-
ject to a power greater than him, so much greater, in fact, that he can-
not give it a name. This pleases Theseus, who arranges for the couples 
to be wed. The duke and those with him then exit, leaving the lovers 
to themselves, and now we see that their self-doubt is deep-seated, not 
merely performed so as to satisfy authority. Their lingering uncertainty is 
interesting enough – to me, anyway – to dwell on the next six lines. They 
speak enigmatically:
demetrius: These things seem small and undistinguishable,
Like far-off mountains turned into clouds.
hermia: Methinks I see these things with parted eye,
When everything seems double.
helena: So methinks:
And I have found Demetrius like a jewel,
Mine own, and not mine own. (4.1.186–91)
Bewilderment abounds. Given that, we might wonder whether these lov-
ers have learned anything about love. I think that they have, and that 
 Way of Life 105
they’ve actually learned something pretty important. (Even if, arguably, 
they forget what they’ve learned by the time of the rude mechanicals’ 
performance in the play’s final act.) To explain what they’ve learned, I’ll 
examine three of the lovers in turn.
Let me begin with Demetrius, simply because he comes first. When 
he says, “These things seem small and undistinguishable,” “these things” 
could refer to many things: to the wood outside Athens, to the interac-
tion they’ve just had with Theseus and Egeus, to the circumstances of 
their awakening. At the least, “these things” would seem to refer to what 
has happened in the wood and to the resolution. Demetrius has just pro-
fessed certainty as to how he now loves Helena and only Helena. At the 
same time, he also clearly acknowledges limits to clear perception, and 
to how far his certainty extends. He’s admitting that he can’t see what’s 
in the distance. Whatever it is, is “small and undistinguishable.”
The simile in the second line I find especially telling. Some readers, 
with reason, see the “far off mountains turned into clouds” as Shake-
speare drawing our attention to love’s metamorphic quality, its power to 
transform us for good and for ill.9 Still, I think the simile draws our atten-
tion as much to the sheer murkiness of love as it does to its metamorpho-
ses. Demetrius hopes, perhaps, that the future to which he tends with 
Helena has a mountain’s solidity. But it could be no more substantial 
than a cloud; and right now, after whatever has happened in the wood, 
clouds are what the horizon seems to hold. Maybe the future, when they 
reach it, will impress them with its dimensions and its splendour, will 
implant in them the wish to reach love’s summit. Or maybe they will not 
meet anything so solid, and whatever substance love has had, or could 
have, has already been eroded and soon will evaporate altogether. What-
ever the case, Demetrius’s hesitancy, uncertainty, and doubt about his 
own powers seem to me far superior to the aggressive resolve charac-
teristic of him hitherto, and far more auspicious when it comes to love.
Hermia, too, sees “these things,” these changes in their lives, with 
incertitude. When she entered the wood, she saw all through the lens 
of a single-minded, uncomplicated love for Lysander, viewing him as her 
other half so adamantly that when he leaves her side, she imagines that 
the only options left to her are to find him or die, as though her heart 
could not beat without his: “I well perceive you are not nigh. / Either 
death or you I’ll find immediately” (2.2.154–5). Now, though, she lays 
claim to double vision and a complicated, ambivalent love. Perhaps Her-
mia, deflated a bit, dimly recalls Lysander’s vitriol, his spurning of her 
not long ago. Perhaps she realizes, as Nancy Cass does in Silas Marner, 
that nothing, not even love, is as good as it seems at first.10 Perhaps 
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Hermia realizes, as Nancy’s husband Godfrey fails to realize, that no life 
can be thoroughly joyous.
Whatever Hermia realizes, she at least realizes that love for her is no 
longer a simple story by which two become one, the story that Lysander 
tells her in the wood and that I referred to earlier. When “everything 
seems double,” as it does for Hermia, love cannot make one of two. Love 
is a story in which two remain two, or even a story in which one becomes 
two. Once Hermia saw herself and her love simplistically, marked by 
Cupid’s “best arrow with the golden head” and by “the simplicity of 
Venus’s doves” (1.1.170–1). Now she sees all with a parted eye. Lysander 
lodges no objection, so perhaps he has learned something similar. I hope 
that he has.
Early in the play, Hermia and Lysander famously lament that the 
course of true love never does run smooth, for reasons that even they 
view as rather hackneyed. Lovers are either too distant in rank or years, 
or too reliant on the advice of friends. That, or war, sickness, or death 
gets in the way. In this view, we might say, the course of true love runs 
crooked because of obstacles that appear on love’s path and that force 
lovers to stray from a course that, in itself, runs clear and straight.
Were Hermia and Lysander to have this exchange again in act 4, they 
would need to alter their view. Love’s course won’t run smooth, not 
because of obstacles that arise on the path but because there are two 
paths, because – when you see all with a parted eye – it becomes hard 
to answer the question of which path is right. Seeing double, how could 
Hermia know which path to take? How could she know whether to pledge 
fidelity to Lysander absolutely, or whether, instead, to commit to him with 
only half a heart? How could she know that both paths won’t lead to the 
same place? Whatever answers a reader might offer, I leave the scene 
thinking that never again can love, or her sense of Lysander, be simple.
Hermia’s double vision has received considerable comment, but the 
reading perhaps most germane to this chapter – and collection – comes 
from David Marshall.11 Marshall argues that we must understand Hermia 
in terms of performance, of a certain theatrical self-consciousness that 
she possesses at different moments in the play, and perhaps never more 
acutely than here: “Hermia’s double vision of these things, her parted 
eye, comes from her parted I: the doubling and dividing of her ‘I’ into 
two parts – Hermia and not Hermia, the part and the actor before us.”12 
While I might use different terms, I certainly agree that Shakespeare has 
in mind a paradox having to do with love and its performance. On the 
one hand, love is not love unless it is performed, inventively and artfully. 
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For Shakespeare, how could it be otherwise? On the other hand, the per-
formance of love can call love into question, as we see, for instance, when 
Demetrius and Lysander profess their love for Helena while drugged in 
the wood. Just as Hermia does not know which path of love to take – the 
one in which she commits to Lysander whole or half-heartedly – so she 
cannot know just how to interpret Lysander’s own expressions of devo-
tion. Should she respond with conviction, with uncertainty, or with con-
viction of uncertainty?
Helena, equally perplexed, elaborates her own double vision. She 
explores what such vision entails not for the path of love, but for pos-
session of the one that she loves. Helena does say that she has happened 
upon Demetrius as one would happen upon a jewel, and this might set 
off alarms for those looking to practise an art of love, especially since 
much of the play has been about who, in love, has a right to whom, about 
who gets to possess whom: about whether Demetrius or Lysander has a 
right to Hermia, and then Helena; about whether Oberon or Titania has 
a right to the changeling boy; about whether Helena has a right to Her-
mia as a friend. Conflicts over possession have made love more like war.
That Helena refers to Demetrius as a jewel is not encouraging. Yet even 
though Helena conceives of subjects as being like objects, she leaves the 
wood having accepted that she might not have any unassailable right to 
Demetrius. The beloved is only ever, at best, one’s own and also not one’s 
own.13 The dream of total, and totally secure, possession can never be 
realized. (And that dream, the play has shown, was always a nightmare to 
begin with.) Demetrius being Helena’s own but not her own also means 
that love can’t complete Helena in the way that her relationship with 
Hermia once did. If Demetrius does and does not belong to her, he can 
never be Helena’s other half in any straightforward way. Whatever love 
they now have will need to be more complex than that.
In thinking of Demetrius as a jewel, Helena falls short of a certain 
standard: of the “non-will to possess” that, according to Roland Barthes, 
might define the art of love. We are, Barthes writes, “to let come (from 
the other) what comes, to let pass (from the other) what goes; to pos-
sess nothing, to repel nothing; to receive, not to keep.”14 Helena cannot 
keep from wanting to keep Demetrius. But if she still dreams of posses-
sion, perhaps she has managed to rid her love of the possessiveness – the 
desire to make Demetrius indisputably, certainly hers – that makes vio-
lence more likely.
There may even be another sense in which Helena’s comparison of 
Demetrius to a jewel is not solely discouraging. If we understand the 
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jewel not only as a possession but also as a cut stone, it refracts light 
and bends lines. If we see Helena as not only looking at Demetrius as a 
jewel, but also as looking through him as a jewel, we can see how he might 
change, colour, and double her perspective without quite determining 
it. Just as she does and does not possess him, then, so he does and does 
not possess her or her way of seeing. How far this is from the moment 
when the drugged Lysander wakes and sees “Transparent Helena!,” 
when all seemed so clear (2.2.102).15
One common technique that sceptics use in order to achieve tranquil-
lity, and that I explored in Shakespeare as a Way of Life, is the holding of 
opposed visions in an equipollence.16 At least as early as Sextus Empiri-
cus, balancing views against each other, being double-minded in that 
sense, allows us not to be so single-minded about pursuing our passions. 
In the scene I’ve been discussing, the quartet of lovers practise some-
thing like this. Helena views Demetrius as hers and as not hers; Hermia 
sees an attractive path of love and a less attractive one; Demetrius sees 
a future of solid mountains and of insubstantial clouds. These double 
visions of love, I think, account for the ataraxia that these lovers seem 
to have achieved. In this, Shakespeare’s play suggests that one way to 
counter overpowering passion – whether of love or hate – is to entertain 
opposed notions. Think that someone belongs to you absolutely? Enter-
tain the idea that no one belongs to anyone. Convinced that your future 
is rock solid? Imagine that it might dissolve into nothing. Sure that your 
lover embodies all the best ideals? Consider that they could be just awful. 
Perhaps, Shakespeare suggests, such a practice could help settle your 
heart.
The reading that I have offered so far may seem to make too much 
of too little. After all, Demetrius now questions whether they are even 
awake or still sleep. We can, if we want, interpret his bewilderment as 
Shakespeare’s way of suggesting that there’s little of substance to be 
taken from what has come before. The fogginess of it all – the emphasis 
on the small, indistinguishable, and doubled – could be Shakespeare’s 
way of suggesting that there isn’t much to be learned about why, who, 
and how we love. It could be Shakespeare’s way of preparing us for the 
apology that comes in the play’s epilogue.
I don’t think that this is quite how the scene’s uncertainty works. I think 
that uncertainty in love is what the characters have learned, and what the 
audience is meant to learn.17 We must remember that until Oberon and 
Puck separate the four lovers so that they do not kill each other, they 
have been nothing if not certain. Hermia and Lysander start out certain 
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that their love is true love, and that they must run away. Demetrius is cer-
tain that he must run after Hermia, so certain that he feels his pursuit of 
this singular, irreplaceable person gives him every right to kill Lysander. 
Helena is adamant that any relationship with Demetrius is better than 
nothing, that any place in his life is a place of high privilege.
After love-in-idleness adds to the confusion in the wood, certainty 
ratchets up – as do threats of violence. Lysander insists that he would 
run through fire for Helena, and Demetrius that Helena is a goddess; 
each man vows to slay the other. Helena is convinced that both mock her 
and that Hermia mocks her too, while Hermia becomes convinced that 
her former best friend has betrayed her and deserves to die.
Act 4 does away with all this. Sure about their futures in the sense 
that they know whom they will marry, the lovers are unsure about nearly 
everything else. They are unsure about what their married futures hold, 
whether they are as solid as mountain ranges or as insubstantial as clouds. 
Until act 4, Oberon had offered the only way to pry love and violence 
apart, a way that involves an incapacitating violence of its own. Then 
uncertainty and humility arrive, with Lysander and Demetrius so unsure 
of themselves that threats of violence seem inconceivable, and Helena 
and Hermia so unsure of love that desire is not the violent perturbation 
that it once was. Uncertainty quells the violence of desire and desire that 
leads to violence.
In A Midsummer Night’s Dream uncertain love brings peace. Marshall 
reads the play as asking whether it would be possible to have a powerful 
theatrical vision without imposing it on someone else, and Laura Levine 
answers that question in the negative. According to this play, in her view, 
theatre is always a kind of violence, even a kind of rape.18 Anytime some-
one has a vision of love, one seeks to force that vision on someone else. 
This is true at some points in the play, to be sure, but not this one. Open-
ness, not imposition, defines the doubt that these lovers perform, and 
the visions that they have, at the wood’s edge.
What might all this imply about the art of love? Here are some of the 
more basic implications. Just as these lovers cannot account for how they 
have ended up as they have, so we ought not to assume that we under-
stand why our own hearts are the way they are, or that our hearts are 
only one way. Just as Demetrius both is and is not Helena’s, so we ought 
to assume that the beloved is at best ours and not ours, and only so for a 
time. Just as Demetrius knows that he cannot say what the future of his 
love might hold, so we ought to take little for granted about our own 
horizons, to admit that those horizons are open.19
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Accepting such a clouded vision might seem opposed to the art of 
love. In The Art of Loving, for instance, Erich Fromm writes that in love 
we must aim for clarity, must strive to move from narcissism to objectivity. 
To practise the art of love we must develop “the faculty to see people as 
they are, objectively, and to be able to separate this objective picture from a 
picture which is formed by one’s desires and fears.”20 A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, by contrast, suggests not only that objectivity is impossible, but 
also that striving for it may be undesirable. I say this not, or at least not 
only, because love in this play needs fantasy – because characters “as they 
are” need to be gilded by imagination in order to even appear lovable 
(because, to cite just two examples, Lysander may well be weak of faith 
and Demetrius almost certainly a monster). Objectivity may not be worth 
striving for, the play suggests, not so much because love depends upon 
fantasy but because striving to see someone objectively assumes an overly 
confident view of our capacity to see clearly.21 Love in Shakespeare’s play 
demands acknowledging not our capacity for this but our incapacity; it 
demands more that we see the limits of our powers of perception than 
that we sharpen those powers. 22
In this, Shakespeare’s play exists at some distance not just from Fromm 
but even from Alain Badiou’s more nuanced sense of how love should 
change our way of seeing. For Badiou, love is not an essentially inward 
experience but an outward looking one, a construction made not “from 
the perspective of One but from the perspective of Two.”23 Whereas 
Fromm believes that love involves developing as objective a view of the 
beloved as possible, Badiou believes that love involves incorporating the 
beloved’s perspective into one’s own and seeing the world accordingly. 
Love demands fidelity to this new perspective, to seeing through the 
prism of difference and to constructing a truth, moment by moment 
and day by day. Badiou advocates fidelity to a perspective that is, in some 
way, doubled by the beloved’s; he advocates, in this sense if not Hermia’s, 
seeing the world with a parted eye. But Shakespeare suggests that anyone 
who has loved for very long – who has been through that wood – will 
know that we cannot quite construct a truth together. Our vision is too 
feeble and fragmented for that.
Such a kind of love, based more in incapacity than capacity, in some 
ways may be dull and disappointing. In fact, for all its fancy, A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream compresses the trajectory of many relationships. When love 
begins, we’re often full of confidence – as Stendhal has it, we endow the 
beloved with a thousand perfections, and we imagine that the beloved 
might perfect us.24 The beloved seems divine and seems to inspire a cer-
tain divinity in us. Robert Solomon, in fact, opines that the only reason 
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for loving is that the beloved will bring out the best in us, will help us 
to become our best selves.25 (To cite just one example from the play, 
desire for Hermia leads Lysander to think that he has power to thwart 
authority, until his newfound desire for Helena makes him think himself 
flame-retardant, able to thwart the natural order [2.2.102].)
Then time passes. Those we love start to seem less perfect. We’re less 
sure of their flawlessness, and we’re less sure of ourselves. If the play sug-
gests that this can be a good thing and that love can make us better – if 
it can do anything apart from make us more deluded, and more likely 
to murder – it would do so not by making us more perfect or more pow-
erful. Instead, love would make us better by making us more aware of 
our own inability. Love would make us better by making us humbler. We 
would learn to live with the uncertainty that comes from the certainty of 
imperfection and of imperfect perception, and we would acknowledge 
the hazy future that this promises. Then, and only then, love might last.
Enduring love has a hard time finding its way onto the stage. Badiou 
writes that literature in general, and theatre in particular, “contains very 
little in terms of the experience of its [love’s] endurance over time.”26 
Indeed, Badiou goes so far as to say, “If you watch plays that show the 
struggles of young lovers against the despotism of the family universe – a 
classic theme – you could give them all as sub-title Marivaux’s The Tri-
umph of Love…. It’s the triumph of love, but not its duration” (81–2). If 
Badiou is right, A Midsummer Night’s Dream would be rather unusual. The 
play ends uncomfortably, and, as many readers have pointed out, Shake-
speare might not show us love’s triumph.27 But in the way that he com-
presses a long course of love, Shakespeare does show us how we might 
make for love’s duration.
Shakespeare gives us licence, if we want, to pass over the lines I’ve treated 
as ones spoken by impaired characters who remain in an altered state. But 
if we do, I think we miss out on one important way that love can avoid trag-
edy: when lovers admit how much they don’t know. Admitting this, they 
are changed, bettered not by being made more powerful, or more adept, 
or more perfect, but by being made to see the limits of their powers and 
their perfections. When their certainty becomes uncertainty, the war of 
love becomes peace. The art of love, in this play, is an art of doubt.
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of Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Or, the Ancient Constitution in 
Ancient Athens,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 14, no. 1 (2014): 
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King Lear’s anxiety to unburden himself of the “cares” of kingship so 
that he can “crawl toward death,” innocent, free, and detached from the 
oppressive concerns of this earthly plane, dominates the opening scene 
of Shakespeare’s tragedy:
Meantime we will express our darker purpose.
Give me the map there. Know that we have divided
In three our kingdom, and ’tis our fast intent
To shake all cares and business from our age,
Conferring them on younger strengths.1
As derived from the old English term for grief and suffering (caru, cearu), 
care is a force to eschew for the aging monarch.2 As if the physical passing 
on of the crown could “shake” the “cares and business” of a long reign, 
Lear’s emotional and psychological divestiture is naively conceived as 
a simple passing of the baton, a mock reading of a final testament that 
is rendered into the absurd. Cares, however, are obstinate and heavy, 
clinging tenaciously to Lear’s aging soul. In Richard II’s description, the 
crown and cares are immortal partners, inseparable by time and syntax:
Your cares set up do not pluck my cares down.
My care is loss of care, by old care done;
Your care is gain of care, by new care won.
The cares I give I have, though given away;
They tend the crown, yet still with me they stay.3
The early modern personification of Care as worry in the realm of 
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Horace’s Ode 3.1: “But fear and threats climb up to the same spot as the 
master; and she withdraws not from the bronze galley, and she even sits 
behind the horseman – black, gloomy Care.”4 Personified frequently as 
a masculine figure, Care appears in Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene as 
the toiling blacksmith:
Rude was his garment, and to rags all rent,
Ne better had he, ne for better cared:
With blistred hands emongst the cinders brent,
And fingers filthie, with long nayles vnpared,
Right fit to rend the food, on which he fared.
His name was Care; a blacksmith by his trade,
That neither day nor night from working spared,
But to small purpose yron wedges made;
Those be vnquiet thoughts, that carefull minds inuade.5
Care is an intruder in Friar Lawrence’s counsel to a perturbed Romeo – 
“Care keeps his watch in every old man’s eye, / And where care lodges, 
sleep will never lie”6 – and a fraying force, unravelling man’s physical 
adornments as a reflection of his internal state in Macbeth: “Sleep that 
knits up the raveled sleeve of care.”7 It is the detachment from these 
“unquiet thoughts” that tantalizes Lear as he approaches retirement and 
aspires for a rather different form of care – the “kind nursery” he expects 
from Cordelia as his caregiver in old age.8
While detachment from oppressive cares is an envious state of being, 
the movement from noun to verb, from cares to caring, transforms 
the burdens of one’s ego to concern for others. The dynamics of this 
semantic movement coexists in King Lear and in early modern usage as 
an active potentiality that transforms individual concern into collabora-
tive possibility, releasing an ego crippled by concern and self-obsession 
into the emancipatory space of the abode of service to others. The latter 
state develops individual capacity in empowering others while the for-
mer robs the self from attaining a state of self-knowledge that is possible 
only through an outward-looking orientation. The Latin use of the term 
cura as concept and creation myth, found in the writings of first-century 
Roman grammarian Hyginus, captures the nature of the keyword care as 
that of both mental oppression and the conscientious attention to oth-
ers that increases one’s capacity to empathize with and serve a friend, a 
family member, a stranger.9 This chapter draws upon classical concep-
tions of the multifaceted concept of care and contemporary philosophy 
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engaging with the ethics of care to examine how care as a state of being 
and doing develops in Shakespeare’s plays.
“Care Is No Cure”10
In his Fabulae no. 220, Hyginus relates an origin story with a feminine core:
When Cura was crossing a certain river, she saw some clayey mud. She took 
it up thoughtfully and began to fashion a man. While she was pondering 
on what she had done, Jove came up; Cura asked him to give the image 
life, and Jove readily grant this. When Cura wanted to give it her name, 
Jove forbade, and said that his name should be given it. But while they were 
disputing about the name, Tellus arose and said that it should have her 
name, since she had given her own body. They took Saturn for judge; he 
seems to have decided for them: Jove, since you gave him life [take his soul 
after death; since Tellus offered her body] let her receive his body; since 
Cura first fashioned him, let her possess him as long as he lives, but since 
there is controversy about his name, let him be called homo, since he seems 
to be made from humus.11
The origins of man’s inevitable life of “care” in both the sense of indi-
vidual worry and collective concern appears in Robert’s Burton’s Anat-
omy of Melancholy as a significant contributor to the development of one’s 
melancholic disposition. As Stephanie Shirilan explains, in the Anatomy, 
Burton is “profoundly concerned with the relationship between care 
as fear or worry and care as caritas or charity. His promotion of melan-
choly rests precisely on the idea that the excess cares and supposedly 
groundless fears suffered by the melancholic attest to a generosity of 
spirit evidenced in his or her sensitivity to the suffering of others.”12 
Burton “valorizes care (as in worry or fear) as the root of compassion-
ate feeling”;13 Burton, in other words, reads Hyginus’s feminine fable 
in terms of its Old English associations with one’s state of being, as in 
Shakespeare and Spenser’s references to the masculine personification 
of insomnia inducing Care. This dual conceptualization of care is cap-
tured, for instance, in Thomas Elyot’s Latin-English dictionary, where 
Cura is defined as “care, thought, study, diligence, warke or labour, also 
loue.”14 Although the Old English etymology of care as worry and grief 
is distinct from the Latin cura, care as verb – to care for – rather than 
care as a state of being is in use by the thirteenth century. The English 
derivative of cura, cure, circulates in the fourteenth century, leaving a 
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rich linguistic heritage of association with spiritual and medicinal heal-
ing called upon in the work of Shakespeare and his contemporaries.15
The frequent early modern use of a personified Care departs from its 
Roman hermeneutic in Hyginus’s myth as that speaking to the ethics of 
caring for others, a concept found in the Stoic writing of Seneca where 
human perfection is attained through care. As Warren Thomas Reich, 
drawing upon Konrad Burdach’s early twentieth-century work, explains 
in his seminal essay on the historical evolution of the idea of care, “In 
this Stoic view, care was the key to the process of becoming truly human. 
For Seneca, the word care meant solicitude; it also had connotations of 
attentiveness, conscientiousness, and devotion.”16 Martin Heidegger 
elaborates on this duality or the “ambiguity of the terms ‘cura’” in Being 
and Time in terms of Seneca’s perfection, claiming that “the perfectio of 
human being – becoming what one can be in being free for one’s own-
most possibilities (project) – is an ‘accomplishment’ of ‘care.’”17 For Hei-
degger, “being-in-the-word is essentially care.”18
Warren T. Reich’s affirmative reading of the Cura myth has profound 
implications for the well-known clash of civilizations thesis, a reading of 
human relationships that maintains an inevitable battle of differences 
rather than collaborative unity in diversity: “The Myth of Care offers a 
subversively different image of human society, with very different implica-
tions for ethics in general and bioethics in particular.”19 As Reich explains, 
care is the “glue,” the binding source, the aspirational material for human 
society, the means to perfection of universal virtues from within diverse 
cultures and religions. Writing from a personalist philosophy, Milton May-
eroff’s 1971 On Caring explicates the nature of this dynamic state of being 
in the world that emphasizes the “primacy of process,” which often forms 
through the struggle of “overcoming obstacles and difficulties.”20 Caring is 
intricately linked with familial relationships and by extension with others 
in one’s community; it is a means of being in the world with oneself and 
with others that is focused on capacity building: “To help another person 
to grow is at least to help him to care for something or someone apart 
from himself.”21 As in the Cura Myth, caring in Mayeroff’s estimation con-
cerns the foundation of being in the world: “We are ‘in place’ in the world 
through having our lives ordered by inclusive caring.”22
While caring is not limited to familial responsibilities or simply for 
vulnerable populations, it is noteworthy to read Shakespeare’s engage-
ment with an ethics of care found in King Lear alongside The Tempest. 
Both plays depict the needs of two particularly vulnerable populations: 
the elderly and the poor in Lear and an orphaned and disfigured Caliban 
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in The Tempest.23 Through these prominent depictions of poverty and 
oppression, Shakespeare adumbrates the hard and thorny path to devel-
oping virtues in not only Lear and Prospero, but also in Edgar, the future 
king, and in Caliban, an independent sovereign reigning his reclaimed 
island by the conclusion of the play. Mayeroff’s contribution to the dis-
course on care includes an inventory of virtues or “major ingredients” 
that comprise caring: knowing, alternating rhythms, patience, honesty, 
trust, humility, hope, and courage. In King Lear, the limitation of “ethical 
possibilities,” in James Kearney’s terms, leaves us with a state of knowl-
edge that is hindered from more than minor acts of caring, the “small 
ethical moments” that brighten the darkness of the play.24 In The Tempest, 
Shakespeare takes us to the fringes of care in the guardian–ward rela-
tionship between Prospero and Caliban, exploring the challenges and 
potentials of patience and trust.
Caring on the Heath
Lear’s aspirational desire to detach from the cares of kingship depends 
on his attachment to Cordelia, the daughter who will succour him 
through her “kind nursery” (1.1.122), an anticipated time of ongoing 
care that never comes to fruition in the fullness of his expectations at 
the beginning of the play.25 Ethical possibility, often hinging on a form 
of care through hospitality and solidarity with others, is muted, lost, or 
forgotten in Shakespeare’s tragedies, dramaturgically relegated to narra-
tion rather than dramatization, and temporally distant from the chaotic 
tragic actions on stage. In Othello, caring as a form of hospitality is part 
of Othello’s defence of his prior relationships with Brabantio and his 
daughter as he proclaims in front of the duke, “Her father loved me, oft 
invited me.”26 He gestures toward a past temporality of hospitality and 
reciprocity between Othello and Desdemona’s family that seems hope-
lessly lost in the face of Brabantio’s accusations toward his new son-in-law.
While the continual care of Cordelia’s kind nursery is a desirable state 
unattainable in Lear’s lifetime, Lear’s understanding of the work needed 
to achieve such kindness evolves in his interactions with Edgar as Poor 
Tom on the heath, an “ethical catalyst in the play”27 who brings Lear to 
account through his extreme representation of poverty. Edgar as Poor 
Tom manifests the characteristics of both the inhabitants of Bedlam Hos-
pital and an assumed con artist, a well-known “social stereotype” as Wil-
liam Carroll describes.28 In the sixteenth century, various acts, such as 
the Poor Relief Act of 1601, were considered and passed attempting to 
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distinguish the social situation of the “true” poor or “approved beggars” 
that could be assisted and those to be physically punished in some form, 
bringing greater attention to the needs of those marginalized while 
firmly upholding certain biases, prejudices, and fears of those outside 
the social constraints of the greater society.29 Poor Tom, like Caliban, 
stands as a figure on the fringes of society by mirroring in his entertain-
ment of insanity the breakdown of the kingdom and the family nucleus 
in the play. In this sense, as scholars have noted, poverty is not only a 
physical state reflecting the plight of unfortunate citizens of the day, but 
also a spiritual state, the “nothingness” at the heart of Lear’s unexam-
ined life. When Lear spontaneously reflects on his duties towards the 
destitute in his kingdom, he expresses regret for his neglect:
Poor naked wretches, whereso’er you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you
From seasons such as these? O, I have ta’en
Too little care of this! Take physic, pomp,
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them,
And show the heavens more just. (3.4.28–36; emphasis added)30
At this moment before Edgar’s entrance, Lear’s reflective prayer on 
the state of the poor is the gateway to the knowledge of those whom he 
has neglected. As if in answer to his desire to “feel what wretches feel,” 
Edgar’s suffering being appears as a test assaying the fledgling virtue of 
care sprouting in Lear’s heart. As Mayeroff writes, to care for others is to 
saturate oneself in a deep understanding of another person:
To care for another person, I must be able to understand him and his world 
as if I were inside it. I must be able to see, as it were, with his eyes what his 
world is like to him and how he sees himself. Instead of merely looking at 
him in a detached way from outside, as if he were a specimen, I must be 
able to be with him in his world, “going” into his world in order to sense 
from “inside” what life is like for him, what he is striving to be, and what he 
requires to grow.31
As with the progressive development of a newly acquired virtue, such 
as care, compassion, and even justice, the framework of understanding 
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hinges on the self in its infantile state and as such, Lear responds to 
Edgar’s physical manifestation of poverty as a reflection of his own psy-
chological and spiritual state: “Has his daughters brought him to this 
pass?” (3.4.60). In his reading of this revealing scene, with patterns 
reflecting recognition scenes from romances, Kearney suggests that Lear 
has not cultivated the capacity to fully recognize the alterity of Edgar 
as distinct from his own being and as such is unable to empathize with 
him.32 In this vein, Edgar’s appearance as Poor Tom tests the practice 
of the virtue of caring that Lear summons in his prayer for the poor. 
The general “wretches” appearing in the particular figure of Poor Tom 
invoke a range of responses that revolve around Lear’s needs rather than 
a shivering Tom. Thus, while harm may seem to be the opposite of care, 
the more accurate antonym is the paralyzing force of apathy, a cruci-
ble of selfishness and estrangement from others that deteriorates social 
bonds, leaving individuals alienated, despairing, and insecure.
Although Poor Tom necessitates care, he is also the indirect caregiver 
serving primarily as one of Lear’s interlocutors. More than just a listen-
ing ear, the protean Edgar is the obliging child humouring an aged 
father figure, taking on the mask Lear wants him to assume as the “good 
Athenian” (3.4.168), the “learned Theban” (3.4.145), the “noble phi-
losopher” (3.4.160). Here Shakespeare’s turn to philosophy is performa-
tive, a parading of philosophers from antiquity uniting in their emphasis 
on virtue as a product of philosophical engagement and care for the 
self.33 When Edgar assists Lear by turning away three imagined barking 
dogs and thereby accommodating his distressed state, Lear acknowl-
edges Edgar’s service in this instance of solidarity between two abject 
souls, proclaiming, “You, sir, I entertain you for one of my hundred, only 
I do not like the fashion of your garments. You will say they are Persian; 
but let them be changed” (3.6.77–9). Considering Edgar’s rags are far 
from any sartorial symbols of Eastern elegance, riches, and pomp, the 
image Lear claims to see is ironic and puzzling. At the same time, Lear’s 
lament on Edgar’s clothing informs us of the presence of another per-
sona for Edgar, an invisible Persian figure or Englishman dressed as a 
Persian, possibly a soldier or an ambassador, graciously aiding Lear in his 
confrontation with the rancorous dogs populating his suffering mind. 
Thus, Lear does not accept Edgar as Poor Tom into his dissolving retinue 
in his attempt to salvage his dignity and control over his lost fortunes, 
but rather as an unknown figure with Persian adornments who succours 
him much like his Greek philosophers and the wise judge – all figures of 
aid the forsaken king beseeches in his time of need.
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Lear’s prayerful reflection reveals the fundamental incoherence of his 
life, that it was impossible to be a devoted father of his daughters if he 
was not a devoted servant to his realm. Lear’s prayer narrates the move-
ment of the cares of the head to caring in the heart, which becomes, 
in Seneca’s terms, a solicitous attitude toward others. In this sense, his 
epiphany speaks to Mayeroff’s description of the potential conflicts of 
caring: “My carings must be compatible, in some kind of harmony with 
one another, if they are to be inclusive enough to enable me to be in-
place. My life cannot be harmoniously ordered if, for example, there 
is a basic incompatibility between caring in my work and caring for my 
family.”34 Lear achieves Mayeroff’s state of knowledge on the journey to 
develop the virtue of caring: “To care for someone, I must know many 
things. I must know, for example, who the other is, what his powers 
and limitations are, what his needs are, and what is conducive to his 
growth.”35 Lear’s tardy arrival to the state of knowledge necessary for car-
ing in the world prevents him from moving beyond theory into practice, 
but he does arrive at the threshold of appreciating the order of values 
with caring at its core.36
While Lear may not have the time or even the capacity to go beyond 
a theoretical and limited state of empathy for the poor, Edgar’s perfor-
mance leaves open the possibility for greater understanding of social 
diversity to permeate his capacity as future king. While theatricality sepa-
rates Edgar from the true oppression of the state he assumes and later 
dismantles, nevertheless the physicality of his suffering and the initial 
familial displacement he undergoes offer him opportunities to develop 
virtues of sympathy and compassion. Through his dramatic experiment 
as Poor Tom, Edgar can access a glimmering of suffering otherwise dis-
tanced from him and those around him. Perhaps this part does in fact 
affect his capacities, leading him to claim a portion of lost sympathy in 
the play, to “speak what we feel” (5.3.326; emphasis added), if not the 
desire for sustained empathy with the poor, “to feel what wretches feel,” 
as Lear advocates. There is hope, perhaps, that the future reign of Edgar 
will be informed by his performance of poverty, in some measure.
Tempering Human Care
Despite his staged ramblings and reflections, Poor Tom speaks an 
indisputable truth: “Tom’s a-cold” (3.4.161). Tom’s need, however, 
is overlooked because of Lear’s desire to “feel what wretches feel,” to 
experience the “creaturely existence of the human animal stripped of 
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all prosthetic and pretension.”37 Like Tom’s physical suffering, Caliban’s 
enchanted pain inflicted by a wrathful Prospero is the only truth both 
parties acknowledge:
prospero: If though neglect’st or dost unwillingly
What I command, I’ll rack thee with old cramps,
Fill all they bones with aches, make thee roar,
That beasts shall tremble at thy din.
caliban: No, pray thee.
[Aside] I must obey. His art is of such power,
It would control my dam’s god, Setebos,
And make a vassal of him.38
Caliban’s pain and Tom’s cold are parallel physical ailments manifest-
ing the powerful interior suffering of a displaced orphan and an under-
mined, soon-to-be-orphaned son. Both require care from the father 
figures in the plays, yet both are consistently denied such care or, worse, 
are the victims of abuse. While Lear’s encounter with Poor Tom reveals 
how the “realm of ethical possibility” is “beneath” or “behind the world 
of Lear,” how the ethics of care is manifest in small gestures rather than 
systematic action, Prospero’s care, estrangement, and acknowledgement 
of Caliban speak to the action of caring that Lear never fully achieves.
While acknowledging the significance of seemingly conflicting power 
structures defining Caliban’s being and doing, namely readings that see 
Caliban as a victim of colonization and those that see Miranda as the vic-
tim of attempted rape, with Caliban as the perpetrator of an even greater 
abuse of brute power, the question of the efficacy of early modern educa-
tion and servitude as enacted in Prospero’s cell, aptly analysed by Tom 
Lindsay, aligns with the discourse on care I am elaborating.39 As Lindsay 
explains, the play is a “drama about the workings of Prospero’s house-
hold and schoolroom, his ‘cell’” that unsuccessfully hosts a training that 
emphasizes a “set of capacities for political action – submissiveness and 
assertiveness in particular.”40 While Miranda successfully absorbs this 
education from the patriarch, well known in the period’s educational 
manuals and procedures, her ultimate outlet for political action is inher-
ent in her nobility, whereas Caliban is unable to channel his learning in 
action, either through household tasks that are bereft of “edifying” skills 
or through a greater social reality, that is the goal of such education.41 
Thus, this failure in educational advancement and empowerment is in 
part because of the limited focus on behaviour and powers of expression. 
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According to Lindsay, Caliban’s frustrations and “disillusionment” lead 
him to enact his own forms of political agency that attempt to harm the 
personhood of Miranda, and ultimately Prospero.42 Perhaps, in both the 
case of Caliban’s oppression and his attempt at sexual and political dom-
ination, it is the fundamental loss of the capacity to care or the inability 
to care appropriately by knowing the needs of the new resident within 
the cell or household that leads to such abuses of power.
Caliban’s counter-narrative to Prospero’s claim of kindly guardianship 
affirms rather than dismisses the care Prospero alleges to have bestowed 
on an orphaned Caliban on the enchanted island in The Tempest:
caliban: When thou cam’st first,
Thou strok’st me and made much of me; wouldst give me
Water with berries in’t; and teach me how
To name the bigger light, and how the less,
That burn by day and night. And then I loved thee
And showed thee all the qualities o’ th’ isle,
The fresh springs, brine pits, barren place and fertile.
Cursed be I that did so!
prospero: Thou most lying slave,
Whom stripes may move, not kindness. I have used thee
(Filth as thou art) with humane care, and lodged thee
In mine own cell till thou didst seek to violate
The honor of my child. (1.2.332–48)
The verbs of care incorporate associations of physical touch (“strok’st”), 
generosity (“give”), and dedication to capacity building (“teach me”), 
which lead Caliban to “love” in this seemingly joyful family affair which 
is never staged and only left to the audience to imagine. This prior 
time, like Othello’s former hospitable welcome and Lear’s future dream 
of kind nursery, remains bracketed, accessible only through narration 
and shared memory. This off-stage, hidden moment of hospitable care 
involved taking Caliban into a smaller, more intimate, and familial dwell-
ing within the island, similar to an au pair in Julia Reinhard Lupton’s 
reading of Caliban’s minority status. Lupton’s powerful characterization 
of Caliban identifies his various states first as an orphaned child on the 
island after the loss of his mother, Sycorax, and then as an adopted child 
in the care of Prospero and Miranda, an erring youth and quasi-peer who 
is then outcast, shunned, imprisoned, and convicted as an adult for his 
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assault on Miranda.43 The tragedy of the failure of an ethics of care in 
the backstory of their relationship is manifest in Prospero’s claim to have 
treated Caliban with “humane care” despite the doubt of the capacities 
of his “vile race” (1.2.357) that Miranda voices in the opening act. Thus, 
in his claim of an initial attempt toward some sort of equality, it is evident 
that “‘humane’ characterizes both Prospero’s moral bearing toward Cali-
ban (he acted humanely) and his expectations for Caliban’s moral apti-
tude (he treated Caliban as a human, capable of personhood).”44 While 
Prospero’s intentions with the young Caliban may never be fully revealed, 
his early acts of care for Caliban take him to the fringes of care in his abil-
ity to go beyond the state of knowledge into the realm of doing that Lear 
never arrives at. In Mayeroff’s estimation, Prospero’s initial welcome of 
Caliban calls upon a degree of courage to go into the “unknown” in his 
caring for Caliban and his willingness to “trust in the other to grow.”45
However, and unfortunately, the tragic denial of “humane care,” the 
loss of trust brought about when Caliban tests the limits of care in his 
household, reveals the inadequacy of his education to his growing needs 
as an adolescent, physically and existentially. Following his punishment 
for his assault on Miranda, rather than apathy, the relationship between 
Prospero and Caliban turns into one of puerile revenge, of attachment to 
the anger of being wronged that plagues Prospero in his dealings with all 
except Miranda and Ariel, although in both the former and the latter he 
is not above reminding Miranda of her educational and life- preserving 
debts to him and to chastising Ariel for his forgetfulness of his time of 
arboreal imprisonment. As Melissa Sanchez explains, while Caliban 
refers to himself as a “subject,” Prospero’s designation of him (and Ariel) 
as “slave” speaks to the play’s linguistic conflation of the terms in the 
realm of servitude, a “philosophical indeterminacy” highlighting “the 
difficulty of finding a precise account of the origins and extent of author-
ity, whether political, domestic, or erotic. Instead, the play registers the 
possibility that authority can be defined only insofar as it is resisted.”46
Prospero’s counter-assault on Caliban expresses an ongoing grudge, 
a psychological state that transforms the verbs of care turn into verbs of 
torture in the tempus or time of the play:
caliban: All the infections that the sun sucks up
From bogs, fens, flats, on Prosper fall and make him
By inch-meal a disease! …
His spirits hear me,
And yet I needs must curse. But they’ll nor pinch,
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Fright me with urchin-shows, pitch me i’ the mire,
Nor lead me, like a firebrand, in the dark
Out of my way, unless he bid ’em. But
For every trifle are they set upon me;
Sometime like apes that mow and chatter at me,
And after bite me; then like hedgehogs which
Lie tumbling in my barefoot way and mount
Their pricks at my footfall; sometime am I
All wound with adders, who with cloven tongues
Do hiss me into madness. (2.2.1–14)
While Caliban is in his tortuous exile, feeling the “pinch,” “mow and 
chatter” of Prospero’s will upon his body and soul, his attempt at sov-
ereignty through his partnership with Trinculo and Stephano leads to 
experimenting with his own political will. When all is revealed at the con-
clusion of the play, Prospero’s acknowledgment of Caliban, “This thing 
of darkness I / Acknowledge mine,” is followed with a reintegration, 
albeit temporary, of the household: “Go, sirrah, to my cell; / Take with 
you your companions. As you look / To have my pardon, trim it hand-
somely” (5.1.275–6, 294–7). As both Prospero and Caliban have grown 
in their understanding of social reality, Prospero’s understanding and 
development of the virtue of forgiveness enables him to attempt a return 
to the caring stance he failed to maintain at the onset of his relationship 
with Caliban. His acknowledgment here is, in part, an affirmation of the 
pain released through his earlier banishment of Caliban, even as it is 
“painfully partial” in its insistence on the “darkness” of Prospero’s claims 
of Caliban.47 As Sarah Beckwith writes in this volume, the relationship 
between acknowledgment and care is contingent on “where we stand in 
relation to others” and calls for an acceptance that aims to transcend the 
pain brought about through the tragic denial and avoidance of others.48 
Similarly, Prospero’s acknowledgment of Caliban speaks to Mayeroff’s 
claim that care calls upon the virtues of hope and courage, a hope that is 
not only future-oriented but also “an expression of the plenitude of the 
present, a present alive with a sense of the possible.”49
Caliban’s experience and subsequent reintegration before Prospero’s 
departure not only chastens him but also inspires him to be “wise” in 
his return to solitary sovereignty on the island. As in the case of Edgar’s 
learning in action, his dramatic trial as Poor Tom, Caliban’s impend-
ing sovereignty is similarly informed and chastened by experience and 
perhaps also tempered with more wisdom than was accessible to him 
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before his state of extreme servitude and poverty. Caliban’s desire to 
rule with wisdom exhibits hope and courage by caring for himself as he 
embarks on the next phase of his development. Mayeroff’s description 
of the interplay between courage, trust, and hope speaks to both Cali-
ban’s enlightened state at the conclusion of the play and Shakespeare’s 
portrayal of the primacy of enabling individual virtue in The Tempest: 
“This is the courage of the artist who leaves the fashions of the day to go 
his own way, and in so doing comes to find himself and be himself. Such 
courage is not blind: it is informed by insight from past experiences, and 
it is open and sensitive to the present.”50
From Dame Cura to Carers
If you plant a seed in the ground, a tree will become manifest from that 
seed. The seed sacrifices itself to the tree that will come from it. The seed 
is outwardly lost, destroyed; but the same seed which is sacrificed will be 
absorbed and embodied in the tree, its blossoms, fruit and branches.
– ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, 1912
While Cordelia manifests the feminine care Lear hopes will cradle him 
in his old age, the crisis of care he both experiences and creates results 
from an individual and collective lack of virtue buttressing the structures 
of his kingdom. Such a dual moral concern speaks to our modern con-
ceptualization of the work of care.51 Dame Cura’s contemporary avatars 
include nannies, nurses, and caregivers for the elderly, forms of affec-
tive labour that are monetized, marginalized, and minimized in social 
and economic value. Perhaps one of the most intriguing fictional fig-
ures of care is Kathy H., the “carer” in Kazuo Ishiguro’s dystopian novel 
Never Let Me Go, which opens with biographical lines that mimic an ad 
for employment: “My name is Kathy H. I’m thirty-one years old, and I’ve 
been a carer now for over eleven years.”52 Destined to be a caretaker of 
her fellow clones who must go through a series of organ donations until 
the euphemistic “completion” of their lives, Kathy’s humanity is ironi-
cally evident in her superior skills as a caregiver despite her status as a 
clone: “I’ve developed a kind of instinct around donors. I know when 
to hang around and comfort them, when to leave them to themselves; 
when to listen to everything they have to say, and when just to shrug and 
tell them to snap out of it.”53 If care is what shapes and moulds humans, 
then it is the capacity to care and empathize that distinguishes Kathy H. 
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and furthers the tragic lack of acknowledgment of the humanity of the 
genetically modified youth in Ishiguro’s novel. Care is intricately bound 
up with sacrifice and obligation for Kathy H. as well as the other carers 
and donors and becomes the binding force that enables the system to 
continue. As in the myth of Cura, as John Hamilton explains, “Cura’s pri-
mary task is to unify. With muddied hands she brings together the dual 
aspects, spirituality and materiality, that define the human condition.” 
As Hamilton observes, in Hyginus’ fable, the “donors” are the gods who 
endow humans with “a form, a body, a spirit, and a name,” only to return 
the donations after death when man is secure from a life of care.54
The question of sacrificial obligations haunts our understanding of 
care. In one sense, Ishiguro’s clones are the epitome of sacrificial care, 
donating parts of themselves until death for the well-being of others. Yet 
it is the joy of sacrifice, indirectly associated with Kathy H.’s “boasting” 
of her ability to care for donors, that is perhaps the most admirable and 
mysterious part of the human condition. From the streaming tears of a 
birthing mother to the chance heroic encounter of an altruistic Good 
Samaritan, the joy of sacrifice provides us with glimmerings of our high-
est nature, noble, virtuous, and caring. What is clear is that mortality and 
care are bound together in profoundly significant ways, revealing how, 
in its essence, caring tests one’s virtues through the arena of sacrificial 
service that can be completed or exercised only in one’s lifetime. It is the 
sacrifice of the self that enables the growth of another; it marks the end 
of estrangement and the beginning of human solidarity. It is the catalyst 
for a powerful transformation of the self and others. Lear’s contempla-
tion on care as he faces his own mortality, a mortality that saturates Never 
Let Me Go, reminds us that the cultivation of humankind’s sublime vir-
tues is contingent on the work one completes or ignores in this world.
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Concerning The Winter’s Tale, Frank Kermode remarked that “we value 
it not for some hidden truth, but for its power to realize experience.”1 
I believe the same judgment applies with equal force to King Lear, the 
play to which The Winter’s Tale is intimately related. Yet even if we feel 
intuitively that this is the case, we must still ask what it means, concretely, 
to realize experience in these plays. My goal is to recreate and explain 
a particular experience, the experience of an atemporal presentness, that 
is realized in both King Lear and The Winter’s Tale and, most remarkably, 
in the interchanges between these two plays. Shakespeare’s carefully 
framed term for this atemporal presentness is simply now. Although 
I will not press the point here, it may be that, for Shakespeare, realizing 
the experience of the now is the condition for realizing all other forms 
of experience, that is, not only for becoming aware of experience ex 
post facto but for having it in the first place. My focus on this occasion 
is restrictively on how Shakespeare’s language of theatricalization cre-
ates the experience of the now, not only for given protagonists within 
these plays but for the spectator and, indeed, for Shakespeare as well. 
I will leave for discussion in the appendix the important views of present-
ness in King Lear that have been offered by Stanley Cavell and Christoph 
Menke, but I note here that both of their views ultimately relate to pres-
entness in a linear temporality within the worlds of the play, whereas the 
now that concerns me is an interruption of that temporality. Separately 
and together, King Lear and The Winter’s Tale enable stepping outside 
time into an experience of the now.
I begin with the closing lines of King Lear, which in the Folio are 
assigned to Edgar:
chapter nine
Shakespeare’s Now: Atemporal 
Presentness in King Lear  
and The Winter’s Tale
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The oldest hath borne most; we that are young
Shall never see so much, nor live so long. (5.3.299–300)
Emily Sun has suggested that Edgar is repeatedly positioned in the play 
as spectator and that these final words issue to the spectators of the play 
“the challenge of succeeding King Lear in a way that gestures toward the 
possibility of a future beyond the disaster it dramatizes.”2 The succession 
of spectatorship that Sun envisions is for “an aesthetics and politics of 
plurality.” It is certainly reasonable to suppose that Shakespeare is here 
thinking of a politics characterized by an ethical commitment born of 
the sense of one’s own immediate involvement in a community of diverse 
commitments. Yet I suggest that the more immediately realized succes-
sion that he has in mind is something more elemental: this is a continual 
inward striving for the dynamics of spectatorship that realizes the now 
itself. We will see that Edgar the spectator exemplifies that realized now 
in which an ungraspable extent of seeing (so much) and enduring (of 
living so long) are concentrated.
The Now of the Spectator or Onlooker
I propose that the dynamics of spectatorship in King Lear are greatly 
illuminated by a model of meditative experience that has been available 
in modern thought, in various forms, roughly from Shakespeare’s era. 
According to the broad outlines of this model the meditating mind goes 
from (1) achieved suspension of consciousness of the external world, to 
(2) a residual consciousness of a self in an atemporal now that is inde-
pendent of the world, to (3) reclaiming intentional consciousness of the 
external world and its temporality.3 The best-known expounders of prin-
cipal elements of this model are the Descartes of the Meditations, with his 
bringing to bear of a systematic scepticism or hyperbolic doubt, and the 
Husserl of the Cartesian Meditations, with his application of a “bracketing,” 
“reduction,” or “epoché [literally a withholding]” that produces the “now” 
of the “onlooker.”4 Going further than Descartes, Husserl explained how 
consciousness of an internal actuality can be disclosed in a transformed 
“now” by “bracketing” the “natural attitude” toward spatial and tempo-
ral reality. In other words, the momentary bracketing of external reality 
transforms our sense of time into an internal, atemporal “now” or “pres-
ence” and suspends us in a sense of “Wunder.” In that state of wonder the 
onlooker grasps the “coexistence” of being. Such presence and wonder, 
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as well as a grasp of coexistence, are located outside the temporal and 
spatial continuity in which we are usually embedded. For Husserl the 
atemporal now of the epoché coincides with the unrepresentable point 
that is produced by bracketing. For Shakespeare the now characteristi-
cally emerges, after bracketing of his own kind, in the unrepresentable 
point of the “nothing” – which can at times seem to resemble the “Nichts” 
and the “Néant” that other modern philosophers have derived within the 
Husserlian line.
Important bridging elements were available between Descartes’s 
and Husserl’s models of this kind and, in the wake of Husserl’s epoché 
and now, other prominent models of a transformed temporality were 
vividly proposed. Such are Heidegger’s elaborations of what he grasps 
as the “Zeit” of “Sein” or Walter Benjamin’s “Jetztzeit,” or, lately, Giorgio 
Agamben’s use of Benjamin’s model, all of which significantly derive, 
directly or indirectly, from Husserl’s elaboration of “presence.”5 
Although Husserl avoided acknowledging it, his own debt to Kant in 
these matters is particularly great. This debt has a special relevance to 
my present subject. Husserl’s “reduction” in the epoché can be seen as 
a version of Kant’s “deduction” in the sublime, Husserl’s atemporality 
as a version of Kant’s assertion that the experience of the sublime can-
cels the time dimension, and Husserl’s “wonder” in the epoché as a ver-
sion of what Kant says we may feel in the experience of the sublime.6 
Husserl, however, goes further than Kant in making clear a deliberate 
meditative work of the epoché that is even a chosen ordeal.7 In Hus-
serl’s view, only by bracketing the “natural attitude” in the epoché and 
momentarily breaking with the world in the now, only by achieving 
what he accordingly calls the transcendental status of the onlooker, do 
we attain to awareness and intentionality in the natural attitude itself. 
Only then are we empowered, in Husserl’s phrase, for “accomplishing 
life.”8
Yet curiously enough Husserl has little to say about how bracketing or 
the epoché are to be achieved in practice, while Kant, in his parallel account 
of the “deduction” in the sublime, supplies point-by-point instruction 
about how we enter not only into the sublime in experience of nature 
but of art as well.9 Kant explains that this deduction is achieved when 
imagination and reason clash in the mind’s attempt to follow an infinite 
progression of items while experiencing the impossibility of grasping the 
totality of such a progression. The result is a “check to the vital forces” 
in which (as noted) the time dimension is momentarily cancelled. For 
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Husserl the realized experience of that atemporal moment is the now of 
the onlooker.
I take the strenuousness of Derrida’s denial – contra Kant and espe-
cially contra Husserl – of a “metaphysics of presence” as an indication 
that in fact many have imagined that they have experienced a transcen-
dental now. Derrida devoted a large part of his writings to drawing as 
close as possible and then just avoiding the experience of such presence. 
Quite late in his career he remarked, “For me Husserl’s work, and pre-
cisely the notion of epoché, has been and still is a major indispensable ges-
ture. In everything I try to say and write epoché is implied.”10 Rather than 
address the theoretical framework of Derrida’s critique of a “metaphysics 
of presence,” I will proceed somewhat like Dr. Johnson freely kicking his 
stone to rebut the claim of determinism, that is, in the present case, by 
materially recreating what I understand to be Shakespeare’s realization 
of the experience of an atemporal now. Shakespeare achieves this, I pro-
pose, in his capacity as onlooker.
Shakespeare and the Spectator as Onlookers
In the scene of Troilus and Cressida (5.2) in which Thersites watches Ulysses 
who watches Troilus who watches Cressida with Diomedes, Shakespeare 
shows the voyeuristic potential of one kind of onlooking. Yet in King Lear 
and The Winter’s Tale he represents a very different potential in onlook-
ing of another kind. Side-by-side with the plots of both of these plays, 
Shakespeare projects his authorial presence as onlooker. Right from the 
beginning his represented foreknowledge in or about these plays is in a 
completely different order from what we call “dramatic irony.” Dramatic 
irony pertains to knowledge that an audience possesses that is greater 
than that of the protagonists, yet it is knowledge of the fiction that is 
gleaned from being witness to scenes of the play in which some of the 
characters are absent. The suggestion may seem prima facie outrageous, 
but I propose that although Shakespeare’s omniscient authorial knowl-
edge has no signified place or time – no presence – within the temporality 
of these plays, we (as spectators) nevertheless simultaneously experience 
it as present in an atemporality outside, looking in on, these plays. To 
take in the status of Shakespeare’s atemporal omniscient knowledge, 
the spectator must be capable of achieving not a willing suspension of 
disbelief but – even while watching these plays – a willed suspension of 
belief in the theatricalized representation itself. Paradoxically, that is, 
the spectator then becomes capable of seeing that Shakespeare’s kind 
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of omniscient knowledge is not merely or principally of the fictionalized 
action that seems to take place in worldly time. Rather, that knowledge 
has been made available to Shakespeare ab extra in an atemporal now 
where he looks out upon the counter-forces of being. These counter-
forces can be endlessly fictionalized in endless numbers of ways.
Shakespeare’s claim to possession of this knowledge is not arbitrary. 
The validity of his knowledge in his now has been earned as realized 
experience – as it will be earned by the spectator – by an activity that pre-
cedes or is outside the performance of the plays and that can produce 
the condition of the onlooker. This is the meditative activity – the serial 
acts of consciousness – that Shakespeare has already experienced as play-
wright, as script writer, and that he then makes available, as experience, 
to the spectator. Fragmentarily, this experience is also represented for 
some of the protagonists of these plays in their own partial equivalents 
of this meditative activity, thus beginning to create for them something 
of the same condition as onlookers. Within the plays themselves we thus 
find protagonists (such as Edgar or Perdita) who approximate the con-
dition of onlookers. The full effect of this detached meditative activity, 
however, is attained only outside the fiction, outside theatricalization, by 
the author and spectator.
To be sure, the omniscience of a playwright may be taken to be a 
given in more or less any theory of composition. What is of interest here 
(and no doubt in some other plays of Shakespeare) is that the unbodied 
presence of the author – accompanying but not in the plays – is by the 
spectator felt as a unique quantity. This feeling of the spectator is cor-
relative with the effect of ominous, undefined pregnancy of meanings, 
excesses of signification and/or of systematicity that can be assigned 
only to the author. I submit that for the spectator a perturbation of 
this extra-theatrical kind is inevitable (even if difficult to bring to the 
surface of consciousness) as at least one part of our response to these 
plays, in retrospect, virtually from their beginnings. For example, in King 
Lear, Cordelia’s expression of her radically underdetermined “Nothing” 
stands in total disproportion (by any worldly measure available to the 
spectator) to her father’s question; just so, Gloucester’s “Let’s see. Come, 
if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles” (1.2.34–5) is infinitely too 
light in a scene that is already headed for extreme danger; and, in The 
Winter’s Tale, Camillo’s opening reminiscences of Leontes’s and Polix-
enes’s childhoods are strained with abstraction of causations that must 
have their own iron will in a collective futurity, of which Camillo has not 
the slightest inkling. We do not need to be super-sophisticated spectators 
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to sense that Camillo’s words project the author’s knowledge of a pat-
terning that subsumes the predictable surprises of thearicalization. Yet 
it is only when we, too, as spectators, begin to access the atemporal now 
that we begin to share Shakespeare’s now and his knowledge outside 
theatricalization. As I have begun to suggest, this access is produced by a 
meditative activity of a special kind.
My claim for a bifurcation between knowledge of theatricalized fic-
tion and a knowledge that is beyond all theatricalization may seem to 
denature the idea and experience of theatre itself. Yet for a thinker and 
writer as committed to trying to see reality to the best of human abilities, 
as was Shakespeare, it was, after all, inevitable and necessary to take into 
account and to try to overcome the deflections from seeing reality cre-
ated by theatre and representation, even by the theatre and representa-
tion that are at work in thinking itself.
Throughout King Lear Shakespeare the onlooker plots Lear’s develop-
ment towards – but never fully reaching – the status of onlooker. After 
being ejected from Regan’s and Goneril’s houses, Lear begins to see, 
from outside, “houseless poverty” and “houseless heads” (3.4.26, 30). His 
growth as onlooker is expressed in his wish merely to abide in prison 
with Cordelia as “God’s spies” (5.3.17). In his final injunction to “Look 
on” dead Cordelia’s lips – the rounded lips that form, once more, the 
zero, the nothing of fullness, that he finally begins to comprehend – he 
stands on the threshold of his own transcendental nothing, born of the 
knowledge that nothing worldly is further at stake for him. Standing now 
on the boundary line of mortality, he, too, is for an atemporal instant a 
transcendental onlooker – God’s lonely spy – to the coexistence of death 
and life. We need to understand the something in his experience, the 
something that is reflected or created in his language, that has given 
him, for that instant, a place to stand as onlooker.
How the Now of the Onlooker Is Achieved
In King Lear and The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare employs a language of 
spectatorship that works through and exceeds the theatricalizing oscilla-
tions of the human imagination. These oscillations are seen in the back-
and-forth movements between role-playing consciousness and what can 
be called, awkwardly, a would-be non-role-playing consciousness that is itself 
never free of role playing. In Shakespeare’s language of theatricalization 
the rhetorical figure that repeatedly represents these cross-purposes is 
chiasmus. In modern philosophy chiasmus has often been explicated as 
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a key figure in the production of human consciousness.11 My contention 
is that in Shakespeare’s hands a series of such chiasmata runs through 
the length of each play and will even be seen to occur between these two 
plays. The products of these progressions of chiasmata, added on to an 
element of dynamic progression that inheres in each chiasmus, are a 
sublime bracketing of the world and the opening of the now that is the 
onlookers’ grasp of the coexistence of being.
Joel Fineman drew close attention to the centrality of Shakespeare’s use 
of chiasmus in the sonnets. Yet Fineman’s identification of this usage of 
chiasmus with thematized contents (such as sexual and bisexual desire) 
ignores the unrepresentable and atemporal space of negativity that is 
primary in the experience of chiasmus.12 Building on Fineman’s analysis 
of the centrality of chiasmus in Shakespeare’s sonnets, Lisa Freinkel has 
noted how the elements of each chiasmus necessarily form an effectively 
infinite progression: “Repetition becomes inversion and inversion takes 
us back to where we started,” so that chiasmus initiates “an exchange 
that seems to have no beginning and no end.”13 Thus, she notes, chias-
mus “precludes a present.… The now itself … is lost,” leaving, she says, 
an “odd temporality.”14 I believe that these observations are correct and 
important. Yet what Freinkel has seen here pertains to the precluded 
present or lost now of worldly temporality, not to the onlooker’s inward 
now that is disclosed in an unrepresentable negativity – such as, indeed, 
Kant explains in the deduction of the sublime. This Kantian deduction 
of an atemporality takes place in the mind’s attempt to follow an infinite 
progression of items while experiencing the impossibility of grasping the 
totality of such a progression. In effect, Shakespeare employs the instru-
mentality of theatricalized chiasmus to produce this Kantian deduction, 
which is also (as I have suggested) the Husserlian epoché.
I propose that Shakespeare’s turning, in his plays, to the use of a chias-
mus of theatricalization coincided with the dramaturgical breakthrough 
that Stephen Greenblatt has located in Hamlet. Greenblatt has suggested 
that in Hamlet Shakespeare “made a discovery by means of which he 
relaunched his entire career.… The crucial breakthrough,” he says, “had 
to do … with an intense representation of inwardness by a new technique 
of radical excision,” by which Greenblatt means (among other things) 
“writing about a character suspended” in a “strange interim.”15 I propose 
that in Hamlet the time of the strange interim is not created solely in the 
construction of plot and character. Instead or in addition, it is a tem-
porality within language that is created by a dynamic of excision and 
suspension within Hamlet’s language of theatricalization. I have recently 
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offered a reading of Hamlet along these lines.16 I will here very briefly 
extract some elements of that reading, since the core of my argument 
in the present chapter is that Shakespeare made a further breakthrough 
by adopting for himself and by perfecting, as playwright, the onlooker 
condition broached by Hamlet’s chiasmus of theatricalization and of the 
now. To be sure, for Shakespeare this was a radical, almost unthinkable 
step, for it meant stepping outside his own plays even within the process 
of conceiving them.
In Hamlet’s hands chiasmus is a compact, portable engine of infinite 
progression and of experiencing the impossibility of grasping the total-
ity of such a progression. Judging by the intensity of Hamlet’s recurring 
to chiasmus we may well conclude that he knows, or at least senses, 
that the momentary failure it entails can somehow leave him with the 
residual consciousness of a self in an inward now – a “that within which 
passes show” (1.2.85). He knows, or senses as well, that paradoxically, 
the use of this instrument of momentary suspension can ultimately fur-
nish the grounds for his experience and intentional action in the world, 
for accomplishing life. Here we begin to obtain a fresh understand-
ing of one of the key paradoxes in Hamlet’s monumental thinking, 
namely, his resolute purposiveness or intentionality within apparent 
vacillation.17
Hamlet’s most significant use of the chiasmus of theatricalization – 
serving virtually as a template for all his other employments of this fig-
ure – is his self-accusatory question concerning the player’s capacity to 
feel and to express emotion. After asking about that emotion whether it 
is only “all for nothing – For Hecuba?,” he asks further:
What’s [A] Hecuba to [B] him, or [B] he to [A] her,
That he should weep for her? (2.2.492–4)18
In the following way the abstracted configuration of the Hecuba chi-
asmus encompasses the mind’s, the imagination’s, interminable inter-
change between kinds of role playing in the quest for authenticity:
Play-acting (experiencing Hecuba in the fiction) to would-be non- play-acting 
(“him,” the live actor, in real existence) // would-be non-play-acting (“he” the 
live actor) to play-acting (“her” in the fiction).
The interminability of this interchange, and the mind’s inability to grasp 
it whole, produces the epoché. With the epoché comes the space of the 
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“nothing” and the time of the atemporal now. Hamlet’s pronouncement 
that art must hold the mirror up to nature therefore finds a deeper 
meaning in his meditative employment – his productive thinking – of 
chiasmus, right to left and left to right, AB:BA, ad infinitum.
The full emergence of Hamlet’s inward now takes place as he prepares 
for being fully present, fully ready, for the close of his journey. His readi-
ness can no longer be altered by changes in worldly time. Now, indeed, 
he can let the world (including his fated participation in the world) sim-
ply be:
We defy augury. There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow. [A] If 
it be now, ’tis not to come. [B] If it be not to come, it will be now. [B] If it be 
not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all.… [A] Let be.
(5.2.198–202; emphases added)19
Hamlet’s employment of chiasmus is a record, or an immediate chiastic 
enactment, of a partially mute transformative event in his perception of 
being. The products of such an event are a sublime bracketing of the 
world and the opening of the now in the onlooker’s grasp of the coexis-
tence of multiple “be”-ing.
Such chiastic events also constitute the core of King Lear and The Win-
ter’s Tale. The Fool shows Lear to be in the grip of a lacerating theat-
ricalized oscillation that Lear’s imagination has created but which he 
completely fails to understand:
[A] now thou art an O [B] without a figure.
[B] I am better than [A] thou art now. (1.4.152–3)20
The experience of the chiastic event in this figure belongs to the Fool, 
not Lear. In the point of intersection of the unrepresentable, of negativ-
ity, the Fool opens the now of his “I am” while Lear is located in a nothing 
of banality, beside the point – the midpoint – of the chiasmus. Here as 
everywhere in these plays Shakespeare sustains two mutually challenging 
meanings of the word nothing: one is the negativity that opens the now; 
the other is mere meaninglessness. This play’s most spectacular instan-
tiation of that duality is in Shakespeare’s takeover of Lear’s pronounce-
ment that “Nothing will come of nothing.” Lear the martinet has applied 
emptily to the archetypical chiasm, Ex nihilo nihil fit. Shakespeare, not 
Lear, knows and experiences the chiastic event that is reflected in, or 
takes place, in these words. Lear is left in the lurch of the meaningless 
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nothing. Here or before the play even commences, Shakespeare has 
earned the midpoint of the nothing that is the now.
The so-called Gloucester subplot functions in King Lear as a massive 
standpoint of ab extra spectatorship if only because the insights it pro-
vides into Lear’s fate are too perfect to be anything but the made-to-
order invention of the all-knowing author. Standing almost shoulder 
to shoulder with Shakespeare in that standpoint, the principal articula-
tor of the theatricalized oscillations of a tormented human imagina-
tion is Edgar. No one else within the tragedy has greater power to trace 
these oscillations, even about his imagining of his own self. After taking 
on his disguise as “Poor Tom” he yokes his awareness of this oscilla-
tion to a contorted language that is almost unreadable: “Edgar I noth-
ing am” (2.3.21). The outer terms of this chiasmus are “Edgar” and 
“am.” The inner terms are “I” and “nothing.” Within this welter of pain 
Edgar abides in his now of onlooking where he is a recipient of a fur-
ther dimension of the now, that of a blessing that is independent of 
any material outcome. In the chiasmata of theatricalization of King Lear 
and The Winter’s Tale, the blessing of the now emerges as an unforeseen 
disclosure precisely when there are apparently no possible effects of 
blessing in sight.
Nothing and Blessing in King Lear and The Winter’s Tale
Gloucester’s words, just before he leaps from what he thinks is the cliff at 
Dover, point, unknowingly, to the blessing of Edgar in his now:
If [A] Edgar live, bless [B] him.
Now, [B] fellow, fare [A] thee well. (4.5.41–2; emphasis added)
As spectators, we and the audience know that the “Edgar” and “thee,” like 
the “him” and “fellow” of Gloucester’s words, are exact chiastic equiva-
lents that unknowingly identify Edgar’s onlooker now with blessing, as 
if signalling that blessing can be accomplished by a formalism of mere 
language even when the protagonists, who are not God, cannot bring 
about any material blessing. I will yet return to this triad of the now, the 
nothing, and blessing in Shakespeare’s language of spectatorship. Yet it 
is worth establishing already that this formal pattern is somehow of cli-
mactic importance in King Lear. In act 4, after Cordelia begins to bring 
Lear back from his fevered state and Lear says, “Would I were assured / 
Of my condition,” Cordelia responds,
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[A] O look upon me, [B] sir,
And [B] hold your hand in benediction [A] o’er me. (4.6.54–5)
The Cordelia, the “me,” who asks to be looked upon, to be recognized 
not as stranger but as the undyingly faithful daughter whom Lear has 
loved, and the “me” who would receive Lear’s blessing, are the same; 
and they oscillate with the “sir” who hardly knows who he is or has been, 
though his “hand” is a metonymy of that fatherly “sir.” Here, too, bene-
diction that is powerless to change fate yet is for all that somehow real 
blessing, is by Shakespeare imagined as the channelled product of the 
imagination’s oscillations. In act 5 Lear closely mirrors that pattern and 
that potentiality of blessing in language’s formalisms exactly at the nadir 
of any power to deliver material blessing:
[A] When thou dost ask me blessing [B] [imagining that Cordelia kneels as she 
did at 4.6.54–6], [B] I’ll kneel down [A] And ask of thee forgiveness.
(5.3.10–11)
Here we have a “forgiveness” that is construed as the equivalent of bless-
ing, together with Cordelia’s kneeling and Lear’s kneeling. The chiastic 
oscillations continue and bring us ever closer to an as yet unexplained 
quantity that can somehow be blessing itself.
The interrelations between King Lear and The Winter’s Tale have a 
special function in realizing experience of the now. To be sure, what 
John Pitcher has recently called “the visible flow between the two plays” 
has been noted frequently. We see it in such things, Pitcher observes, 
as the “reference in King Lear to being caught between a bear and a 
raging sea (3.4.9–11) [that] is made real in The Winter’s Tale.” And we 
feel it “in the harrowing final lines in King Lear” when a delirious Lear 
“believes that Cordelia’s lips have life in them. In the final scenes of 
The Winter’s Tale,” Pitcher adds, “when Leontes faces what he thinks 
is the inanimate statue of his dead wife” and believes “that ‘the very 
life seems warm upon her lip’ … as sweet as ‘any cordial comfort,’ 
he thinks Hermione is breathing and tries to kiss her” (5.3.66, 76–7). 
Pitcher notes the remarkable “half-hidden, bitter-sweet pun passing 
from ‘Cordelia’ to ‘cordial.’”21 To this we must add the massive parallel 
in the very openings of these plays, when, in a fit of madness, a king 
banishes the person he most loves and even, in both cases, brings about 
the death, or apparent death, of his daughter. I will yet return to this 
last parallel.
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The adhesion of King Lear and The Winter’s Tale to the now, nothing, 
blessing, and wonder of chiasmus is powerfully exemplified by the fig-
ure of Perdita who, as Time the interrupter of The Winter’s Tale says, is 
“now grown in grace / Equal with wond’ring” (4.1.24–5). Perdita is the 
spectator in The Winter’s Tale who most closely succeeds to the Edgar of 
King Lear. Perdita, the lost one, stands ab extra throughout. Polixenes 
bears unimpeachable witness to her status of this kind: “Nothing she 
does or seems / But smacks of something greater than herself, / Too 
noble for this place” (4.4.157–9). She herself views the scene around her 
as if she continues to be a spectator: “I see the play so lies / That I must 
bear a part” (4.4.626–7). When the curtain is drawn on Hermione as 
statue, Perdita explicitly names herself as onlooker: “So long could I / 
Stand by a looker-on” (5.3.84–5). Shakespeare goes further than giving 
a name to this onlooker status. He probes it for its structural creation of 
the place of nothing, its strange or wondrous interim. The “nothing … 
but” that Polixenes mentions, which means everything, is by Florizel 
given its inner meaning of wondrous interval, of still-ness, of a sustained, 
atemporal present. “When you do dance,” he says to Perdita, “[A] I wish 
you / A wave o’ the sea, [B] that you might even do / Nothing but that: 
[B] move still, [A] still so” (4.4.140–3). The power of this country maid 
to disclose an atemporal interval is startlingly shown in her invocation 
of timeless Ovidian mythology, all in perfect chiasmus centred in the 
“now”:
[A] O Proserpina,
For [B] the flowers now, [B] that, frighted, thou letst fall
[A] From Dis’s wagon! (4.4.116–18)
Perdita’s inner time fixes the detached inner time that is bracketed within 
(or outside) the play as a whole. This is already the strong time or kairos 
that Paulina will announce in her exclamation, “’Tis time” (5.3.99). We 
encounter the same time of the now in the chiasmus that Leontes and 
Paulina share in one verse that thematizes the now of epoché. When, Leon-
tes observes, “as she [A] lived [B] now,” Paulina responds, “As [B] now she 
might have [A] lived” (5.3.32; emphases added).
In act 5 Perdita, facing the statue, says,
[A] do not say ’tis superstition, that
[B] I kneel and [B] implore [A] her blessing. (5.3.43–4)
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Paulina provides the iteration for both of the parent participants in 
the pattern of blessing by interposing Perdita – the Perdita of motion-
less motion and of an atemporal interval, the Perdita of lost-ness – both 
between herself and her mother and between Leontes and Hermione, 
saying,
Please you to interpose, fair madam; kneel
And pray your mother’s blessing. (5.3.119–20)
Paulina no doubt here provides the stage director with a kind of block-
ing cue. More significantly, she has transformed blocking into bracket-
ing and the now.
In Hamlet Shakespeare drew the spectator’s ab extra attention to the 
gravity of his use of the form of chiasmus by having foolish Polonius call 
chiasmus “a foolish figure” (“’tis true ’tis pity, / And pity ’tis ’tis true”: 
2.2.98–9). In The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare draws a similar ab extra atten-
tion to chiasmus by echoing Puttenham’s term for chiasmus, the “cross-
couple,” when Leontes chiastically says to Perdita and Florizel,
[A] I lost a couple that twixt heaven and earth
[B] Might thus have stood, [B] begetting wonder, as
[A] You, gracious couple, do. (5.1.131–3; emphasis added)
Only Shakespeare and the spectator as onlookers can see the chiastic 
correspondences that couple these couples as well as their standing and 
doing. For Shakespeare and the spectator or reader of Shakespeare’s 
plays the depth of onlooking is here dizzying indeed. The standing and 
doing of this couple are as actors who are play-acting the roles of Flori-
zel and Perdita who are play-acting the roles of having been “sent” by 
Polixenes. Repeating this vision, Leontes formulates it as the heart of his 
desire for renewed life:
[A] Might I a son and daughter [B] now [B] have looked on,
[A] Such goodly things as you! (5.1.176–7; emphasis added)
The disclosed items at the dead centres of these closely equivalent chi-
asmata are “wonder” and the “now,” precisely the products of the Hus-
serlian reduction that Shakespeare performs in his own way, indeed, well 
beyond Husserl’s resources of language and meditation. Leontes stands 
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in the temporality of the now that can renew life. In the last lines of the 
play Leontes, addressing the Paulina who has stage managed all this the-
atre, speaks the chiastic language that exits the play and opens upon the 
spectator’s realized experience of the now:
[A] Lead us from hence, where we may leisurely
[B] Each one demand and answer to his part
Performed in this wide gap of time [B] since first
We were dissevered. [A] Hastily lead away. (5.3.152–5)
The atemporal urgency of the now in the wide gap of time, as well as the 
unrepresented place of “away,” are experienced by the spectator both “lei-
surely” and “hastily.” We reach this strange interim when, as spectators, we 
follow the “interchange” of the chiasmus that leaves us in the now.
Doubling the Chiasmus of Theatricalization
The dénouement of The Winter’s Tale – and of The Winter’s Tale and King 
Lear together – is realized in the double chiasmata and their epochés that 
are made possible by “heavens directing” or “the heavens” continuing 
“their loves,” which is to say, continuing their loves not only from the 
aborted first half of The Winter’s Tale but from the tragic interdiction 
at the close of King Lear. The matrix of such doubling of chiasmata is 
set out within The Winter’s Tale by Perdita after Florizel has crowned her 
“queen” of the sheep-shearing festival:
perdita: Sir, my gracious lord,
To chide at your extremes it not becomes me –
O pardon that I name them! Your high self,
The gracious mark o’th’land, you have obscured
With a swain’s wearing, and me, poor lowly maid,
Most goddess-like pranked up. But that our feasts
In every mess have folly, and the feeders
Digest it with a custom, I should blush
To see you so attired – sworn, I think,
To show myself a glass. (4.4.5–14)
Where Hamlet saw that art must hold up a chiastic “mirror” to nature – 
as in his Hecuba chiasmus of theatricalization – Perdita’s role in the 
sheep-shearing festival shows a doubly chiastic “glass” that (she does not 
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yet know) doubles the chiasmus of theatricalization. Hamlet employs the 
chiastic “mirror” and its epoché to disclose his self or subjectivity. Beyond 
Perdita’s immediate knowledge, her “glass” traces a double mirroring 
that yields the possibility of an intersubjectivity.
The mirror of Perdita’s outer chiasmus of Self and Other shows 
the “extremes” of “queen”-Perdita/“swain”-Florizel // Florizel “so 
attired”/Perdita “myself.” Within these outward terms abides another 
chiasmus, also of Self and Other, that is a mirror of the other mir-
ror: Perdita princess of Sicilia/Florizel prince of Bohemia // Florizel prince 
of Bohemia/Perdita princess of Sicilia. Perdita, the closest thing to a fully 
achieved onlooker in these plays, indeed points us to this matrix of a 
chiastically achieved intersubjectivity. Just such a possibility of achiev-
ing intersubjectivity by means of a double mirroring and a double 
epoché has been envisioned by Husserl’s inheritors in their effort to 
achieve the goal of an intersubjectivity that eluded Husserl himself 
throughout his philosophical career. In the words of Eugen Fink, cited 
approvingly by Alfred Schütz,
The experience of the Other involves a reciprocal relationship: in experien-
cing the Other concurrently I experience the Other’s experiencing of me. 
But this reciprocal relationship is, taken strictly, not only a simple running 
back and forth from myself to the Other and from the Other to me. This 
reciprocal relationship allows, potentially, indefinite reiteration. I can the-
refore say that I so experience the Other as the Other is experiencing me, 
and that the Other so experiences me as I am experiencing the Other…. 
We have here an indefinite [i.e., infinite] reciprocal reflectibility somewhat 
like two mirrors placed one opposite the other reflecting into each other in 
indefinite reiteration.22
Yet the matrix of intersubjectivity that Perdita forms can be fulfilled only 
in the full detachment of an onlooking, at the plays from outside the 
plays. This is effected in reflection on The Winter’s Tale and King Lear 
together. That chiastic object of reflection is constituted by the chiasmata 
and epochés that these plays form with each other.23
It is time to observe the experience of the now that is realized between 
these plays. This is disclosed by the immense chiasmus that the two plays 
perform jointly. Whereas the trials of the earlier play are set in motion 
by the repeated utterance of the word “Nothing” by a beloved daughter 
(1.1.182, 184), which causes a king’s maddened outburst on the word 
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“nothing” and the banishment (and ultimate death) of his daughter, the 
tribulations of the later play are set in motion by a king who himself first 
lingers madly on the word “nothing” –
 Is this nothing?
Why then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing,
The covering sky is nothing, Bohemia nothing,
My wife’s nothing, nor nothing have these nothings,
If this be nothing. (1.2.289–93)
This in turn generates the murderous court trial of his beloved wife 
together with his order of banishment/execution of his daughter. In 
near perfect chiastic inversion of the pattern in King Lear, in The Winter’s 
Tale the king’s daughter even utters the word “nothing” in counterfac-
tual counterpoint to Cordelia’s earlier counterfactual “nothing.” Corde-
lia’s silent point, after all, is that she has everything to say about love for 
her father. “I cannot speak / So well, nothing so well,” speaks Perdita 
(4.4.360–1) in the very same vein. The effect of this cross-conversation 
is to create another bracketing of a strange interim, another moment 
of the now, for Shakespeare and the spectator of these plays. All this is 
remarkably managed by the onlooker author who thus begins to create 
an extra-theatrical object of reflection between these plays. Yet the most 
remarkable expedient for creating this extra-theatrical effect, between 
these plays, still remains to be described.
Grafting, Nothing, and Blessing
Only Shakespeare and the spectator (on a second viewing) can see that 
throughout The Winter’s Tale the disclosure of a “great difference” within 
chiastic form is redoubled in multiple, reciprocal mirrorings of chias-
mus. The opening exchange between Archidamus and Camillo already 
sets out one such doubling in laying out the reciprocal visitations that will 
structure the entire plot of the play. Together, Archidamus and Camillo 
unknowingly present the chiastic schematism of the “great difference” 
between Bohemia and Sicilia/Sicilia and Bohemia:
archidamus: If you [A – i.e., Sicilia] shall chance, Camillo, to visit [B] Bohemia on 
the like occasion whereon my services are now on foot, you shall see, as I have 
said, great difference betwixt our [B] Bohemia and your [A] Sicilia.
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Camillo mirrors and enters into this reciprocity of visitations from where 
Archidamus left off:
camillo: I think this coming summer the [A] King of Sicilia means to pay [B the 
King of] Bohemia the visitation which he justly owes him. (emphases added)
This is only the beginning of the vast network of chiastic relation that 
will rule in this play and that will ultimately determine its relation to 
King Lear.
I propose that it is central to The Winter’s Tale that at this opening 
moment, directly after the chiastic relation of Bohemia/Sicilia // Sicilia/
Bohemia has been presented, Camillo extracts a chiastic pattern of nat-
ural grafting from Sicilia’s and Bohemia’s apparently everyday actions 
of “separation” and “interchange” (22–3). Camillo cannot know, much 
less prevent, the “great difference” that is about to erupt between Leon-
tes and Polixenes. Yet in the opening rehearsal of the history of their 
friendship he proceeds to a meaning that overleaps the material causes 
of that “great difference” and he locates (blindly) the operations of the 
far greater transformative “vast” that this play, and its relation to King 
Lear, will ultimately reveal. In The Winter’s Tale this “interchange” will be 
achieved in the natural grafting of roots that will (after painful interrup-
tion) be duplicated in a natural grafting of branches that is endowed 
with transcendental and scriptural meanings.
To begin to understand the meanings that Shakespeare attaches to 
grafting in The Winter’s Tale we must take in the setting that the play 
provides to highlight its significance. Polixenes’s account of an artificial 
grafting is one of the most often cited and – as far as Shakespeare is 
concerned – most seriously misunderstood touchstones in the history of 
aesthetics, that is, in the theory of the relation of “art” to “nature.” Polix-
enes’s artificial, hierarchical model of grafting serves as the anti-model 
that highlights the natural grafting, which is the pivotal trope of the play 
as a whole. Here is Polixenes:
You see, sweet maid, we marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art
Which does mend nature – changes it rather – but
The art itself is nature. (4.4.92–7)
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Shakespeare directly subverts the application that Polixenes claims for 
such grafting. Polixenes’s account presumes to enlighten a supposedly 
ignorant, low-born Perdita, yet his words fly against him. This “sweet 
maid” is neither of “wildest stock” nor of “baser kind.” The apparently 
“gentler scion” of apparently “nobler race” – Polixenes’s boast for him-
self and his family line – is no whit gentler or nobler than Perdita. Of 
course, Polixenes cannot be blamed for not knowing who Perdita actu-
ally is, yet his puffed up condescension, as well as the trap that Shake-
speare has laid for his ignorance, cast doubt, for us, on the relevance of 
everything he says about the relation of art to nature – at least, concern-
ing the relation of art to nature in this play.
Shakespeare is indeed pursuing a profound analogy between grafting 
and art, yet the artificial grafting that Polixenes describes is in The Winter’s 
Tale distinctly one of two models of grafting, one artificial, hierarchical, 
1 Leonard Mascall, A booke of the arte and maner how to plant and graffe all 
sortes of trees, (London: John Wright, 1590), 58. Reprinted courtesy  
of the University of Cambridge.
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and imposed, the other natural, equal, and spontaneous. In the model 
of artificial grafting a dominating, vividly phallic “scion” is inserted into 
the incised cleft of the receiving “stock.” Figure 1 is an image of artificial 
grafting from the title page of Leonard Mascall’s manual, A booke of the 
arte and maner, howe to plant and graffe all sortes of trees (1590), reprinted 
no fewer than ten times in Shakespeare’s lifetime. In his right hand the 
well-dressed gentleman holds the cutting instrument with which he has 
made the deep cleft in the stock.
Polixenes’s wrongheaded invocation and application of this artifi-
cial grafting serves only to place in bold relief the play’s alternative, 
pervasive application of a model of natural grafting that is reciprocal 
2 Mascall, A booke of the arte and maner how to plant and graffe all sortes of 
trees, 74. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Cambridge.
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and chiastic. In natural grafting, tree roots and/or branches of the 
same species spontaneously graft when they make physical contact 
with each other, such that the bark of the roots or branches is stripped 
away, thereby exposing the vascular cambium and allowing the roots 
or branches to graft together. In figure 2, also from Mascall’s manual,24 
we see the chiastic conditions and chiastic effects of natural grafting, 
in roots as well as in branches. Seen here graphically is what, we will 
see in a moment, Camillo will unknowingly prophesy about Leontes 
and Polixenes and their progeny: “There rooted between them then 
such an affection which cannot choose branch now.” I have drawn a 
rectangle upon the rooting together that has produced this tree and 
circles upon three of the branchings-together of the branches that 
emerge from cross-matchings and generate, as well, their own branch-
ings, each as part of a chiasm around a centre point that cannot be 
shown.
By a chiastic art that is closely analogous to this natural grafting, the 
protagonists of The Winter’s Tale, acting in equality and reciprocity, nat-
urally redeem their consciousness of “nature” through art. This pat-
tern of natural grafting not only configures the whole of the play’s plot 
(including, despite himself, Polixenes’s own place within that plot) but 
already sets out the goal of an intersubjective consciousness, built on 
chiastic reciprocity, that can be humanity’s greatest blessing. Here, as 
so often elsewhere, for Shakespeare chiastic form expresses both the 
interchanging flux of sameness and difference in physical reality as well 
as the meditative reasoning that can be applied to that interchange. In 
The Winter’s Tale the art of chiasmus thus configures grafting as an inter-
section at a point of “separation” and “great difference” in the physical 
world. This is also the unrepresentable inner point in which the “noth-
ing” as “vast” can make us alive, as meditators, to a transformed now of 
coexistent being.
We can begin to offer a penultimate understanding of the significance 
of grafting in The Winter’s Tale. Camillo pictures the chiastic workings of 
the natural grafting of roots and branches of the houses of Sicilia and 
Bohemia: “In their childhoods … there [A] rooted betwixt them then 
[B] such an affection [B] which cannot choose but [A] branch now.” The 
grafted roots are Leontes and Polixenes. The branches that will be pro-
duced by the grafting of Sicilia-Bohemia (Camillo does not know) will be 
Florizel and Perdita. Indeed, as we have begun to see, Camillo’s words 
will turn out to be an oracular prophecy of everything that is destined to 
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happen in The Winter’s Tale, including Camillo’s own being coupled with 
Paulina, and even, as we shall soon explain, encompassing the specta-
tor’s shared responses from a vantage point outside the play. Here is 
Camillo:
Sicilia cannot show himself over-kind to Bohemia. They were trained 
together in their childhoods; and there rooted betwixt them then such an 
affection which cannot choose but branch now. Since their more mature 
dignities and royal necessities made separation of their society, their encoun-
ters, though not personal, have been royally attorneyed with interchange of 
gifts, letters, loving embassies; that they have seemed to be together, though 
absent; shook hands, as over a vast; and embraced as it were from the ends 
of opposed winds. The heavens continue their loves! (1.1.18–21)
Camillo thus sets out his understanding of a life-determining chiasmus 
in the way Leontes and Polixenes were thus “trained,” in horticultural 
terms, in accordance with having a root grafting “betwixt them”: “[A] 
they have seemed to be together though absent, [B] shook hands [B] 
as over a vast, and [A] embraced as it were from the ends of opposed 
winds” (24–5). Yet Camillo has no grasp of the “vast” of “separation,” the 
unrepresentable nothing, that lies waiting within this chiasmus and in 
which an atemporal now is disclosed, that is, at the intersecting point of 
chiasmus figured as grafting.25
Paulina and Pauline Grafting
Given the heaven-directed relation of Camillo’s and Paulina’s own 
branching to the continuity of grafting in The Winter’s Tale, we should 
not be surprised to discover that Paulina has an important role in plac-
ing the trope of grafting at the centre of this play. In fact, her role is 
even greater than Camillo’s in disclosing, within the trope of grafting 
itself, both the special temporality that it generates and its ultimate fruit 
of blessing.
It has long been suggested that Shakespeare’s naming of Paulina – a 
character who is Shakespeare’s own invention – is meant to inject ideas 
of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans into The Winter’s Tale. A Pauline echo 
has been heard in Paulina’s exhortation to the assembled company in 
the play’s final scene: “It is required / You do awake your faith. Then 
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all stand still” (5.3.94–5).26 In King Lear, Cordelia invokes Christ’s words 
at Luke 2:49, saying to Lear, “O dear father, / It is thy business that I go 
about” (4.4.23–4). I propose that in The Winter’s Tale Paulina’s exhorta-
tion to stand in awakened faith not only recalls Romans 11:20, “because 
of unbelief they were broken off, and thou standest by faith,” but brings 
with it the creative power of Paul’s extended simile of grafting in which 
“thou standest by faith” is the core:
If the root be holy, so are the branches.… If some of the branches be broken off, and 
thou, being a wild olive tree, wert graffed in among them, and with them partakest of 
the root and fatness of the olive tree … thou standest by faith.… And they also, 
if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be graffed in: for God is able to graff them 
in again.… How much more shall these, which be the natural branches, be 
graffed into their own olive tree?… So all Israel shall be saved: as it is writ-
ten, There shall come out of Sion the Deliverer…. For of him, and through him, 
and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever.
(King James Version, 11:16–36; emphases added)
Paul’s simile lays out the condition of redemption or blessing that will be 
created in Christ’s grafting of Gentile believers onto Jewish believers.27 
Paulina further echoes this intent in verses that have seemed to com-
mentators oddly vague. Soon after she has said, “It is required / You do 
awake your faith. Then all stand still” and “’Tis time,” she adds, as if to 
Hermione alone,
Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him
Dear life redeems you. (5.3.102–3)
Editors of the play have usually glossed the perplexing pronoun “him” as 
death. Yet the word “redeems” suggests far heavier freight for this “him.” 
I suggest that, in fact, it takes us back to the resounding transcendental 
coda of Paul’s elaboration of the efficacy of grafting in faith. Paulina’s 
“from him” points, once again, to the above passage from Paul where 
he ends with the Deliverer’s power to redeem, to save, to give “dear life” 
in place of death, specifically redeeming the death of the spirit: “For of 
him, and through him, and to him, are all things.” Through Paulina’s 
invoking of this “him” we have exited theatre and entered a transcen-
dental realm of redeemed “dear life” that is beyond worldly time and 
earthly representation. Yet not even the Pauline Paulina could see the 
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further Shakespearean intention in the art of chiasmus that configures 
grafting as an intersection at a point of “great difference” or epoché. This 
takes place in the point of intersection between King Lear and The Win-
ter’s Tale. At the unrepresentable inner point within this chiastic object 
of reflection – made from reflection on the two artefacts together – the 
“nothing” as “vast” makes us alive, as meditators, to coexistent being, 
not least to intersubjective coexistence with Shakespeare. This ultimate 
blessing of a grafting between the two plays is therefore realized in the 
chiastic point of a mere nothing that now affords the onlooker spectator, 
with onlooker Shakespeare, the realized experience of the now that is 
beyond theatre.
Appendix: Stanley Cavell and Christoph Menke on  
Spectatorship and Presentness in King Lear
Stanley Cavell writes,
The perception or attitude demanded in following this drama [King Lear] 
is one which demands a continuous attention to what is happening at each 
here and now, as if everything of significance is happening at this moment, 
while each thing that happens turns a leaf of time. I think of it as an experi-
ence of continuous presentness. Its demands are as rigorous as those of any 
spiritual exercise….
Catharsis … is a matter of purging attachment from everything but the 
present, from pity for the past and terror of the future.… What is revealed is 
my separateness from what is happening to [the protagonists of the tragedy 
and to fellow spectators]; that I am I, and here. It is only in this perception 
of them as separate from me that I make them present.… I have no present 
apart from theirs.28
Christoph Menke challenges Cavell’s claims for presentness and spec-
tatorship in King Lear by expanding upon Nietzsche’s perceptions of 
irony in Hamlet. In Menke’s understanding of both Hamlet and King 
Lear the “theatrical spectatorship” of the protagonist and the audience 
entails a “doubly ironic reflection” that causes the “dissolution of pres-
entness” even in the “experience of action.” The “double irony” that 
Menke sees here is “the (theatrical) irony of the player over against his 
role, which, according to his whims, he puts on or takes off like a mask” 
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and “the (dramatic) irony of fate, over against the agent’s intentions, 
which themselves give rise to what turns against them.” Thus in Menke’s 
view spectatorship in King Lear, as in Hamlet, interrupts “absorption in 
the presentness of dramatic events and characters” by “adhering to the 
rebukes of an irony that dissolves the dramatic present.”29
Cavell and Menke are both describing different stages of an experience 
of presentness that is embedded in a linear temporality. Such a present-
ness continuously “turns a leaf of time” (Cavell), while accompanying the 
“experience of action” (Menke). Menke’s recording of a “dissolution of 
presentness” in “theatrical spectatorship” can even be seen as a fulfilment 
of Cavell’s description of theatrical “catharsis” as the preliminary step of 
“purging attachment from everything but the present.” I have turned to 
Cavell and Menke both to acknowledge that the experience of present-
ness in King Lear has important temporal dimensions and to note ele-
ments of both of their accounts that point beyond temporal presentness. 
Cavell’s idea of a purged present, the demands of which are “as rigorous 
as those of any spiritual exercise,” requires an attention to worldly objects 
that is paradoxically detached from worldly impingements, detached as 
well, therefore, from the time of contingency in which pity and terror are 
occasioned. So, too, the picture of double irony that Menke observes in 
Shakespeare’s spectatorship constitutes, on the concrete level of config-
ured language, a four-way cancellation of polarities that has at least one 
important possibility that Menke has left out: in the very space or instant 
of the dissolution of chronological present time one might experience 
an inward presentness that is beyond the reach of time – that is atempo-
ral. For achieving this atemporal presentness, too, the initial movement, 
emphasized by Cavell, of alternately being with, and being separate from, 
others is indispensable. Once achieved, the inward authenticity of this 
atemporal presentness returns us to the world and to the other.
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of Method, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University 
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of nature in which they are mutually intertwined. This “kind”-ness equally 
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cannot yet know – the lives of their offspring. In addition, as we have 
noted, Camillo cannot yet know that the branch grafting from the root 
branching that he has described will include the “match” of himself with 
Paulina. Shakespeare makes these larger connections unmistakable by 
inscribing a host of ancillary, smaller connections. In the first scene of 
the play Archidamus predicts to Camillo that “we will be justified in our 
loves” (1.1.8). In the last scene of the play Leontes makes the match of 
Camillo and Paulina, saying, that it is “here justified / By us, a pair of 
kings.” Similarly, in the first scene Camillo ends his account of the root 
grafting of Leontes and Polixenes “that cannot choose but branch now,” 
with the prayer, “The heavens continue their loves.” In the last scene we 
hear from Leontes that the root grafting by this “pair” here branches 
yet further – in the attained “now” of chiastic grafting – by “heavens 
directing” (5.3.145–6, 150).
 26 An extended argument in this vein is provided by Ken Jackson, “‘Grace 
to Boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale,” 
in The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies, ed. Paul Cefalu 
and Bryan Reynolds (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 192–210. Jackson relies 
heavily on Agamben’s The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter 
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Walter Benjamin’s concept of messianic time – a concept that was itself 
influenced by Husserl’s exposition of the epoché. On significant points 
of correspondence between Shakespeare’s thinking and Paul’s, see Julia 
Reinhard Lupton, Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 21–48. I am grateful for her comments 
on this chapter.
 27 It has been observed by biblical commentators that Paul has here borrowed 
an early Jewish midrash that was later recorded in the Talmud (tractate 
Yibamoth 63a). That midrash glosses the phrase from Genesis 12:3 in 
which Abraham is told by God, “And in thee shall all families of the earth 
be blessed.” The Hebrew word for and shall be blessed is ונברכו. The midrash 
turns on reading the root of this word, ב ר כ, as that of the Hebrew word 
for grafting, הרכבה, which thus yields the astounding meaning not that the 
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“R. Eleazar … stated: What is meant by the text, And in thee shall the families 
of the earth be blessed? The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Abraham,  
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Naamah the Ammonitess.’” In Romans, Paul’s eleven packed verses laying 
out his extended simile of the grafting of Gentile and Jewish believers is 
thus itself a grafting of Christian and Jewish texts as well as of all who stand 
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by faith. In Judaism, spiritual identity is passed on matrilineally. From 
Naamah the Ammonitess, wife of Solomon, righteous queen of Israel, will 
come Solomon’s royal successor Rehoboam. From Ruth the Moabitess 
will come the prophesied Deliverer. Neither Rabbi Eleazar nor Saint Paul 
spelled out how grafting might in itself be blessing or deliverance. Whether 
or not Shakespeare knew the grafted Jewish origin of Paul’s metaphor 
of grafting, Shakespeare finds his way, resonating with Paul, to produce 
blessing from the structures of grafting.
 28 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 322, 338–9 (italics in original).
 29 Christoph Menke, “Tragedy and Skepticism: On Hamlet,” in Varieties of 
Skepticism: Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, ed. Andrea Kern and 
James Conant, 377–83 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014).
He had perfected the means
to represent inwardness.1
– For Stephen, 7 November 2018
An Anecdote: Entertaining the Idea
Hegel’s first biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, begins his portrait of the phi-
losopher, one of whose best-known students he was, with an anecdote: 
Hegel’s schoolteacher, Löffler (no first name known), had given to his 
talented student, the eight-year-old Hegel, Wieland’s new translation of 
Shakespeare’s plays. He would not understand them yet, but learn to 
understand them soon.2 The prediction proved true and the recommen-
dation valid: Hegel’s philosophy did develop by learning how to read 
Shakespeare. Not only the conventional pillars of instruction, Greek 
tragedy and the church fathers, were formative in Hegel’s education (all 
of classical literature, Greek and Latin, in fact),3 but their modern anti-
pode Shakespeare – a commonplace illustrated by Wilhelm Meister, the 
educational novel par excellence, and still part of the agenda in Joyce’s 
portrait of the young man in Ulysses.
Anecdotes have a point, and since Rosenkranz’s is closely tied to the 
literary pretexts of Hegel’s philosophical development, the point seems 
simple enough. Rather than adding to Hegel’s picture a curiously fash-
ionable accent, the story is to compensate some flaw, which asks for an 
explanation in a genius like Hegel. The crux Rosenkranz has to master 
in his biography and does indeed master with the Shakespeare anec-
dote is the improbability of the modern philosopher as genius. It is not 
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that Hegel had read Aristotle or Kant as an eight-year-old boy or that he 
excelled in mathematics like Pascal or Leibniz. The celebrated philoso-
pher of history had read Shakespeare for a start. He was no prodigy in 
his profession, but a shy, amiable young man and a friendly, unassum-
ing professor later on, about whom the biographer had to confess that 
all who had known him in his younger years were utterly surprised to 
hear about the fame of his later years. The only consistency Rosenkranz 
elaborates in his presentation of the biographical sources, as if it were 
the cunning of reason itself, is the parallel development of Hegel as a 
philosopher and lover.4 Notoriously shy in his way with women – gifted 
with an unusual respect for the weaker sex, but without success in court-
ing the admired ones – Hegel married late, Rosenkranz reports, as a 
surprise almost, and it was a “beau marriage” in the substantial sense that 
characterized his life and philosophy throughout. Thus, why and in what 
respect Shakespeare?
Rosenkranz states the case of his admired teacher with utmost care 
and cleverness; it is the case of the exemplary philosopher of enlight-
ened times in a bourgeois society. As an institution of dialectical self- 
understanding, the theatre provides – asks for and supports – the 
enlightened subject’s frame of a public consciousness. In the Phe-
nomenology of the Mind, which has also been translated as one of Spirit, 
Shakespeare does not simply mirror the world-historical process of the 
Enlightenment. He does not just illustrate this process, but the stage is 
the medium of what came to happen. It is not easy, but philologically 
rather difficult, to prove this point of Rosenkranz’s anecdote. And pre-
cisely this is the merit of an anecdote: to point within the context of a 
life – a life’s text – to vicissitudes that would otherwise escape, since they 
are beyond the biographer’s means. Which does not mean they would 
escape his mind. Ominously, Rosenkranz carried, and was certainly con-
scious of it, a name from Hamlet – an involvement of the biographer in 
his anecdote that would need an anecdote of its own.
Witnesses: Kierkegaard and Solger
There are few developments in Shakespeare criticism from its eighteenth- 
century’s beginnings to the New Historicism of the twentieth century 
that remained untouched or un-prefigured by Hegel’s reflections on 
Shakespeare. His reading of Shakespeare is an unrivalled (although 
mostly unacknowledged) paradigm for the post-Romantic academic 
discipline of literary criticism as a “critique” in the post-Kantian sense. 
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Prominent successors in the history of philosophy like Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche followed his reading of Shakespeare more closely than 
the explicit Hegelian aftermath admits. Nietzsche’s “Dionysian Man” 
is a barely disguised response to Hegel’s Hamlet, as was Kierkegaard’s 
resistance to Goethe’s “aesthetic” life. As a model for Hegel’s reading, 
Wilhelm Meister’s encounter with Hamlet in Goethe’s novel remained 
the backdrop of a critical stage-setting that is still effective – no longer, 
maybe, in the analytically advanced discipline that calls itself still philoso-
phy, but in the study of literature and its lead model for literary moder-
nity, Shakespeare Studies.
A well-informed, philosophically competent witness beside former stu-
dents of Hegel like Rosenkranz is Kierkegaard, who was familiar with 
Hegel’s philosophical milieu, though not part of his school. He begins 
the second part of his timely dissertation (if there ever was a timely dis-
sertation, it was this one) with an unmistakable reference to Hegel’s 
infatuation with Shakespeare. The topic is irony and the philosophi-
cal key in the title, The Concept of Irony, was Hegel’s bone of contention: 
“the truth of irony.” The irony implied – beside the one thematized in 
Kierkegaard’s title, like in the sequel, The Concept of Anxiety – is due to a 
conceptual paradox of terms, states of mind like irony and anxiety that 
do not depend on being conceptualized. The starting point is Hegel’s 
colleague Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger’s conception of irony. Hegel 
had dismissed, disqualified, even denounced Friedrich Schlegel’s irony, 
but had given in to Solger’s mediating attempt to rescue the concept. 
Without detour, Kierkegaard comes to the exemplary case, crucial for 
Hegel, as it was for the Schlegels, Tieck and Solger alike. Right from 
the start (third sentence of part 2, “The Truth of Irony”) Shakespeare 
is first on the agenda: “There is an extra-ordinary degree of objectivity in 
his madness,” Kierkegaard explains: “When Shakespeare is related ironi-
cally to what he writes, it is precisely in order to let the objective dominate. 
Irony is everywhere present [in his work]; it sanctions every single line so 
that there will be neither too much nor too little.”5
“Let the objective dominate” was Hegel’s judgment on Shakespeare’s 
“dramatic irony.” Kierkegaard reports Hegel “in der Sache” and the 
“Sache’s” name is “the objective,” or, in Solger’s more cautious way 
of putting it, “so-called objectivity.”6 The subjectivity effect of irony 
brings out what is objectively happening and not due to just subjective 
 imagination – an objective state of affairs opposed to the imaginary free-
dom proposed by Friedrich Schlegel. For Kierkegaard, Shakespeare’s 
role in the irony debate was still evident, and his testimony of a by now 
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opaque state of affairs is all the more valuable. The point from which 
Kierkegaard proceeds is Hegel’s positive reaction to Solger’s rescue of 
an objective irony from Friedrich Schlegel’s (as Hegel feared) nihilism 
avant la lettre. Kierkegaard ironically restages Hegel; he “mimes” Hegel, 
one might say, whose answer to Solger he cites.7 In this response Shake-
speare is always present, beginning with Solger’s review of Lectures on Dra-
matic Art and Literature by Friedrich Schlegel’s brother, August Wilhelm 
Schlegel, a work whose authority would become the starting point for 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. In Nietzsche, Shakespeare’s importance for 
Hegel returns with, but unhappily reduced to, August Wilhelm’s analy-
sis – a twisted story, which reverberates up to now.8
I shall concentrate on what is underestimated in this story, Hegel’s 
substantial interest in Shakespeare, for which “dramatic irony” remained 
a dubious denominator. The alternative, in which Hegel agreed with Sol-
ger’s discussion of irony, is “objective humor” as an ingredient already of 
Hegel’s appreciation of Wilhelm Meister. A key of Hegel’s philosophy of 
art in general, this term owes everything to his reading of Shakespeare, 
and Rosenkranz points in this direction. But it does more than give a 
clue for future historians of ideas; it initiates questions of method rather 
than of content. Writing with Shakespeare on the side meant more for 
Hegel than registering humour in Shakespeare’s plays. Responding to 
Solger, the objectivity of Hegel’s humour transcends dramatic irony 
in that it reveals itself in the process called “phenomenology.” There, 
the objectivity is a matter not of content, but of cognitive performance 
within the genealogy of the “subject.” After Aristotle reading Greek trag-
edy and Saint Augustine reading Vergil (a disaster barely mended by 
Dante), Hegel’s reading of Shakespeare may be the foremost instance 
of what it means philologically, in terms of method, to read literature 
philosophically. In order to demonstrate the intricate interlacing of 
allusions to Shakespeare’s texts and their reflective transformation in 
Hegel’s own text, I proceed along a series of longer passages from the 
Phenomenology. I take the additional complication of a Hegel translation 
that does not know about the implicitly transported Shakespeare as an 
opportunity to clarify and highlight the relevant points in the order of 
their occurrence.9
Hamlet’s Progress: The Phenomenology
The Phenomenology reads best from the end – Hegel’s long preface is the 
proof, since there he does exactly this: instead of an outline, he looks 
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back from the result. Thus, it seems only appropriate to begin with the 
role of art in the perspective of the book’s ending, in the penultimate 
chapter of the penultimate part, “Religion” (CC). “Religion in the Form 
of Art” (b) is the chapter’s title, which takes the decisive step towards “The 
revealed religion” (c), and to the last part, “Absolute Knowing” (DD).10 
The multilayered design of the book was and is still subject to much 
controversy; suffice it here to say that literature has a significant part in 
it, especially near its riddled ending, where empirical history enters into 
what seemed to be at first a purely cognitive affair, but becomes more 
and more intertwined with historically concrete manifestations of the 
mind in its self-conscious development. In this development, in which 
it is philosophy’s part of re-flection in the sense of looking back, in the 
retrospect of a higher perspective, literature manifests the growth of the 
mind’s intellectual capacity.11 The winding way of what happens in that 
process is in parts opaque and far less obvious than that it happens. Lit-
erature does not simply illustrate the process for Hegel, but is a medium 
of what actually comes to happen through it.
A first decisive step for the phenomenological project is thus retraced 
and documented as late as § 733, “Religion in the form of art.” This step 
is of a purely linguistic nature and takes shape in the institution of Greek 
tragedy. In tragedy (Aeschylus and Sophocles) rather than in philosophy 
(Socrates and Plato), the decisive threshold was reached and crossed. 
The Birth of Tragedy will imitate and emulate this Hegelian move and 
reach farther back, beyond the institution of tragedy, to its performative 
origins. Like Hegel, Nietzsche will find the perfect instance of the Diony-
sian primal scene incorporated in Hamlet instead of Socrates – but this, 
it is important to realize, was already a crucial insight in Shakespeare’s 
drama itself.12 Not to forget Freud, whose intuition of an “Oedipus 
complex,” found the primordial scene fully represented in Hamlet: It is 
Hamlet who first had the Oedipus complex – not Oedipus, who could 
not know, but Hamlet, who came to know. Here, Hegel did more than 
Nietzsche and Freud would or could admit and most readers suspect.13 
Not unexpectedly, he closely followed (and presupposed for his readers 
silently) the analysis of tragedy in Aristotle’s Poetics, but with a twist as 
yet unheard of. The silent conversation between Aristotle and his dis-
tant other Shakespeare is the hidden challenge of Hegel’s argument (my 
emphases and amendments added):
§ 733. A higher language, that of Tragedy, gathers closer together the 
dispersed moments of the inner essential world and the world of action [of 
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the inner essence and action of the world]: the substance of the divine, in 
accordance with the nature of the Notion [Hegel’s Begriff], sunders itself 
into its shapes [i.e., differentiates itself conceptually into different literary 
characters – Gestalten], and their movement is likewise in conformity with 
the Notion [the characters correspond in their movement to their concep-
tion]. In regard to form, the language ceases to be narrative [as is already 
Aristotle’s point], because it enters into the content, just as the content cea-
ses to be one that is imaginatively presented [and consequently imagined – 
vorgestellt]. The hero is him- [or her-] self the speaker, and the performance 
[Vorstellung – both “show” and “idea” – a conscious pun on Hegel’s part] 
displays to the audience, who are as spectators also self-conscious human 
beings, who know their rights and purposes, the power and the will of their 
specific nature and know how to assert them [to speak for themselves]. 
They are artists who do not express with unconscious naturalness and nai-
vety the external aspect of their resolves and enterprises, as it happens in 
the language accompanying ordinary actions in actual life. Lastly [in the 
end], these characters exist as actual human beings [their being – Dasein – 
as characters makes them finally – endlich – like “real people” – into wirkliche 
Menschen – two more puns: end-lich – in the end, and wirk-lich – acting like in 
real life], who impersonate the heroes and portray them, not in the form of 
a narrative, but in the actual speech of the actors themselves.
The linguistic turn, which occurs on the phenomenological way to “abso-
lute knowledge,” leads from the religiously bound participation of the 
audience in the rite to the awakening of a self-conscious community 
from its narrative embeddedness in the cult. The rite had re-enacted the 
mythical foundations of the community as an unquestionable order of 
things: imposition of power by the mighty, related and re-enforced by 
the epic singer. This stage is resumed and left behind, not reiterated in 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Hegel rephrases Aristotle’s gene-
alogy of literary genres: the transition from the epic tradition to the 
tragic performance of that tradition in the institution of the theatre.14 
He revises the mimetic functioning of art from a quasi-natural embed-
dedness and binding force to a medium in the process of a shared con-
sciousness towards its self-conscious perfection in “absolute knowing.” 
The text is difficult, to say the least (especially, if one is not aware of 
the implied Aristotle), and Hegel’s translators had a hard time. That 
much, however, seems safe to say in a first summary: Hegel avoids the 
topicality of the Querelle between ancients and moderns and the question 
about the extent to which the moderns are more advanced in their art 
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than the ancients. In accordance with the contemporary (Young’s and 
Herder’s) pairing of Sophocles with Shakespeare as his modern equal, 
Hegel’s analysis seems closer to the Shandean motif of the dwarfs on the 
shoulders of giants.15
Unlike Jacob Bernays and Nietzsche, Hegel takes the Aristotelian 
catharsis as a symptom, rather than as the original essence of tragedy. He 
is not interested in the effect, but in the peculiar “illocutionary force” 
(to use J.L. Austin’s term) of a spectator-consciousness that is reached in 
Greek tragedy and enabled and supported by the chorus. After Herder, 
August Wilhelm Schlegel, ultimate Hamlet-translator (Kierkegaard read 
Hamlet in his translation), had elaborated this point with acuteness and 
remained the relevant authority for Nietzsche. Hegel’s conclusion was 
different; it reached farther – not in spite of, but because he gave Shake-
speare a closer reading than the usual references had in stock. Every 
reader of Hamlet knows the riddled outcome of the mouse-trap scene 
and the Hecuba speech, where catharsis is the theme, not the effect – 
and that is part of the trap. For Hegel, it is the starting point of a deeper 
analysis (my emphases and amendments added):
§ 736. The content and movement of the Spirit which here is object to itself 
has already been considered as the nature and [that is, the] realization of 
the ethical substance. In its religion [Latin religio, “binding force”], it attains 
to a consciousness of itself, or exhibits itself to consciousness in its purer 
form and its simpler embodiment. If, then, the ethical substance, in virtue 
of its Notion [in its conception, being conceived of as itself], splits itself as 
regards its content into powers which were defined as divine and human law, 
or law of the nether and of the upper world – the one the Family, the other 
the State power, the first being the feminine and the second the masculine 
character [both kind and mask] – … the previously multiform circle of gods 
with its fluctuating characteristics [and determinations] confines itself to 
these powers, which are thereby brought closer to genuine individuality [in-
dividuality, undivided in the “proper” sense as eigent-liche Individualität].
“Closer to individuality” in its “proper” sense means here in the sense 
of Goethe’s Meister, in which the undivided self comes into its “own” 
(becomes eigent-lich). It is Hamlet who makes the difference in a maze of 
complicated analytical respects:
§ 737. At the same time [in equal parts – zu-gleich] the ethical substance 
is divided with respect to its form or to knowing [i.e., it splits itself up 
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according to its form or knowing]. The doer finds himself thereby in the 
antithesis of knowing and not-knowing.… The present reality is, therefore, 
one thing in itself, and another thing for consciousness [for the conscious 
actor between knowing and not-knowing]; the upper and the nether law 
come to signify in this connection the power that knows and reveals itself 
to consciousness, and the power that conceals itself and lies in ambush. 
The one … knows all and reveals all – Phoebus, and Zeus who is his father. 
But the commands of this truth-speaking god and his announcements of 
what is, are really [in fact] deceptive. For this knowing is, in its principle, 
immediately a not-knowing [in its unmediated conception by the therein 
deceived subject, subjected to this deceptive truth that is not a knowing – in 
seinem Begriffe unmittelbar das bloße Nichtwissen].
The stage, on which this conflict of knowledge is exposed, is ruled from 
the start by dramatic irony, as a Hegelian critic of the nineteenth century, 
Connop Thirwall, observed as early as 1833.16 It presents the audience 
with a specific type of “negative knowledge” – Cavell calls it a “disown-
ing knowledge” – that sharpens the negativity in Hegel’s Shakespeare. 
For Hegel, the radicalization of this point in Hamlet is the latent thrust 
of the play. It emerges already in Sophocles as the “power that conceals 
itself and lies in ambush,” and looms large in duplicitous “equivocation.” 
We may note here the typological shorthand used by Hegel in his dense 
account, firmly modelled upon Oedipus Rex, but moving on to Hamlet, in 
the mutual illumination of the antithesis of “upper and lower law.” Ham-
let uncovers and masters the latent “ambush” with a consciousness more 
advanced than the one deceived in Greek tragedy – a consciousness that 
Laertes, like a remnant of Greek tragedy, is lacking.
§ 737 (continued). The priestess through whom the beautiful god [Apollo] 
speaks [in Oedipus] is in no way different from [is the exact same as – nichts 
anders als] the equivocating sisters of Fate [the “weird sisters”], who by their 
promises drive [Macbeth] to crime, and who by the double-tongued cha-
racter of what they announced as a certainty deceive him, who relied on the 
obvious meaning. The consciousness, therefore, that is purer [Hamlet’s] than 
the latter, which believes in witches [Macbeth’s], and is more prudent [beson-
nener], more solid [more profound – gründlicher] than the former [Oedi-
pus’s], which trusts the priestess and the beautiful god [Apollo], tarries with 
his revenge, even though the very spirit of his father reveals to him the crime 
by which he was murdered, and institutes still other proofs – for the reason 
that this revelatory spirit [the ghost of Hamlet father] could also be the devil.
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The consciousness “that is purer,” Hamlet’s, does not fall for the mythic 
fallacy, which inescapably dominates Greek tragedy and carries the tragic 
implication of an “ethical order,” in which it is embedded and remains 
trapped in total deception. Hamlet’s narrow escape from this deception 
is conceived of in Shakespeare as a “turning point of history,” Solger 
concluded, himself a translator of Sophocles, in his Lectures on Aesthetics.17 
Congenial to the spirit of the Phenomenology, Solger praises Shakespeare 
for the “sphere of the purest, highest subjectivity,” which is the sphere of 
the “purer consciousness” demonstrated by Hamlet. Included in Hegel’s 
patchwork is Orestes as the one “who trusted with childlike confidence” 
(§ 737 continued). Orestes took on the divinely imposed duty to exact a 
most vicious revenge – the analogy had been discussed early on, already 
by Nicholas Rowe, and was repeated by Herder before Hegel. Orestes 
suffers the tragic fate that Hamlet evades; he pays a price for what seems 
to run down to the same deadly result, but whose remedy lies open in 
Hamlet’s “coming to know,” as Cavell has put it in terms of a striking 
Hegelian negativity, “of what we cannot just not know” (Freud’s analysis 
broadened).18 Orestes fell prey to a deep tragic necessity, while Ham-
let died (as Hegel explains in greater detail in his Aesthetics) in a scene 
of purest contingency, through the fatal “change of rapiers” (5.2.306). 
There was no tragic mistake (harmatéma) that would be culpable, Hegel 
realizes, nor any mere mishap (a-tuchéma).19 All is under control, and 
Hamlet acts (in an act of inverted irony) “most royal,” as even Fortinbras 
admits (5.2.403).
In order to highlight Hamlet’s exemplary surplus for the conception 
of the Phenomenology, Hegel came up with an extraordinary reading of 
Hamlet’s plot structure, which emerges in contrast to the classical Greek 
background. The intuition “that this revelatory spirit could also be the 
devil” is not only in the face of all Shakespeare readings and interpreta-
tions of his time, it goes against the grain of Hamlet reception in general, 
which must insist on the seriousness of the true father’s father-name and 
on the truth of his commandment. Hegel, however, had learned through 
Shakespeare to read Sophocles, which enabled him to recognize in turn 
how Shakespeare had answered the classical standard of dramatic irony. 
A devil enters, who seems to have no place in Shakespeare’s play, but 
whose absence is the stronger. “It” – like Hamlet’s father ghost an It – 
impersonates the “objective” within the irony of History, the flip side of 
the total allegory that salvation history had presented up to Shakespeare. 
Hegel specifies: “The negative of the object, or its self-supercession, has 
a positive meaning for the self-consciousness” as “the indivisible unity 
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of being-for-itself” – its individuality. On these negative grounds Hegel 
enters the last part, “Absolute Knowing” (§ 788), which leads up to the 
“Calvary of Absolute Spirit” (§ 808). The allegory of History had always 
been its irony or, from the point of view of the “absolute spirit,” “objective 
humour.” Objectivity in itself is historical; it remains to be investigated, 
needs to be traced in the epistemological substructure of the process. 
Again, Hamlet is key.
Calvary: The Paradox of the Skull-Bone
In Hamlet we witness how tragedy comes to an alternative end: “History 
comprehended” is the Phenomenology’s last word (§ 808). History compre-
hended means “at once the recollection and the Golgotha of the Absolute 
Spirit,” Hegel clarifies, recollecting and containing in his conception of 
history Hamlet with the skull of Yorick in his hands, the most famous 
theatrical scene of his time. Paradoxically, this baroque image of a medi-
tatio mortis prefigures a new sense of escape, one that emerges in Ham-
let, from tragedy’s fatal classical limitation. In the dispute with Hamlet’s 
father ghost, Hegel recognizes a consciousness that is “purer” (closer to 
“absolute”), because it is up for dialectical reconciliation – Versöhnung des 
Gegensatzes mit sich. The false but popular etymology of Versöhnung echoes 
the fate of sons (Söhne) as the Christian Christ Son’s prime matter of 
reconciliation. Thus, Klopstock’s Messias had answered the Shakespeare 
adept Milton’s Paradise Lost (a hot debate in the generation before 
Hegel).20 In Hamlet the “purer consciousness” transcends “the Lethe of 
the nether world of death,” Hegel recalls in his Lectures on Aesthetics, and 
he renders old Hamlet’s invocation of “Lethe’s wharf” (1.5.33), that had 
prompted him from the grave, as the “strand of finitude.” He clearly saw 
that this could not “satisfy” Hamlet: sie genügt ihm nicht.21
In the Phenomenology, this achievement gained attention and momen-
tum in the graveyard scene, when Hamlet awaits the beloved Ophelia’s 
maimed rites. The sophistry of the witty gravedigger lends Hamlet’s 
behaviour a baroque significance last but not least in the light of the 
most notorious of monologues, “To be or not to be” (3.1.56). Hegel takes 
the notoriety for granted and proceeds immediately to a subtle analy-
sis that must have impressed Kierkegaard. In his Smuler, “philosophical 
bites” translated as Fragments, he entitles one “metaphysical caprice” of 
bites “The Absolute Paradox,” and in response to the conception of the 
“Absolute” at the end of the Phenomenology, he identifies the absoluteness 
of the metaphysical paradox as “Hamlet’s dialectic.”22 In view of Calvary, 
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Hamlet’s encounter with the graveyard skulls offers the occasion for a 
doubled reflection on objectivity, its necessary reliance on irony and the 
urgent demand for a humour facing history’s impossible reconciliation.
In Phenomenology’s progress, Yorick “the court jester” had raised the 
standard of reflection long before tragedy’s achievement enters explic-
itly into Hegel’s design (§§ 733ff.). He enters Hegel’s account in the 
early phase of “self-observation,” which begins with “the relation of self-
consciousness to its immediate actuality” (as early as §§ 309ff.).23 As seat 
of the mind, the brain is “not a physical part,” but “the being of a self- 
conscious individuality,” and thus positioned against, and confronted 
with, the external “natural thing,” which is, “as the actuality and exis-
tence of man …, his skull-bone” (§ 331) – the emphasis falls on the “fac-
tual being” of the bone as the lifeless substructure for the brain as seat of 
the living individuality of the conscious self:
§ 333. [No matter, what] may occur to us in connection with a skull, like 
the thoughts of Hamlet over Yorick’s …, the skull-bone just by itself is such 
an indifferent, natural thing that nothing else is to be seen in it, or fancied 
about it than simply the bone itself. It does indeed remind us of the brain 
and its specific nature, and of skulls of different formation, but not of a 
conscious movement, since there is impressed on it neither a look nor a 
gesture, nor anything that proclaims itself to have come from a conscious 
action, but another sort of aspect of the individuality, that would no longer 
be a self-reflected, but a purely immediate being.
The “immediate being” of the skull-bone (Hegel’s emphasis), its absolute 
objectivity, is disconnected from all possible internal significance or, as 
he puts it, stressing the dramatic genre, “speaking movement” (§ 333), 
as it is thematized in Hamlet’s meditation on the skull. As an arbitrary 
given, the skull-bone in particular is not recognizable as part of an indi-
vidual, since the speaking faculty is missing: the skull is “chop-fallen” 
(5.1.178).24 At this early point before all historical concretion, the first 
Hamlet reference is implicitly “planted” by Hegel. It was William Emp-
son who called such planting “a standard piece of Shakespearian tech-
nique” and found it foremost in Hamlet.25 Already Hegel recognized and 
indeed adapted the technique in order to bridge the precarious gap in 
the phenomeno-logical development between the earlier epistemologi-
cal stages (one might say, the anthropogenetic substructure) and the his-
torical telos of the manifest forms of “Religion in the Form of Art” (part 
CC, section b). In his later Lectures on Aesthetics Hegel will credit Juliet 
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along with Hamlet explicitly with the dramatic surfacing of “dialectics” 
as method.26 In the Phenomenology, Shakespeare is introduced as a source 
of technique rather than of motifs. The issues that Hegel finds in Hamlet 
and addresses as tragedy’s cognitive achievement are issues of method 
rather than content. He adapts Shakespeare’s “planting” as a method of 
enabling a dialectics in progress.
The decisive step on the way to “absolute knowing,” which is prefigured 
in Yorick’s skull as emblem of the absolute phenomenological paradox, is 
taken up by Kierkegaard as the self-reflective moment of a theatre – the 
theatre as an institution – on the theatre. It continues the mouse-trap 
that was intended to catch the conscience of the guilty king. But famously 
the trap did not work or, rather, the drama does not tell how it worked. 
Instead it leads up to Hamlet’s conundrum of “To be or not to be,” 
ironically cited from a Quodlibet, a scholastic exercise of Logic.27 It masks 
Shakespeare’s departure from Greek tragedy in the decisive moment, 
since it is in “To be or not to be” that Hamlet leaves behind the famous 
Silenus’s wisdom that it were better “not to be born” than “to be born.”28 
“That it were better my mother had not borne me,” Hamlet echoes only a 
little later (3.1.123). The citation was promptly recognized by Nietzsche, 
classical scholar, who went on to sharpen the Dionysian bent in Hamlet 
from “not to be” to “being nothing” in The Birth of Tragedy.29
The mouse trap returns on the graveyard, and the gravedigger has the 
appropriate keyword ready for Hegel, since it is Hamlet who exclaims, 
“How absolute the knave is” (5.1.133). The gravedigger’s absoluteness 
indicates the paradoxical apex of “absolute knowing” that is approached: 
Calvary is professionally no news for the gravedigger, who makes many 
a rude point about it. He certainly knows about “factual being,” and 
Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard’s “John of the Ladder,” acknowledges 
the dialectic’s paradox: the skull as the non-speaking point zero of repre-
sentation. The gravedigger has no problem to identify the individual skull 
in question and connects this one instantly with his own bad memories 
of “the King’s jester” (5.1.175). Both the digger and the jester are con-
trary exponents of the same absoluteness in knowing or – in the medical 
terminology of humours – of melancholy vs. irony.30 Skull in hand, Ham-
let illustrates Hegel’s intricate analysis of the skull-bone with an equally 
intricate speech. Hegel’s reflection at this point of Phenomenology’s prog-
ress performs a subtle emulation of Hamlet’s monologue long before 
the dead end of the process is reached and “History is comprehended.”
The Yorick scene exposes a first step beyond the dramatic state of art 
that is reached in Greek tragedy, and it foreshadows early on the much 
later stage that is reached with Hamlet the play’s technical achievement 
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and reach beyond dramatic irony. It shows the delusion of the con-
sciously “speaking movement” as the tragic trap left behind in Phenom-
enology’s reflection on its way to objective humour. The subjectivity effect 
is reason for a last laugh: “Alas, poor Yorick,” Hamlet addresses the mute 
bone (5.1.178–89). The power of vivid imagination prevails, but it turns 
into horror – “how abhorred” – in the decomposition that detaches the 
bone, which the skull “quite chop-fallen” is: “That skull had a tongue in 
it” (5.1.74) – detaches it piece by piece from all that may have been con-
nected with it in recollection. Hamlet is left with the bone alone, without 
the lips he often kissed (5.1.182). A glimpse of a theatre after tragedy, 
Beckett’s Endgame, is not far off. The skull has to put on “paint an inch 
thick” in order to mask death at the ultimate point of the play, a death as 
senseless a contingency as a “chopless” skull without expression: “Make 
her laugh at that” is Hamlet’s last wish to the dead maiden. The desper-
ate laughter of comedy topples the tragedy of error that is left behind.31
Immanence: A Bone of Contention
An unresolved philological problem of Hegel criticism is the uneven tra-
jectory of ever-changing degrees of implication in the Phenomenology’s 
way to full explicitness of knowledge.32 Or, as Hegel had announced in 
his preface, “The True, not as substance, but equally as subject” (§ 17) – not 
as a substance, but subjected to the process of its coming to be: Truth is 
the truth of the subjected subject’s coming to know. Only a few turns in 
the developmental progress of consciousness are marked in Hegel’s text 
through highlights like Yorick’s skull; mostly they appear in passing and 
vanish soon. One historical aspect that is implicit in the advancement to 
consciousness is the supercession or “burial” of stages in textual crypts 
difficult to access.33 The literary sphere plays its role as a depository of 
former achievements on the road to an absoluteness of knowing that 
obliterates the relativity of its gradual coming to know. Shakespeare’s 
dramatic personae loom large in this cryptic account. As a consequence 
of the dialectical crux, classical and modern characters appear telescop-
ically blended into each other. This amounts to more than the usual 
paradiastolé of Renaissance “re-description” that would turn Greek trag-
edy into something better, morally improved. Hobbes’s rigid rhetoric, 
in which ambiguity and ambivalence are on the brink of hypocrisy, is 
Quentin Skinner’s best example.34 Hegel, on the contrary, refashions 
the epochal break with a Hamlet knowing not “seems” (1.2.77). For 
him, the abysmally deepened ambiguity of “not to be” relates to nothing 
morally relevant, whether achieved or missing. The tragically exposed 
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“substance” is lifted to a higher level of knowing, one that leaves behind 
the “seems,” which inflicts deception and deepens the deceit that is 
embedded in an “ethical order” that is literally, in its letters, living on 
and working with equivocation.
The philological predicament of reconstructing the steps along the 
lines of Hegel’s Logic consists in the difficulty of reassessing, at each new 
step, the respective state of affairs.35 Calvary on the last level marks the 
absolute limit of lived recognition, a cognition whose historical shadow 
is reflected in language and dramaturgy. The substructure of the phe-
nomenological trajectory appears on stage in Hamlet the play; there it is 
thematized in actu and pointed out by Hegel as a dramatic achievement 
rather than an effect of mere performance. According to principles 
of cognitive structure, rather, than the lively description of characters, 
Shakespeare was read by Hegel. As for Aristotle, the enargeia is proof of 
a heightened cognitive mobility rather than of emotive response. The 
 natural-historical genealogy is left behind by a purer consciousness, 
which becomes aware in Hamlet, post-tragic hero, not of life’s natural 
limitation, but of the mind’s dialectical absolution from life’s logic.36 
Hegel’s commentary on the limits of observation – on the mix-up of 
“high and low” in the “organ of generation and urination” – is overcome 
by the idea of a “life that comprehends itself” (§ 346).
While individuals get lost or linger in a limbo of memories, characters 
steadfastly remain as an inscription of what they etymologically (character 
means “writing”) indicate: a kind of writing to be read – no catharsis of 
emotion, but an archaeology of knowledge. Following Aristotle’s lead, 
Hegel deciphered in Shakespeare’s theatre an epistemological drama of 
objective history, rather than of lived experience. It amounts to a con-
ception of the world as History. The “beginning and end of art” can 
anticipate only what remains enclosed until the end in a state of reflected 
anticipation; the mere (could it be more?) entertainment of an idea, 
whose name may be “freedom” (for Hegel it was), and whose embed-
dedness in life includes a process designed to transcend the historical 
forms of the “objective mind.”37 Their objectivity in the varying content 
of Shakespeare’s dramas is of a conflictual nature that does not lend 
itself easily to consensual living. It needs a sense of objective humour 
in spite of the impossibility of achieving such a thing in any other way 
than subjectively or in the fleeting second-degree objectivity of art. In its 
prospect, Shakespeare’s art may almost necessarily lead beyond Hegel. If 
it does so, Hegel on his part pointed to the idea of an objectively inbuilt 
transcendence that lies buried in the paradoxical (call it “dialectical”) 
immanence of a life facing Calvary.
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3 John Philipp Kemble as Hamlet, Sir Thomas Lawrence, 1801.  
Tate Gallery, London. Wikimedia.
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Sir Thomas Lawrence’s picture of the actor, “John Philipp Kemble as 
Hamlet,” was unknown to Hegel when he worked on the Phenomenology 
but gives an idea of what Hegel had theorized at about the same time. 
The illuminated actor’s face – we need not know (and would be rather 
irritated, if we knew) what he is imagined to think; it does not matter – 
corresponds to the well-lit skull-bone, shining in the gloom of its mate-
riality, while Hamlet’s hand holds it, his fingers locked in its face exactly 
where the jaw that made the jester jest is missing. Not much of a laugh 
is ours and wasn’t Ophelia’s, but a sense of objective humour is needed 
and may carry a promise (of consolation). This, instead of a catharsis like 
pissing, is Hamlet’s truth beyond irony in Hegel.
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In his reading of The Winter’s Tale, René Girard notes that the play can 
“affect those even with no particular interest in religion in a manner that 
can only be defined as religious, or bordering on the religious.”1 Other 
discussions of The Winter’s Tale’s also note its “religious” dimension. Spe-
cial attention has been paid to the themes of “forgiveness” (Beckwith, 
Lupton), “faith” (McCoy), and “resurrection” (Cavell, Girard).2 Given 
the emphasis on forgiveness and resurrection, “religious” here seems 
to mean Christian. Then again, as Cavell notes, the issue of “adult life 
struggling toward happiness from within its own ‘debris’” also occupies 
Freud and the Romantics. And they openly acknowledge this occupation 
as part of their debt to Shakespeare.3 If these are Christian issues, then 
they are not exhausted by any Christian or religious or artistic treatment 
of them.
Still, Shakespeare does seem to have in mind not only the recogniz-
ably Christian themes of forgiveness, “faith” awakened, artistic devotion, 
and vocation – but also those of maternal love and grief for a dead son. 
In this chapter I will discuss the latter elements in the play’s trial scene, 
where the scepticism of the first half of the play reaches its fever pitch, 
as a prelude to returning to the former issues on another occasion for 
a fuller discussion. At the same time – to state one more orienting gen-
erality – the story of The Winter’s Tale, already in Shakespeare’s sources, 
clearly revises key elements of the Christian narrative: for a start, like 
Mary, Hermione’s conception is a matter of some speculation and con-
cern – although it is not portrayed as immaculate. Like Mary, Herm-
ione’s love for her children is maternal – but it is also perhaps rooted in 
sexual love for a man. Like Mary, Hermione will grieve the loss of her 
son – but she will also grieve for a daughter. What to make of all this?
chapter eleven
Bliss Unrevealed: The “Trial”  
in Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale
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I
In what follows, I also want to offer some thoughts about the insepa-
rability of form and meaning in the trial scene of The Winter’s Tale. For 
the moment, we can leave open the issue of whether this form should 
be taken as artistic or religious; The Winter’s Tale bears upon the fates of 
both art and religion in the years since Shakespeare’s death. For some 
initial help, let me first turn to what I see as the most ambitious and far-
reaching reflections on the fate of art and religion: the lectures of Hegel. 
Elsewhere I have argued that it was Shakespeare, not Hegel, who first reg-
istered the pastness of art’s highest vocation – and that it was Hegel who 
recognized that Shakespeare was the first artist to see art’s highest voca-
tion as a thing of the past.4 Here I want to begin considering The Winter’s 
Tale in light of Hegel’s remarks on Christian art, starting with Christian 
painting. Because Hegel sees modern (what Hegel calls “romantic”) art 
as essentially Christian art – not post-seventeenth-century art – it is worth 
considering what it means for Hegel to see Shakespeare as the culmina-
tion or fullest development of modern art, and as the moment of art’s 
registration of its own loss of highest vocation.
It is difficult to state Hegel’s views on painting economically. But the 
first thing to be said is that, for Hegel, Christian painting makes visi-
ble (makes “shine”) the liveliness of subjectivity as self-relatedness, or 
“inwardness” (volle Innigkeit). Christian painting does this, moreover, by 
showing something of general-universal significance in its portrayal of 
concrete, particular self-conscious, inwardly self-related human beings. 
For Hegel, Christian paintings attract our gaze such that we learn some-
thing about our own subjectivity; in looking at portrayals of particular 
human beings posed in particular ways, as well as landscapes or still lifes, 
we learn something about ourselves as self-consciously self-related.5
Second, painting makes human self-consciousness affectively, compel-
lingly visible – in a “lively” way. That is, minimally, Christian paintings are 
not mere illustrations of narrative episodes that can be called to mind 
whether or not they are sensuously apprehended, as if pictorial illustra-
tion merely aided such calling to mind. Whatever is theoretically grasped 
is grasped affectively by the beholder.
Third, what is sensuously grasped – the subject matter or content – 
is self-related subjectivity or, more broadly, the human heart, feeling, 
Innigkeit. And Hegel specifies that this self-related subjectivity must 
result from a withdrawal from external suffering into self-repose. That 
is, this self-relation appears where a human being overcomes not some 
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external obstacle but some internal obstacle.6 Hegel calls this “bliss” – as 
distinct from “happiness” or “good fortune,” since it also entails broken- 
heartedness. Hegel also refers to this bliss as “religion alone” – “the 
peace of the individual who has a sense of himself but finds true satisfac-
tion only when, self-collected, his mundane heart is broken so that he is 
raised above his mere natural existence and its finitude, and in this eleva-
tion has won a universal depth of feeling.”7 Hegel offers several examples 
of what he means, including a treatment of Correggio’s Mary Magdalene 
that would be worth a separate discussion.
However – and the thesis is so astonishing that it has yet to receive the 
commentary it deserves – the paradigm of such painterly bliss for Hegel 
is the religious love, the passionless love, of Mary for her son, Christ: “As 
the most perfect subject for painting, I have already specified the [bliss-
ful] love, the object of which is not a purely spiritual ‘beyond’ but is pres-
ent, so that we can see love itself before us in what is loved. The supreme 
and unique form of this love is Mary’s love for the Christ-child … the 
most beautiful subject to which Christian art in general, and especially 
painting in its religious sphere has risen.”8
For Hegel, religious or passionless (leidenschaftslos) love is the true, 
ideal subject matter of painting. We could, I think, call it the ideal of 
parental love, which is what Hegel sees validated in Christian religion, 
too, in its inversion whereby the privileged adoration of a transcendent 
God by his “children” is superseded by the adoration of a concrete, immi-
nent child by his mother.9 Hegel sees this realized in the history of paint-
ing, as Christian painting overcomes the iconoclasm according to which 
the Divine (as transcendent) cannot be represented pictorially, in favour 
of seeing and being affected by seeing the Divine as “love reconciled and 
at peace with itself … above all as the Madonna’s love for her child, as 
the absolutely suitable ideal subject for this sphere” (LFA 819). Painting, 
that is, brings about a new view of the “divine” as passionless love for a 
child, rather than the iconoclastic (non-artistic) adoration of a Divine 
beyond. And this new view is not just a mirroring illustration of a practice 
(of parental love) that lies outside painting; the paintings are a matrix 
for understanding, and hence for intervening in, the reality of the love 
that they depict. Think of how parents often gaze upon photographs 
or images of their children, not as mere representations to be dispas-
sionately studied, but with a devotion that is dialectically entwined with 
historical shifts in the practical forms that devotion to children takes.
As Hegel points out elsewhere, love as “mutual subjectivity” cannot 
flourish in modernity unless parents love their children more than 
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children love their parents.10 Perhaps it is helpful here to recall, too, 
that artists often regard their works as their “children” – and that paint-
ing is often figured as a kind of “giving birth” or “labour of love.” These 
metaphors – for they cannot be literally true (to destroy an artwork is a 
travesty, but it is not a murder) – might be taken as a clue to grasping 
the way in which paintings can demand a form of attentiveness that is 
significantly akin to the attentiveness required for the devotional love 
of children, in the sense that beholding fine paintings entails the attri-
bution of an absolute value and passionless devotion to what is beheld. 
Lovingly passionless, not merely disinterested (in Kant’s sense) – without 
the expectation that the love be “returned” in kind from the artwork (or 
the child). This, I take it, is also part of Hegel’s critique of the role that 
disinterestedness plays in Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment.
We should note that while Hegel emphasizes that the passionless 
devotion entailed in beholding “Christ the child” is the most “important 
object of love in paintings” (LFA 820), he nevertheless does not see this 
as adequate to comprehend loving “subject-subject” relations tout court. 
Hegel is clear that the “mutual subjectivity” of love cannot be restricted to 
such passionless devotion; he goes on to discuss the “heat of passion” in 
dramatic and poetic presentations of love (LFA 566–8). The Madonna’s 
passionless love is, in other words, only how the art of painting best grasps 
love-as-divine – inadequately and incompletely with respect to the fuller 
modern logic of mutual subjectivity, wherein love goes beyond parental-
maternal love and comes to necessarily include passion, caprice, roman-
tic love, the individual’s “heart for love and … right to become happy 
through it” (LFA 568).
Hegel’s larger point, then, seems to be that love – superseded through 
and in parental love – ultimately reveals the insufficiency of the art of 
painting’s analogousness to it. And if Hegel’s “science of art” is to be 
true to its name, then that insufficiency must also somehow show up in 
art. That is why Hegel must then go on to emphasize the insufficiency 
of poetry and drama, too, when it comes to the sensuous comprehen-
sion of love’s intense, passionate contingency. (For example, dramatic 
art is no longer fine art when it devolves into merely the depiction of 
the “supreme contingency” of passionate love, as Hegel puts it, “[or] 
in the … caprice which has neither universality nor any scope beyond 
itself … [and] which freezes us despite all the heat of passion in its pre-
sentation” [LFA 568].)
In such passages, Hegel seems to be suggesting that it is dramatic-
poetic presentations of love – and not painting’s presentations – that 
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instructively manifest their own failure to sensuously comprehend love 
as the modern logic of mutual subjectivity or “spirit as infinite subjectiv-
ity.” Put another way, in part because painting cannot annul itself from 
within its own activity, dramatic poetry is called for – if art is to bring to 
an end (not just be forced by external circumstances to conclude) its 
task of sensuously embodying the logic of mutual subjectivity – such that 
our grasp of art’s becoming past might yet instruct us with respect to the 
demands of “the modern logic of social subjectivity,” the ethical task of 
shared intelligibility in “subject-subject” loving relations (ATB 86).
In other words, art’s becoming past with respect to the demands of 
comprehending “love” is one way that we might continue to learn what 
love’s demands can yet entail.11
II
Parental and passionate love are of course at the heart of Shakespeare’s 
Winter’s Tale, and Hermione bears more than a passing resemblance to 
representations of Mary in Christian painting.
Imprisoned by Leontes, from whom she is now estranged, barred from 
seeing Mamillius, her son, and informed that her newborn daughter is 
to be burned alive, Hermione is “hurried here, to this place, i’th’open 
air, before I have got strength of limit” (that is, before fully recovering 
from giving birth to her daughter) – to a public trial. There, she “lays 
down” (WT 3.2.79) her attachment to her finite life in the very sort of 
terms used by Hegel to define the “bliss” of Mary’s infinitely self-related 
subjectivity. Hermione is not annulled by having everything she holds 
dear taken from her. She demands, rather, to be seen and understood 
as who she is, in this state of bereavement. When Leontes threatens her 
with death, she replies:
Sir, spare your threats.
The bug with which you would fright me I seek.
To me can life be no commodity….
But yet hear this – no life,
I prize it not a straw, but for mine honour
Which I would free. (3.2.89–109)
It might be objected that Hermione speaks these lines; she does not 
appear, silently, as in a painting of the “blissful” Madonna. But things are 
more complicated than that. Hermione will very shortly fall silent and 
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become – we are eventually asked to believe – a kind of visual artwork. 
And she follows this speech – with virtually the last words we hear from 
her for sixteen years – with the following lines:
The Emperor of Russia was my father.
O that he were alive, and here beholding
His daughter’s trial; that he did but see
The flatness of my misery; yet with eyes
Of pity, not revenge. (3.2.116–21; my emphasis)
In imagining her trial beheld by her father, she sees her misery as “flat-
ness”– as a two-dimensional picture of her state.12 And in asking for 
“eyes of pity, not revenge” she seems to be suggesting that the vindica-
tion of her suffering is visible, already, in the “flatness” of her appear-
ance. Hence, any further vindication of her honour (by her father) is 
unnecessary.
One implication of this might be that Hermione also senses that she 
is not being looked at aright by Leontes, not being rightly seen by him, 
even as she appears in flesh and blood before him, in person, on trial at 
his behest. We already know that her words are not believed by Leontes, 
and so – as she herself notes – it makes little sense for her to appear in 
person at the trial merely in order to speak to him in her own defence:
Since what I am to say must be that
Which contradicts my accusation, and
The testimony on my part no other
But what comes from myself, it shall scarce boot me
To say ‘Not guilty.’ Mine integrity
Being counted falsehood shall, as I express it,
Be so received. (3.2.20–7)
And yet, we are told, “It is his highness’ pleasure that the queen / Appear 
in person here in court” (3.2.8–9). To what end? Does Leontes want 
to parade her, as Octavius wants to parade Cleopatra – “a great king’s 
daughter, / The mother to a hopeful prince, here standing / To prate 
and talk for life and honour, ‘fore / Who please to come and hear?” 
(3.2.38–41)? I do not think so, because I think that Leontes is sincere 
when he opens the scene by stating his reluctance to bring Hermione, 
“the daughter of a king, our wife, and one / Of us too much beloved” to 
trial.13 Is it then to “catch her conscience” – to see if she will disclose her 
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guilt or innocence as Hamlet hoped Claudius might do when confronted 
with the Mousetrap? I see no evidence that Leontes regards Hermione’s 
honour or guilt as something to be seen in the spontaneous expressions 
of her face, or in the bearing of her person.
It clearly does matter to Leontes, on the other hand, that the trial 
could clear him of any accusation of “tyranny.”14 That is, it matters to 
him not only that the indictment and verdict be read with Hermione 
present, in front of witnesses; it matters that the truth be revealed to be 
something other than his tyrannical domination of others, especially of 
Hermione. He asks her to stand trial so as not to dominate her, so as to 
submit to the same verdict to which she will submit. He does not want 
the truth to be authorized by him, or by his fantasies and suspicions. He 
wants to the truth to come out, to be revealed to him and Hermione alike 
in such a way that they are both bound to it. And the sincerity of this 
desire, on its own, means that he is not a tyrant in his own eyes. It may 
indeed mean that Leontes is also not the radical sceptic that he has been 
taken to be – at least, insofar as Leontes also seems to crave a revelation 
that he can believe in, that he can take as authoritative for him.15
The accusation seemed to have been provoked by Leontes’s suspicion 
that Perdita is not his “issue.” And the trial seems to have resulted from 
Leontes’s further view that the confirmation of his suspicion needs to 
be resolved by some external determination other than what might be 
had by looking at the child, by studying the child’s physical features. It 
has been supposed that what Leontes needs is some super-sensible or 
ahistorical verification, a truth that – like Iago’s quip about Desdemona’s 
honour – amounts to an “essence that’s not seen.” In our current era, 
a DNA test might take the place of such verification; modern scientific 
truth is also an essence that need not be seen to be believed. But I do 
not think that this adequately gets at the form of the truth Leontes craves, 
or why he wants the oracle to be read in public, with Hermione stand-
ing trial. What Leontes wants, I think, is not just the ahistorical objectiv-
ity of scientific data – its irreducibility to subjective sense-perception, its 
“divine” authority. What he wants from the trial, I mean, is a sensuous 
form of authority – the formal revelation of a truth, of a fact of the mat-
ter – which both he and Hermione would be bound to accept.
We could say that he craves the form of authority proper to the high-
est vocation of drama or dramatic representation.16 And for drama to 
have that kind of authority, it must facilitate the suspension of disbelief. 
The question – the open question for Shakespeare, I think – is whether 
dramatic revelation is (still) up to that task. Another way of pressing the 
192 Paul A. Kottman
question: Can dramatic revelation reflect meaningfully on its own capac-
ity to help us suspend our disbelief, in the face of the new demands on 
mutual acknowledgment that the world throws up? I see Shakespeare’s 
late works grappling with these questions.
As with any performed drama, its director or sponsor (Leontes) can-
not fully govern the result, although he can rightly insist on elements of 
the mise-en-scène, such as the reading of the oracle. If the witness of the 
oracle were to pronounce Hermione guilty, then she might of course still 
protest her innocence – but she would have lost the ability to claim that 
her plight resulted merely from Leontes’s jealous tyranny. She would 
have to at least answer the oracle’s testimony as well, taking seriously its 
form of authority. Indeed, it is Hermione – not Leontes – who declares 
“Apollo be my judge” (3.23.114). By the same token, if the witness of the 
oracle pronounces Leontes “a jealous tyrant,” then Leontes might still 
protest his innocence; but he would be unable to do so unless he could 
find a way to disbelieve the testimony of oracle, without rejecting the 
dramatic revelation as a whole – without disbelieving everything.
As it turns out, this is precisely what he tries to do. Leontes does not – as 
most interpreters conclude – persist in ever more radical doubt; instead, 
he doubts the oracle (doubts his own tyranny) in order to keep alive the 
suspension of disbelief, in the hope of further revelation.
There is no truth at all i’th’oracle
The sessions shall proceed – this is mere falsehood.    (3.2.136–7)
In rejecting the oracle, therefore, Leontes is not rejecting the continu-
ation of the trial itself. Leontes wants the sessions to proceed, wants the 
truth to be revealed – somehow – by whatever follows. If he calls for the 
trial’s continuance by rejecting the veracity of the oracle’s testimony – 
“there is no truth at all in’th’oracle … this is mere falsehood” – then he 
is not necessarily behaving tyrannically. As already noted, Leontes has 
reason to say that the oracle – which brands him a “jealous tyrant” – is 
false.17
We should try to better understand this impasse. The trial’s drama has 
been now brought to a point, I want to say, at which it is no longer clear 
what could count as evidence or a “sensuous form of authority” about 
the past that might compel Leontes and Hermione, and those gathered, 
to accept the same present reality. Put another way, the dramatic presen-
tation of a truth or reality that can be shared by Leontes and Hermione 
alike, and by everyone around them, can no longer come from unveiling 
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evidence of past deeds, from achieving agreement about the historical 
record or a shared understanding of “what really happened” between 
Polixenes, Camillo, and Hermione. Such agreement, such a shared 
understanding, will never be achievable – that much is now clear. And 
facing up to that is something that Hermione, Leontes, Paulina, and the 
rest must now do.
But how?
The sensuous form that a compelling revelation might take is now open, 
no longer governed by the dramatic form that Leontes had called for.
It is only when the trial is brought to that point, I want to say, that 
Leontes and Hermione are thrown back into the historical present. It is 
no longer a matter of determining the truth of what has happened; what 
happens next suddenly matters.
The issue might be stated this way: Could any new reality be presented 
to Leontes and Hermione in such a way that they both accept it, share it, 
face up to it – suspend their disbelief?
III
Whatever the answer to that question, it must take the form of testing 
whether Leontes and Hermione can share any reality whatsoever – any 
objective, independent fact or feature of the world which they both can-
not deny. As noted earlier, this is also the question for drama’s highest 
vocation – for the fate of religious revelation as well as dramatic art’s 
highest vocation.
So, what is most real to Leontes and Hermione? What facilitates their 
suspension of disbelief?
At one level, the question might be one of psychological motivation 
or bedrock desire. Whatever is most real to Leontes and Hermione will 
be revealed, in their self-relation, by a reality by which they cannot stop 
being motivated on pain of self-annihilation. In other words – with the 
same Cartesian echoes that Cavell hears – this motivation can be revealed 
only in the crucible of a radical effort to deny it, to throw it into radical 
doubt. The failure of the radical denial of a motivation is the form that its 
revelation takes.18
With this in mind, Cavell began to offer his own answer to the question 
just posed: “what is most real” to Leontes and Hermione? Cavell’s method 
locates the answer to this in what, he thinks, Leontes works hardest to 
deny: that he is the father of his children, that his children are “his.” 
Cavell suggests that Leontes’s “disowning his issue is more fundamental 
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than, or causes, his jealousy of his friend and brother,” his denial of 
Hermione’s – and everyone else’s – fidelity and veracity.19 I hasten to add 
that Cavell, significantly, also conflates the question of Leontes’s denial 
of “his children” with the denial that Mamillius is his “son” (more on that 
in a moment).20
As evidence, Cavell turns to the very moment of the play under dis-
cussion here. That is, he pursues this question by asking how “Leon-
tes’ ‘diseased opinion’ (1.2.197) drops its disease.”21 And he answers, “It 
vanishes exactly upon learning that his son is dead.” Allow me to quote 
Cavell in full, since I will want to contrast my own understanding to his: 
The sequence is this: Leontes refuses the truth of Apollo’s oracle; a servant 
enters, crying for the king. Leontes asks, ‘What’s the business?’ and is told 
the prince is gone. Leontes questions the word and is told that it means ‘Is 
dead.’ Leontes’ response is at once to relent: ‘Apollo’s angry, and the heav-
ens themselves / Do strike at my injustice’; whereupon Hermione faints. 
(Disowning Knowledge, 195)
I agree with Cavell that it is upon learning of Mamillius’s death that 
Leontes seems to drop his denial of his own paternity, seems to (re)sus-
pend his disbelief. But I do not see, as Cavell does, that the denial and 
acceptance – the reality – at issue here can be adequately grasped by focus-
ing primarily on Leontes’s denial that his son is his, or that “Leontes’ … 
suffering has a cure, namely to acknowledge his child as his, to own it.”22 At 
least, it seems to me significant that such an acknowledgment is not what 
Shakespeare focuses on in this moment. Cavell, by contrast, thinks that 
it’s “here that [Leontes] buckles, lets himself feel the shock” (195). But in 
fact, Leontes’s first response makes no mention of his children – neither 
Mamillius nor his daughter. This in spite of the fact that he has just learned 
that his son is dead. His lengthy speech, which begins “Apollo, pardon …” 
(3.2.150–69) makes no mention of Mamillius; he focuses on reconciliation 
to Polixenes, recalling Camillo, wooing Hermione.
For Cavell, Leontes’s failure at self-awareness, his failure to “see” 
Hermione aright, is finally rooted in Leontes’s denial/acceptance of his 
children as his own. He suggests that Leontes’s relationship to Hermione 
(his jealousy of Polixenes, too) is determined and predicated upon his 
acceptance of his own paternity. Here is Cavell’s train of thought:
The matter for [Shakespeare’s] drama … is to investigate the finding of a 
wife not in empirical fact lost, but, let me say, transcendentally lost, lost just 
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because one is blind to her – as it were conceptually unprepared for her – 
because that one is blind to himself, lost to himself. Here is what becomes, 
at some final stage, of the great Shakespearean problematic of legitimate 
succession: Always seen as a matter essential to the flourishing state, rec-
ognizing (legitimizing) one’s child now appears as a matter essential to 
individual sanity, a discovery perhaps begun in Hamlet, and developed in 
Lear.          (Disowning Knowledge, 204)
So, for Cavell, shoring up one’s own sanity, by conceptually preparing to 
“find” one’s sexual lover, is done by acknowledging one’s parenthood. 
And that acknowledgment entails not just the transmission of name/
property/legitimacy to one’s child, but in something like the realization 
(“at some final stage” of Shakespeare’s career) of parental love as a con-
dition of human self-knowledge. Cavell – like Christianity, and Christian 
painting, I am tempted to say – sees the passionless loving parental bond 
as prior to, in the sense of being the conceptual condition of possibility 
for, the passionate sexual-love bond. Although it should be again empha-
sized that Cavell also sees this as a primarily paternal problem (Leontes’s 
problem) – the issue of paternity as the acknowledgement of sons, espe-
cially, as one’s own (I will return to this).
Now, perhaps the parental bond is prior, in the sense that perhaps the 
conceptual articulation of the significance of parental love in Christian 
painting or Christian religious or human experience writ large – Mary’s 
blissful love of, grief for, her son – is a precondition for any emergent 
actualization and valorization of a culturally authoritative sexual-love 
bond between a man and a woman, as mother and father, and perhaps 
of any love affair (gendered in this way or not). There is no way to settle 
that large issue here, but it can remain on the table.23
But if parental love is prior, then we should look again at what Chris-
tian painting and Shakespeare’s play are at pains to show, and is elided 
in Cavell’s summary: maternal grief and maternal love. Yes, Leontes rec-
ognizes his own “injustice” when he learns that his son has died. But he 
learns what that injustice is – it is revealed to Leontes, I want to say – 
even as he says the very word: “my injustice [Hermione faints] / How now 
there?” (3.2.144).
IV
Let us then pick up the sequence on which Cavell focuses, but at the 
point at which he leaves off: Hermione’s collapse.
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paulina: This news is mortal to the queen. Look down
And see what death is doing (3.2.145)
Like Mary, Hermione loses her son. And Paulina – like the churches which 
display paintings– instructs us to look at this, to register Hermione’s grief.
Consider Annibale Carracci’s Lamentation of Christ (1604, National 
Gallery London), not as an illustration of this moment but as an effort 
that might help us to make sense of what Shakespeare is making sense 
of. If Mary Magdalene (bottom right) responds to Christ’s death by throw-
ing up her hands, then the woman behind stretches her hands out – 
directing our gaze and her care to Mary. (This visible contrast between 
the position of these four hands makes me see the former as an act of 
raising arms, rather than stretching them out.) The limbs of the others, 
on the left, intertwine and fall into one another. Christ’s weight is not 
borne in Mary’s arms so much as he is splayed in her lap. If anything, it 
is Mary whose weight seems borne in the arms of the woman behind her. 
I imagine her – and the woman whose arms are outstretched – saying 
something (both their mouths are open, as if in speech) along the lines 
of Leontes’s words: “Beseech you, tenderly apply to her / Some remedies 
for life” (3.2.149–50).
Mary’s face mirrors Christ’s dead visage, distinctly unbeautiful in its 
slack-jawed colourlessness. The death of the son is registered in what 
looks like the death of his mother. “I say she’s dead – I’ll swear it,” says 
Paulina of Hermione:
If word nor oath
Prevail not, go and see. If you can bring
Tincture or lustre in her lip, her eye,
Heat outwardly or breath within, I’ll serve you
As I would do the gods. (3.2.200–4)
Later in the Winter’s Tale, we are all taken to “go and see” – in the gallery 
that Paulina arranges, wherein Hermione will appear like stone. I will 
have to save a discussion of that scene for another time. Here I want to 
see whether Carracci’s tableau might help us to understand Hermione’s 
collapse in act 3, scene 2 of the The Winter’s Tale. For help, let me turn 
again to Hegel:
Mary sees Christ carry his cross, she sees him suffer and die on the cross, 
taken down from the cross and buried, and no grief of others is so profound 
 Bliss Unrevealed 197
as hers. Yet, even in such suffering, its real burden is not the unyielding-
ness of grief or of loss only, nor the weight of necessary imposition, nor 
complaint about the injustice of fate, and so a comparison with the char-
acteristic grief of Niobe is especially appropriate. Niobe too has lost all her 
children and now confronts us in pure sublimity and unimpaired beauty…. 
Mary’s grief is of a totally different kind. She is emotional, she feels the 
thrust of the dagger into the center of her soul, her heart breaks, but she 
does not turn into stone. She did not only have love; on the contrary, her 
whole inner life is love, the free concrete spiritual depth of feeling which 
preserves the absolute essence of what she has lost, and even in the loss of 
the loved on she ever retains the peace of love. Her heart breaks; but the 
very substance and burden of her heart and mind which shines through 
4 Annibale Carracci, Lamentation of Christ, ca 1604. National Gallery, 
London. Wikimedia.
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her soul’s suffering with a vividness never to be lost is something infinitely 
higher. This is the living beauty of soul in contrast to the abstract substance 
which, in its ideal existence in the body perishes, remains imperishable, but 
in stone. (LFA 825–6)
I want to draw attention to the way in which Hegel sees Mary’s love as 
“totally different” from the classical “pure sublimity and unimpaired 
beauty” of Niobe. Mary’s impaired beauty in Carracci’s painting achieves 
something that differs, say, from Michelangelo’s efforts in the Vatican 
Pietà: the revelation of “the very substance and burden” – not of her dead 
son, of his weight – but “of her heart and mind which shines through.” 
5 Michelangelo, Pietà, 1498–9. Vatican Museum. Wikimedia.
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6 Michelangelo, The Deposition, 1547–55. Museo dell’Opera del Duomo, 
Florence. Wikimedia.
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Hegel expressed his admiration for the Pietà (see LFA 790). Michelan-
gelo’s later (unfinished) version of the Pietà seems to have followed this 
same thought – making Christ’s weight in the “deposition” central to its 
figuration.
At issue, I want to say (with Hegel, I think), is not only how to appre-
hend the weight of what is lost. If the magnitude of the loss were what 
most needed depicting, then – Hegel suggests – something more like 
Niobe’s tears or Laocoon’s grimace would be more appropriate. But – as 
Christian depictions of Mary’s lamentation often suggest – Mary is best 
seen in her acceptance of this painful reality, the acceptance and realiza-
tion of the depth of her love. She “is emotional, she feels the thrust of 
the dagger into the center of her soul, her heart breaks, but she does not 
turn into stone.”
Can we see Mary as she sees herself? The depth of her self-relation – 
her view of herself – is born in her unbeautiful appearance, not only as 
weighed by the dead son she bears in her arms. Not just the magnitude 
of Mary’s loss, not just that burden – but Mary herself, in the profundity 
of her unbeautiful grief?
V
Cavell, I noted, makes Leontes’s acceptance of his paternity the condi-
tion of possibility for a self-relation that would enable him to begin to 
acknowledge Hermione. But if we pursue the scene as Shakespeare pres-
ents it, beyond the sequential summary given by Cavell, some important 
alternatives present themselves.
First, although Leontes does emphatically deny that Perdita is his 
daughter, contrary to Cavell’s suggestion, he never denies that Mamil-
lius is his son. Whereas Cavell, again, conflates the question of Leontes’s 
denial of “his children” with a denial that Mamillius is his “son,” Shake-
speare keeps the two apart: the pair of children never meet each other, 
and Leontes’s initial refusal of the newborn daughter is adamant.24 
Moreover, rather than struggle with accepting Mamillius as his (as Cavell 
has it), Leontes struggles to accept Mamillius as theirs – as his and Herm-
ione’s son, an object of their love. He does not so much deny his paternal 
bond to Mamillius as deny Hermione’s maternal bond to him – he keeps 
the two of them apart.
Second, it should be remembered that one reason for a father to 
acknowledge a son rather than a daughter is that – in a patriarchal 
world – a son can bear the legitimacy of the paternal (but not necessarily 
the maternal) acknowledgment in ways that a daughter cannot.25 In such 
 Bliss Unrevealed 201
a world, to acknowledge a son and to acknowledge a daughter must be 
two different forms of acknowledgment. One way of looking at this is to 
consider that, in barring Mamillius from his mother, Leontes is not ban-
ishing Mamillius from the throne – or from future ascension. With King 
Lear in mind, for example, we could say that such a patriarchal structure 
allows fathers to acknowledge relations to sons in myriad ways without 
thereby acknowledging, with respect to the mother, anything other than 
having once had sexual-biological relations with her.26 That is, Leontes 
can acknowledge his “physical” dependence on Hermione for his own 
paternity – every child must have a mother, of biological necessity – with-
out acknowledging his dependency on Hermione’s acknowledgment or 
love of the child, or of him. His dependence on her “blissful” love of 
their child – her self-relation – has yet to be acknowledged. And it is far 
from clear how they can begin to rightly see each other, as lovers, in the 
absence of that acknowledgment.
In saying this, I do not mean that the issue of acknowledging 
children in The Winter’s Tale remains merely a matter of legitimacy, 
paternal prerogatives, or patriarchal-monarchical inheritance. But 
Shakespeare includes a son and a daughter, in ways the Christian nar-
rative avoids. So I wanted to indicate that the patriarchal context mat-
ters to the vicissitudes of mutual acknowledgment between Leontes and 
Hermione in ways that Cavell does not adequately address. The differ-
ence between acknowledging a son and acknowledging a daughter is 
unavoidable in this context, since the structural inequality of son and 
daughter is repeated in the inequality between husband and wife – 
especially if the latter’s maternal and sexual self-relation can be made 
to “stand trial.”
Indeed, this difference between sons and daughters presses the ques-
tion: What would it mean for a father to acknowledge or love a child as 
his own irrespective of the child’s gender, and beyond matters of political 
or economic legitimacy? And how could the meaning of that very ques-
tion ever get a grip from within an extreme patriarchy like Leontes’s 
Sicilia? If, as I have been emphasizing, parental love – devotion to chil-
dren as one’s own in some sense not captured by seeing them as bearers 
of one’s title or property or prerogatives – is to come into view, then it 
must emerge from this background.
Consider again Carracci’s painting. It hangs in the National Gallery in 
London, which remains open until 9 p.m. on Fridays – when the gallery 
is empty enough to allow a special kind of intimacy with the canvases. 
The bustle of Trafalgar Square outside, the hum of London, the empty 
darkness of the gallery, thoughts of Shakespeare living in this city some 
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generations back – all this, and the lack of an explicitly religious setting, 
provoke me to look at the Carracci painting not as the image of death of 
God’s son and his grieving mother. I see, instead, two dead children – a 
brother and a sister – attended only by women, perhaps themselves the 
mothers or grandmothers.
Faced with the sight of his two dead children, a father – a King, a 
Gloucester, a Leontes – may have reason to lament, first, the death of his 
son. But to which dead child would a mother first turn her gaze, stretch 
out her arms?
And what about us? Faced with such a tableau … to whom would we 
look first, reach for first?
Leontes, it seems, needed to be told where to look. “This news is mortal 
to the queen,” says Paulina, “Look down / And see what death is doing.”
As he looks upon Hermione – upon a scene something like the one 
Carracci offers – Leontes’s response differs markedly from the women in 
Carracci’s canvas. Leontes denies the depth of his wife’s grief, her self-
relation, her “bliss”:
Take her hence.
Her heart is but o’ercharged. She will recover. (3.2.146–7)
Why does Leontes think that Hermione will “recover” from the death 
of their son? Does he think that he can measure her grief because it 
cannot possibly outweigh his own? That her parental love (her self-
relation) cannot equal his? That he can out-grieve her, out-grieve 
them all?
There is evidence for this:
Prithee bring me
To the dead bodies of my queen and son.
One grave shall be for both. Upon them shall
The causes of their death appear, unto
Our shame perpetual. Once a day I’ll visit
The chapel where they lie, and tears shed there
Shall be my recreation. So long as nature
Will bear up with this exercise, so long
I daily vow to use it. Come, and lead me
To these sorrows. (3.2.231–9)
It is difficult to escape the sense that a religion is being articulated 
here, a cult of paternal grief forged in self-pitying interment of mother 
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and child, mother with child, as if covering over maternal love – “one 
grave shall be for both.” The first part of The Winter’s Tale indeed con-
cludes with the erasure of maternal love’s appearance – as if to tally the 
cost of displacing the cult of the Madonna, say.
Contrary to Cavell, what Leontes most damagingly denies is not that 
his children are his. Most damagingly, Leontes denies that what it means 
for his children to be his – in a loving sense not captured by patriarchal 
prerogatives or issues of legitimacy – also depends on whether Hermione 
loves and grieves, and on how her love and self-relation are seen by him. It 
is not therefore, as Cavell has it, that Leontes’s failure to see Hermione is 
rooted in his denial/acceptance of his children. Whether and how Herm-
ione loves her children, rather, must bear on whether Leontes, too, can see 
their children are theirs – as the objective existence of their love – in any 
way not captured the demands of patriarchal-economic power relations, or 
biological processes. And after all, doesn’t Leontes desperately want to see 
the children as theirs, to be able to suspend his disbelief about that?
A last comment:
One way of looking at the myth of the immaculate conception is to 
consider God’s acknowledgment that Christ is Mary’s child, too. Not just 
biologically – via a patriarchal appropriation of her womb, as in Sim-
one de Beauvoir’s reading of the immaculate conception – but in the 
sense that God acknowledges his dependence on Mary’s self-related love 
(her love for God himself, as well for the child).27 But of course, from a 
religious viewpoint, Mary’s love and conception were not sexual. So the 
questions facing Leontes and Hermione are different.
How can Leontes acknowledge his dependency on Hermione’s self-
relation, on her maternal love – and not just on her womb? And can this 
be done in ways that take on board the vicissitudes of passionate sexual 
love, the possibility that parental love and passionate love might not only 
co-exist but be co-dependent?
Can any meaningful revelation about this still take artistic or religious 
form; or do such hopes remain things of the past?
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of what happens. “One is confronted with the question of what exactly this 
truth is, not with the question of whether this is the truth.” See her “Poetic 
Truth and Historical Truth,” in Philosophers on Shakespeare, ed. Paul A. 
Kottman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 186.
 17 To those who would argue that Leontes will only accept an outcome of the 
trial that validates his accusations, I point simply to the fact that this is not 
at all how the scene ends.
 18 Cavell is careful to note – and I agree – that Descartes’s own method is 
not necessarily exportable, psychologically or otherwise. “The cure in 
Descartes’ case is not so readily describable [as that of Leontes]; and 
perhaps it is not available. I mean, acknowledging that the world exists, 
that you know for yourself that it is yours, is not so clear a process” (203). 
Agreed. But this makes it all the more significant that Cavell does think the 
cure presents itself in The Winter’s Tale in the form of an acknowledgment, 
by Leontes, of his paternity. So I shall turn to that question now, and 
contest much of what Cavell has to say about that.
 19 It is worth recalling that Leontes does not only deny that Hermione and 
Polixenes are faithful or honest; he calls everyone a liar: “You’re liars all!” 
(2.3.144). I am citing from Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 195. Along the 
way, Cavell indirectly takes a jab at René Girard’s famous thesis about the 
fundamental role played by mimetic rivalry or mimetic desire in human 
culture and psychology: “The idea of his fearing to be a father would 
make his jealousy of Polixenes suspicious – not merely because it makes 
the jealousy empirically baseless, but because it makes it psychologically 
derivative. This is worth saying because there are views that would take the 
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jealousy between brothers as a rock-bottom level of human motivation.” 
But Girard’s own reading of The Winter’s Tale, published a few years 
after Cavell’s own essay, sees the play as Shakespeare’s own “deepening 
awareness that his past ferocity with sufferers of mimetic desire was still 
fueled by the virulence of the disease in himself” (Theater of Envy, 338). 
Girard’s use of the word “disease” here echoes Shakespeare’s own reference 
to Leontes’s “diseased opinion” (1.2.297) and indicates that Girard, as if 
responding to Cavell’s jab, sees The Winter’s Tale as Shakespeare’s effort to 
refute the notion that jealousy is a rock-bottom level of human motivation.
 20 See Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 194–5.
 21 Cavell’s way of describing the tension is this: “Chaos seems to have come 
again; and what chaos looks like is the inability to say what exists; to say 
whether, so to speak, language applies to anything.” Cavell, Disowning 
Knowledge, 197.
 22 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 203
 23 For a framework within which to at least begin thinking about such issues, 
see my Love as Human Freedom.
 24 See Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 194–5.
 25 For a meditation on the social insufficiency of the maternal 
acknowledgment of sons, in a patriarchal setting, consider that Gertrude’s 
motherly claims on Hamlet are enough to keep him from being 
assassinated by Claudius, enough to keep him and alive and at court, but 
not enough to open much else in the way of a future for either of them.
 26 I am thinking of Gloucester’s remarks about the begetting of Edmund at 
the very beginning of the play. See my discussion in Tragic Conditions in 
Shakespeare: Disinheriting the Globe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009), 84–6.
 27 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila 
Malovanz-Chevallier (New York: Vintage, 2011). Beauvoir’s point is, of 
course, well taken. And yet in Luke’s Gospel, Mary does say, “Let it be so,” 
even as her troubles are registered. Mary did not intend to get pregnant, 
but she nevertheless experiences her maternity not as the result of sexual-
biological reproduction (she is a virgin), but of love.
King Lear, widely regard as the pinnacle of Shakespeare’s achievement 
in the drama, presents us with a vexing paradox. The play usurped the 
position of Hamlet as Shakespeare’s pre-eminent tragedy in the middle 
of the twentieth century. (Two world wars, the threat of nuclear annihi-
lation, and the blasted theatrical landscapes of Samuel Beckett primed 
audiences for the play’s apocalyptic vision.) Yet King Lear poses such 
formidable challenges in the theatre that some of the most prominent 
Shakespeare scholars, critics, and theatre practitioners have doubted 
whether the stage, any stage, can contain its vastness.
Those who engage in such heresy, typically after a surfeit of medio-
cre productions, usually take cover behind one of three prominent crit-
ics: Samuel Johnson, Charles Lamb, and A.C. Bradley. I should know 
because after a string of disappointments with the play in performance, 
I consulted these sceptics for an article I was writing for the Los Angeles 
Times questioning whether the play may indeed be “unreachably sub-
lime.”1 The production under review was Daniel Sullivan’s scattershot 
2014 New York Public Theater staging at Central Park’s Delacorte The-
atre starring John Lithgow, but a career of professional theatregoing had 
left me well stocked with examples.
Johnson’s famous misgivings about the ending of King Lear (“I might 
relate that I was many years ago so shocked by Cordelia’s death I know 
not whether I ever endured to read again the last scenes of the play till 
I undertook to revise them as an editor”)2 are sometimes dismissed as a 
fussy Shakespearean footnote, but this was hardly an off-the-cuff remark. 
Aware of the artistic arguments against Nahum Tate’s adaptation, which 
supplanted Shakespeare’s tragedy with a happier version that was to 




unable to dismiss his reservations: “A play in which the wicked prosper, 
and the virtuous miscarry, may doubtless be good, because it is a just 
representation of the common events of human life: but since all rea-
sonable beings naturally love justice, I cannot easily be persuaded that 
the observation of justice makes a play worse; or, that if other excellen-
cies are equal, the audience will not always rise better pleased from the 
final triumph of persecuted virtue.”3 Johnson wasn’t arguing simply from 
the standpoint of the delicate sensibilities of his theatregoing contempo-
raries; he was aware that hardier Elizabethan audiences had made King 
Leir, an earlier and more conventional version of the drama, popular 
enough for Shakespeare to attempt his own radical reworking of it. Com-
mercial success and artistic merit are hardly coterminous, but Johnson 
was unable to dismiss enduring qualities of dramatic satisfaction.
Charles Lamb thought the glory of King Lear was intellectual and 
could be corrupted only by what he called the “contemptible machinery” 
of the theatre.4 Lamb held early nineteenth-century British stagecraft in 
low regard. But he questioned whether the character of Lear could be 
represented on even an ideal stage. “So to see Lear acted – to see an old 
man tottering about the stage with a walking-stick, turned out of doors by 
his daughters in a rainy night, has nothing in it but what is painful and 
disgusting.”5 For Lamb, the “tamperings,” and by this he means Tate’s 
audience-pandering revisions (the romantic scenes between Edgar and 
Cordelia, the happy ending for Lear and his good daughter) prove to 
him that this “hard and stony” play is “beyond all art.”6 “On the stage 
we see nothing but corporeal infirmities and weaknesses, the impotence 
of rage: while we read it, we see not Lear, but we are Lear – we are in his 
mind, we are sustained by a grandeur which baffles the malice of daugh-
ters and storms.”7 In short, the only way to know King Lear is to commune 
with the play privately in one’s study.
Finally, A.C Bradley, in his published lectures on King Lear, pon-
dered the reasons “Shakespeare’s greatest” tragedy is the least popular 
of the “famous four.”8 Bradley’s lectures were published in 1904, long 
before Peter Brook and Jan Kott helped us to recognize Shakespeare as 
Beckett’s contemporary. Boldly contending that King Lear is “too huge 
for the stage,” Bradley located “the peculiar greatness” of the play in 
its immense scope, “the mass and variety of intense experience which 
it contains.”9 Thus, in his view, “its comparative unpopularity is due, 
not merely to the extreme painfulness of the catastrophe, but in part 
to its dramatic defects,” which are a consequence of the play’s appeal 
“to a rarer and more strictly poetic kind of imagination.”10 Bradley’s 
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case, synthesizing the objections of Johnson and Lamb, offers the most 
comprehensive critique of the play’s stage-worthiness, even if it fails to 
anticipate how revolutions in twentieth- century stagecraft wrought by 
modernism and postmodernism might open new possibilities for theatri-
cal confrontation.
To summarize these historic objections, King Lear eludes us in the the-
atre because (1) the unwieldy plot presents formidable dramatic road-
blocks; (2) the ending rebuffs our moral wishes; (3) performance can 
only debase the play’s intellectual and poetic grandeur. These points 
are sometimes indulgently entertained before they are dismissed as 
examples of antiquated thinking that have no relevance to our ostensi-
bly braver age. Yet anyone courageous enough to undertake staging the 
play would be advised to spend some time contemplating the theatrical 
qualms of these scholarly critics, who not only stood in awe of Shake-
speare’s genius but also helped us to better appreciate its peculiar linea-
ments in King Lear.
Kenneth Tynan, who as drama critic for the Observer and the New Yorker 
had the opportunity to see the greatest twentieth-century actors tackle 
Lear, once described the play as “a labyrinthine citadel, all but impreg-
nable.”11 In a 1953 review of Donald Wolfit’s performance, he memora-
bly compared the challenge of playing Lear in “the last unearthly act” to 
landing “as it were by parachute on the top of Parnassus.”12 My last major 
Lears – Lithgow in Sullivan’s Shakespeare in the Park production; Glenda 
Jackson in Deborah Warner’s Old Vic production; and Antony Sher in 
Gregory Doran’s Royal Shakespeare production – all, understandably, 
fell short of this level of daredevil athleticism. Anthony Hopkins, in the 
attenuated BBC television production, delivered a savage performance 
of excerpts that, were it not for the slick contemporary design, might 
have resembled a nineteenth-century actor-manager’s spotlighted stroll 
through the tragedy.
Sullivan’s production corroborated Bradley’s view of the play as being 
too vast for the stage. Bradley, of course, wasn’t referring to the drama’s 
length (Hamlet, Richard III, Antony and Cleopatra and Othello are all lon-
ger) as much as its poetic scale. Sullivan’s revival suggested that King Lear 
may be too logistically cumbersome for the inflexible producing con-
fines of the American theatre. Simply put, the four-week rehearsal allot-
ment of the typical non-profit theatre isn’t sufficient to prepare a cast for 
the monumental task of scaling King Lear. Sullivan clearly didn’t have 
adequate time to thread his disparate actors into a unified company. 
How could he be expected to rigorously probe the text with them line 
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by resonantly ambiguous line? The ensemble was overmatched by the 
demands of Shakespeare’s mind and music. At the centre was Lithgow, 
a supremely intelligent actor, working exceedingly hard to live up to this 
casting opportunity in a production that was unfortunately too caught 
up in its own survival to become more than a prestigious acting credit on 
a veteran actor’s résumé.
The Warner and Doran productions, employing actors more con-
versant with Shakespearean diction, stumbled in different ways. The 
meeting of modern stagecraft and early-modern dramaturgy seemed 
unsettled in both revivals, as though the directors were grappling on the 
fly with how to produce the play in our post–Peter Brookian universe. 
Warner designed her approach around her star, a two-time Oscar- winner 
who had resumed her theatrical career after more than two decades 
in politics to play the title role. Jackson’s early stage career included 
Brook’s landmark 1964 production of Marat/Sade, and it appeared as 
if Warner were vying for a similar mélange of Brecht’s epic theatre and 
Artaud’s theatre of cruelty. There was detachment, marked by gestural 
italics, which over time transmuted into raw anguish, but not in a way 
that was easy to emotionally or aesthetically parse. Warner’s boldness 
too often came across as busyness, draining the tragedy of a good deal 
of the angry pathos generated by the production’s fiery star. Jackson, 
when I interviewed her in New York while she was performing in Edward 
Albee’s Three Tall Women on Broadway, pointedly described Warner’s 
direction as “fashionable.” But the octogenarian actor is not growing 
less risk-averse: she took another crack at the role in a 2019 Broadway 
production directed by Sam Gold, an American auteur whose freewheel-
ing approach to classics gave Warner’s vogueishness a run for its money.
At the RSC there were signs of disconnection between the director 
(Doran) and his lead actor (Sher), who happen to be marital partners. 
Sher’s language-centred approach to playing Lear shone a spotlight on 
his own fluency. This was above all a beautifully articulated, if at times 
theatrically barnstorming, performance. Curiously though, as the play 
wore on, Doran seemed to become more tantalized by silences than 
Shakespearean sounds. As Lear’s losses mounted, the production opted 
for a kind of Beckettian dishabille. A barren tree reminiscent of the one 
in Waiting for Godot shifted the theatrical period from the late nineteenth 
to the mid-twentieth century. Brook’s landmark staging of King Lear cast 
its mammoth shadow, but instead of Paul Scofield’s archaic majesty there 
was Sher’s elocutionary finesse. The production, operating at cross- 
purposes, failed to arrive at a détente between actor-manager and auteur.
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Once again King Lear overwhelmed its interpreters, though to their 
credit these directors didn’t throw up the white flag in the way of Rich-
ard Eyre’s television presentation, which was curtailed for the short-
ened attention spans of viewers and the privileged schedules of screen 
stars. The experimental push of the stage productions seemed at least 
to be reckoning, however unevenly, with some of the issues raised by 
Johnson, Lamb, and Bradley. The expectation of poetic justice is no 
longer ingrained, but what are the challenges that even the most jaded 
modern audience confronts in a play that so ruthlessly withholds con-
solation? Does Lear’s journey need to be filtered through a contempo-
rary lens (Brecht, Beckett, Artaud, Brook, or perhaps some postmodern 
mélange?) for it to resonate in a theatrical era so far removed from 
Shakespeare’s own? As Brook observed in his seminal treatise The Empty 
Space, “If you just let a play speak, it may not make a sound.”13 Say what 
you will about the erratic nature of Warner’s and Doran’s productions, 
they recognized that Shakespeare’s genius requires contemporary 
mediation.
Directors are still sorting out how to bring the shifting vocabularies 
of the modern theatre to an earlier tradition that was itself in a state of 
flux. King Lear is a Jacobean tragedy written by the reigning master of the 
Elizabethan form. Much of the trouble we continue to have in meeting 
the work on stage is built into the playwriting. Shakespeare was defying 
precedent. His revisions of earlier versions of the King Lear story sug-
gest his own radical thrust. In King Leir, for example, there is no Fool or 
Gloucester subplot, madness isn’t a central theme, and Lear and Corde-
lia aren’t restored to happiness. Shakespeare was testing what the stage 
could aesthetically, morally, and emotionally withstand, and we are still 
daunted by his daring.
In the harrowing scene between Gloucester and Lear, the allegori-
cal encounter between a blind man and a madman, there is a hint of 
just how conscious Shakespeare was of his experiment. Edgar, upon 
seeing Lear in his ravaged state, mutters, “Oh thou side-piercing sight” 
(4.6.85).14 Lear’s next line, “Nature’s above art in that respect” (4.6.86), 
is a response to his own previous utterance, “No, they cannot touch me 
for coining. I am the King himself” (4.6.83–4). But the juxtaposition tells 
another story – that of a dramatist who is challenging himself to go fur-
ther than he’s gone before. Shakespeare depicts not what we have been 
conditioned to expect from drama but what the tragedy of life in due 
course teaches us all: a truth “above” or exceeding what art has hitherto 
deemed permissible to share.
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It’s important to bear in mind that Johnson and Lamb would have had 
occasion to see only versions of the play as reworked to some degree by 
Tate, and even Bradley would likely not have had many opportunities 
to encounter an unadulterated version of Shakespeare’s tragedy. They 
understood the magnitude of Shakespeare’s accomplishment as keen 
readers while doubting as theatregoers the stage’s capacity to accommo-
date the work’s immense poetic scope. I have been fortunate enough to 
see the play performed numerous times in versions that, however much a 
mishmash of quarto and folio texts, strove to be faithful to Shakespeare’s 
ruthless vision. Although I have yet to encounter a production that can 
live up to the exhilaration of my own periodic confrontations with the 
play as a solitary reader, I find the case for theatrical viability made by 
Harley Granville-Barker to be especially cogent. A playwright, direc-
tor, and critic who combined a knowledge of practical stagecraft with 
a scholar’s textual attentiveness, Granville-Barker begins his irreplace-
able preface to King Lear by confronting the classic arguments against 
the drama’s stage-worthiness. He feints a concession to the longstanding 
complaints: “It is possible that this most practical and loyal of drama-
tists did for once – despite himself, driven to it by his unpremeditating 
genius – break his promise and betray his trust by presenting to his fel-
lows a play, the capital part of which they simply could not act. Happily 
for them, they and their audiences never found him out.”15 Granville-
Barker, who recognized a consummate man of the theatre when he saw 
one, explains that Shakespeare relies “very naturally upon his strongest 
weapon, which by experiment and practice, he has now, indeed, forged 
to an extraordinary strength and suppleness besides: the weapon of dra-
matic poetry.”16
Granville-Barker isn’t contesting the difficulty of staging King Lear. He 
is defending the feasibility of the project. How do you create a storm 
onstage without falling into the cheapening theatrical effects frowned 
upon by Lamb and Bradley? By concentrating on the language, on 
“the music and imaginative suggestion,” and by above all trusting in 
the synergy of image and character.17 As for Lear’s trajectory, which 
has proven so defiant to actors, Granville-Barker calls our attention to 
the way Shakespeare’s canny plotting avoids the obvious traps of anti-
climax after the first act and audience exhaustion midway through the 
play. The working in of the “lower-pitched theme of Edmund’s treach-
ery,”18 Granville-Barker observes, helps to vary the intensity of the storm 
scene and its immediate aftermath. Careful scrutiny of the text reveals 
that Lear’s movement from “malediction to martyrdom” is motivated 
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by Shakespeare “in terms of humanity, and according to the rubric of 
drama.”19 Granville-Barker points to Lear’s line “O! Reason not the 
need” as a turning point in “the abandoning of the struggle and embrac-
ing of misfortune” – a crucial juncture in the audience’s relationship to 
a character who hitherto hasn’t done much to win over our sympathies.20 
When uncertain how to theatrically proceed, Granville-Barker urges 
a closer inspection of the text, which was written by a playwright who 
understood only too well the myriad ways actors could be led astray and 
posted discreet signs to set them right.
The deep reading this requires, however, is part of the practical dif-
ficulty of performing King Lear. The logistics of contemporary produc-
ing militate against the kind of interpretive rigour Granville-Barker 
prescribes. There simply isn’t enough time to thread a company of dis-
parate performers into a seamless ensemble. What’s more, there aren’t 
many directors today who can match Granville-Barker’s critical acumen, 
textual sensitivity, and fluency in Shakespearean dramaturgy – or lead-
ing actors equipped to take such direction. But the goal is theoretically 
achievable. Have I given up hope of encountering a production that can 
at least match, if not transcend, my experiences as an eternal student of 
the play? Not while Mark Rylance, the greatest of contemporary Shake-
speareans, is still around.
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